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ABSTRACT 
 
THE DEMOGRAPHY OF MODERN SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
Arun S. Hendi 
Irma T. Elo 
 This dissertation examines three contemporary social phenomena—globalization, 
the rise of secondary and tertiary education, and dramatic changes in marriage and 
divorce—and their relation to key demographic processes. This set of topics is purposely 
broad, in order to demonstrate the importance of interlinkages between demography and 
the social world. Classical demographic techniques can be extended to provide a toolkit 
through which one can investigate and provide insight into a diverse set of social 
processes. 
 Chapter I examines the relationship between globalization and contemporary 
fertility transitions. Fertility transitions have been studied since the inception of the field 
of demography, but we still have a limited understanding of how they arise, progress, and 
diffuse across populations. I test the theory that since 1960, global normative forces led to 
fertility transitions in many developing countries. I show that countries that are more 
connected through the global network have converged in fertility. In particular, poor 
countries engaged in trade with rich countries have converged towards the fertility rates 
of their rich trade partners. 
 Chapter II considers how the changing educational distribution in the United 
States has shaped educational differentials in life expectancy. Though educational 
gradients in longevity have widened since 1990, many have questioned whether this 
widening is due to people with less than high school becoming a smaller, increasingly 
select group. I use a composition-adjusted life expectancy measure to show that much of 
the change in education-specific life expectancy can be attributed to changing educational 
composition. Adjusting for compositional change shows that life expectancy gradients 
have not widened by nearly as much as we thought. 
 Chapter III traces out the history of American marriage since 1960. I develop and 
extend two-sex models of the marital life cycle to quantify how changes in marriage, 
divorce, mortality, and assortative mating have shaped marital life cycles. I find that there 
has been an educational divergence in marriage and divorce, and demonstrate that much 
of the truncation in marriage can be attributed to later age at marriage and higher rates of 
divorce, but is partly offset by lower mortality and more extensive marital sorting. 
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Chapter I. Globalization and Contemporary Fertility Transitions 
Introduction 
 The past half century produced immense changes in global organization, 
including rapid growth in international trade, regional integration, and participation of 
nation-states in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and agreements. Globalization 
forged links between individuals, communities, and nation-states, which in turn increased 
the cross-border flows of goods, services, information, technologies, and people. These 
new connections generated social change by bringing communities on opposite ends of 
the global network into contact with foreign concepts and cultures. This intensification of 
cross-national exchange led to the diffusion of many beliefs and practices, including the 
adoption of international standards (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002), democracy 
(Torfason and Ingram 2010; Wejnert 2005), cultural practices (Kaufman and Patterson 
2005), higher education (Schofer and Meyer 2005), and market-oriented reforms (Henisz, 
Zelner, and Guillén 2005). 
Over this same time period, we also witnessed dramatic changes in fertility, with 
the majority of developing nations undergoing transitions from high to low fertility 
(McNicoll 1992). Much of the research on fertility has focused on how within-country 
changes drive fertility declines. The large body of work arising out of the modernization 
paradigm has documented the negative association between indicators of socioeconomic 
development and fertility (Hirschman 1994; McNicoll 1992; Notestein 1945). But 
globalization also has effects: the structure of the global economy and polity patterns the 
uptake of norms and schemas impinging on fertility. The extant literatures on networks 
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and globalization have explored the pathways between the world polity and the adoption 
of national population policies (Barrett 1995; Barrett, Kurzman, and Shanahan 2010; 
Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997); smaller networks (e.g., village gossip networks) and 
how they shape the development of local fertility norms (Kohler, Behrman, and Watkins 
2001); and the adoption of family-oriented policies (Castles 2003). However, researchers 
have not yet examined the impact of political and economic globalization on fertility 
itself. 
This paper contributes by applying the world society approach to fertility itself: I 
examine how globalization structures fertility change across countries. Where prior 
studies have focused on changes in countries over time, I extend the theoretical and 
methodological approaches by considering changes between and among pairs of 
countries that constitute the global network. This approach can be generalized beyond 
fertility outcomes to study how exchange partners influence their neighbors. In both the 
theoretical framing and empirical analyses, I operationalize concepts from the Theory of 
Conjunctural Action introduced by Johnson-Hanks, Bachrach, Morgan, and Kohler 
(2011). The findings suggest that contemporary fertility convergence is partly driven by 
the normative diffusion of schematic and material structures through the global network 
of international organizations and trade. Bilateral trade, IGO ties, and regional trade 
blocs, three institutional arrangements seemingly irrelevant for fertility, thus structure 
fertility convergence across countries. 
Fertility and Global Institutional Structure 
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Following the Second World War, nation-states throughout the world began to 
experience unforeseen fertility declines. While developed Western countries had long 
since begun their fertility transitions, this was a new phenomenon for non-Western 
European countries and what we now call the developing world (Bongaarts and Watkins 
1996). Demographers, sociologists, and economists were quick to notice the declines and 
theorized that the standard set of demographic transition theories offered the most likely 
explanation: these countries were modernizing and developing economically, and this 
transition to modernity in turn led to fertility declines (Notestein 1945). The 1970s and 
1980s, however, introduced doubt. Fertility scholars began to suspect that the intersection 
of ideational and structural variables played a greater role than previously thought 
(Caldwell 1976; Mauldin and Berelson 1978; Watkins 1986, 1987). The general 
consensus among fertility scholars today is that classical socioeconomic and rational 
choice theories of fertility failed to account for the onset of fertility declines, producing 
inconsistent results at best (see Cleland and Wilson 1987; Mason 1997). Variables 
indexing development explained only part of the fertility declines. New theoretical 
frameworks stressed the role of ideational factors in explaining family change. 
Theoretical models of diffusion, ideational fertility, and social interaction hold 
that individuals, communities, and nation-states interact with each other, spreading 
information, ideas, and technology regarding contraception and fertility ideals (Bongaarts 
and Watkins 1996; Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Thornton 2005). Diffused ideas and 
technologies are received and reinterpreted, gaining new meaning in different contexts 
and impelling or constraining actions pertaining to fertility choice. Studies have stressed 
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the role of information and mass media in shaping thoughts regarding family limitation 
(Montgomery and Chung 1994; Potter et al. 1998; Westoff and Koffman 2011). 
Recently, these frameworks were unified by Johnson-Hanks et al. (2011) in their 
Theory of Conjunctural Action (TCA). TCA explains variation in fertility and family 
variables by considering the intersection of virtual and perceptible structures. The 
primary building blocks of TCA are “schemas” and “materials.” Schemas are unobserved 
mental maps or scripts, defined as “ways of perceiving and acting through which we 
make sense of the world and motivate our actions” (Johnson-Hanks et al. 2011: 2). They 
are created and altered over time through interaction, perception, and comprehension in a 
path-dependent process. Schemas thus reflect the social, psychological, and physical 
environments in which individuals and populations are embedded. Materials are “the 
objects, performances, and organizations that sediment schemas in the perceptible world” 
(p. 8). They instantiate schemas by introducing and enforcing them in the realm of social 
action. Structure is thus formed and reshaped by the interaction of existing schemas with 
the introduction of new material elements. 
In the context of global fertility change, schemas are macro structures that emerge 
at the nation-state level. Nation-states are the domain of national culture and institution-
building, so schemas reflect the symbolic elements, beliefs, and institutions of the nation-
state. Schemas can change in the course of social interaction (Boli and Thomas 1999; 
Meyer et al. 1997; Thornton et al. 2012). Throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century, nation-states were confronted with a series of conjunctures wherein they faced 
the prospect of increased interaction with other countries. Nation-states interact on the 
global stage through exposure to material elements like consumer goods, media, and 
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national institutional arrangements. These material elements may directly affect family 
size, as in the case of contraceptive technology and family planning programs. But 
material exchange can also affect family size through its impact on schematic structures, 
which in turn are reflected in policy and social action. One example is the importation of 
foreign films and advertisements which depict two-child families. While these media may 
not directly cause people to have a certain family size, they can act through normative 
change to affect how people perceive family structure. Thus, in societies where family 
size was not a conscious consideration (i.e., it was “left up to God”), material exchange 
can reshape how people think about fertility and family limitation (van de Walle 1992). A 
second example deals with changing understanding of the life course: completing high 
school or college has become normative in many countries due to schematic change, and 
this in turn has led to delayed marriage and lower fertility. 
Global institutions are the primary links between nation-states and thus are prime 
candidates for channels of social interaction and schematic diffusion. The global network 
refers to the set of nation-states, which are nodes in the network, connected to each other 
through various institutions and organizations embodying these institutions, including 
trade, regional blocs, and intergovernmental organizations and agreements. There is also 
a spatial aspect to the network—countries with similar characteristics like income or 
shared language are considered to be closer to each other. One can think of the global 
network as being embedded in a multidimensional space of characteristics of the 
countries (Berry, Guillén, and Hendi 2014). Participation in global institutions and the 
characteristics of nation-states are constantly evolving, path-dependent, and mutually 
dependent. Increasing connectedness in the global network can result in greater exchange 
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of materials and schemas that impinge on fertility. For example, Figure 1 plots the total 
fertility rate and trade as a percentage of GDP for the whole world over the past half 
century, showing that not only do the two variables follow similar trajectories, but also 
that the concavities of the two graphs change at similar points in time. Changes in the 
intensity of trade occur at roughly the same times as changes in the intensity of the global 
fertility decline. 
The logic of global capitalism and globalization more broadly have sustained 
interaction between nation-states built in, so diffusion of schemas through globalization is 
understood to be a long-term phenomenon. Thus, as nation-states become increasingly 
connected to the global network, their fertility rates become more similar to those of 
nation-states to which they are connected. Globalization structures the global network, 
and thus determines which schemas and materials get taken up and where. 
Trade, IGOs, and Regional Trade Blocs 
The central question in this article is whether increased connectedness between 
two countries results in the convergence of their fertility rates. Connectedness is 
embodied in material exchange. 
One specific vehicle for material exchange at the nation-state level is bilateral 
trade (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). Bilateral trade is the exchange of goods and services 
across national borders. Modern macroeconomic theories predict that trade results in 
increasing fertility differentials between countries. Galor and Mountford (2006), for 
example, argue that countries respond to gains from trade differently, with some 
reinvesting in human capital and economic growth and others in population growth. This 
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results in a delayed demographic transition for the latter group, thus producing 
divergence in fertility rates between the two types of countries. Conflict theories also 
predict divergence—for example, world-systems theory predicts that trade dependency 
concentrates women’s employment in low-wage and informal labor markets, thus 
increasing the incentive for childbearing (London 1988). These theories do not allow for 
trade to act as anything other than a driver of economic change—it has no social 
meaning. 
By contrast, the TCA perspective would argue that beyond its pure economic 
effects, trade is a vehicle for the transmission of schematic structures embodied in 
material elements. Foreign goods and services often carry with them normative 
implications. A television show produced in a foreign country, for example, may depict 
families with two children or with mothers who work in the formal sector. A dubbed 
television program is therefore not only a form of entertainment—it can sometimes serve 
as a model of social, economic, or demographic behavior. Goods are not acultural. They 
come embedded with ideas which get reinterpreted in the receiving country context 
(McCracken 1986). These ideas embodied in materials need not be directly related to 
fertility. Images of mass consumption may have few direct connections with fertility, but 
in a developing country context they may produce fertility reductions because of 
perceived incompatibilities between high fertility and consumption of luxury goods. 
These indirect effects can eventually feed back to shape schemas. Even seemingly 
innocuous forms of trade might have an effect on fertility. Johnson-Hanks et al. (2011) 
provide the example of a sedan that can only accept two child car seats. Importing sedans 
may decrease the likelihood of a family having more than two children because of the 
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limit to the number of children that can be seated in a sedan. In turn, this material element 
may fuel a feedback effect through normative change, causing transformations in national 
schemas that impinge on fertility. Normative change predicated on schematic diffusion 
leads to convergence. TCA thus produces the following generic prediction: 
Hypothesis 1: Increased trade between two nation-states results in decreased 
differences in their fertility rates. 
This generic prediction, however, can be refined. Not all social interaction 
resulting from trade is created equally—interaction with more powerful or authoritative 
actors may produce greater adoption of schemas than interaction with weaker actors 
(Johnson-Hanks et al 2011). This proposition has its origins in observations of elites 
made by demographers starting in the 1970s (Caldwell 2001; Luke and Watkins 2002; 
Mauldin and Berelson 1978; Nortman 1972). To a great extent, elites control the 
construal of schemas within nation-states. They live in globally-connected cities, 
consume and produce images and stories in the mass media, control or manage industries, 
and are generally at the top of their countries’ status hierarchies. Elites have become 
more connected to and cognizant of the global network over the past half-century, and 
have thus adopted the goals and broad policies associated with socioeconomic 
development. In addition to pressuring the state and broader society for the enactment of 
prescriptions like the adoption of democracy and capitalism, national elites actively 
pursue policies to reduce fertility as a mode of development, for personal gain, and to 
procure foreign aid (Barrett and Tsui 1999; Luke and Watkins 2002). Elites in poorer 
countries look to rich countries as models. In the eyes of these elites, the fact that rich 
countries have low fertility legitimizes the script that fertility declines are a pathway to 
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development. Fertility reductions and accompanying schemas are thus seen by national 
elites and ordinary citizens as necessary for gaining legitimacy on the world stage and for 
transitioning from being less to more developed (Thornton 2005; Thornton et al. 2012). 
The specific actions of elites, including decreasing their own family size, 
increasing access to education and healthcare services, supporting family planning 
programs, and influencing media content, may differ across contexts, but what is relevant 
is the desire to develop and any type of related action. Performances, services, and 
consumption goods imported from rich countries carry with them schemas that impinge 
on fertility. For example, television programs like Friends, imported from the U.S. by 
Indian elites, became popular among young Indians and may propagate schemas 
regarding living arrangements. Young single adults and married couples develop 
aspirations to live independently of their parents. Mid-rise apartment buildings 
proliferating across urban India were partly designed and built by rich-country firms (part 
of trade in commercial services) and fulfill these aspirations for elites and the middle 
class, altering childbearing to more closely resemble that of rich countries. Living in 
apartment buildings, as opposed to farmsteads and multigenerational family homes, limits 
the amount of space available for a family and thus may indirectly reduce fertility, and 
this feeds back to fertility-related schemas (Felson and Solaún 1975). The accompanying 
independence from parents may liberate young married couples from traditional gender 
roles and expectations, including women staying at home and early childbearing.   
Globalization in the form of greater trade with rich countries increases the 
relevance of actors and actions external to the nation-state by amplifying their effect on 
national elites and ordinary citizens. From this perspective, as nation-states become 
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increasingly connected to the global network through trade, they adopt the schemas and 
institutional forms of their rich and powerful trading partners. This refinement thus 
predicts: 
Hypothesis 2: If a non-rich nation-state increases its imports from a rich nation-
state, its fertility rate will move closer to the fertility rate of the rich nation-state. 
Regional trade blocs are organizations consisting of geographically proximate 
countries and are formed to increase trade and mutual understanding among member 
states. Trade blocs reduce tariffs and barriers to capital and labor flow among member 
states. In effect, they can divert trade by incentivizing trade with bloc members above 
trade with states outside of the bloc (Krugman 1991).1 This results in social interaction 
becoming concentrated within the trade bloc relative to social interaction with nation-
states outside of the bloc. From the perspective of TCA, trade bloc formation would lead 
to increased material exchange and diffusion of fertility-related schemas within the bloc, 
thus reducing the differences in fertility rates between member countries. Global 
institution-building in the form of trade bloc formation results not only in increased 
within-bloc trade, but also in greater integration of policies relating to national 
economies. For example, trade blocs in Europe, the Caribbean, West and Central Africa, 
South America, Arabia, Southeast Asia, and Central America all allow for some form of 
visa-free travel, resulting in greater movement of people and ideas. Many of these blocs 
also instituted agreements that called for joint bargaining in global forums on matters of 
                                                           
1
 Note that this trade diversion need not imply stalled gains in the absolute amount of 
trade being conducted. 
11 
 
trade and defense. Trade blocs today are not only attempts to enhance trade, but they are 
also often efforts to increase solidarity and enforce regional scripts. They impose 
cohesion through normative influence. The third hypothesis is thus: 
Hypothesis 3: If a nation-state joins a trade bloc, its fertility will move closer to 
the fertility of the members of the bloc. 
Similar to how the effect of trade on schematic change is asymmetric, some types 
of trade blocs may be more effective at promoting schematic diffusion than others. Trade 
blocs differ qualitatively from one another. Some blocs are free trade areas and allow for 
the free flow of goods and services, while common markets may additionally allow for 
the free movement of capital and labor. Still other trade blocs form monetary unions, 
sharing the same currency and monetary policy across member countries. One 
implication of TCA and theories of ideational fertility is that institutional structures that 
allow for greater material exchange have greater potential for affecting schemas. Free 
trade is thus the property of trade blocs most likely to result in schematic diffusion. While 
allowing for the free flow of labor and capital has the potential to intensify 
communication between labor migrants and their host countries, ethnographic and 
historical accounts have shown otherwise (Castles and Miller 2009; Piore 1979). In 
practice, common markets act as attractors for cheap, unskilled labor, where the labor 
migrants tend to be exploited and segregated from the native population. Thus common 
markets would not add much to schematic exchange, and may even lead to the opposite: 
divergence driven by reinforcement of current schemas. Common currencies and 
monetary policies also are not theorized to substantially increase schematic exchange. 
One possibility is that shared currency may help to culturally unify members of the bloc, 
12 
 
leading to greater uniformity in the types of goods consumed. Together, these arguments 
lead to the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 4: Free trade is the most important trade bloc property for producing 
uniformity in fertility rates within regional trade blocs. Common markets and 
monetary unions will have weaker or no effects on uniformity of fertility within 
blocs. 
A third mechanism for the diffusion of fertility-related behaviors is 
communication through intergovernmental organizations, or IGOs. One key element of 
TCA is identity, or the perpetuation of a self-narrative, and its development through 
social interaction. Meyer (2000) describes identity and models of actorhood in the global 
system of nation-states. From this perspective, IGOs help to construct and communicate a 
common world culture among member states. Actors in this approach are nation-states. 
The rise of the global network was accompanied by widespread acceptance of global 
scripts for different dimensions of social, political, and economic life. Individuals and 
organizations both internal and external to the nation-state are theorized to compel actors 
to adopt legitimated models of actorhood, thus leading to conformity along cultural and 
policy dimensions. 
In the context of fertility, positive assessments of low fertility derive from 
“common models of socioeconomic development” wherein limiting population growth is 
perceived as a necessary part of the path to development. Barrett (1995) describes the 
role of population experts who act through organizations like the United Nations (UN) to 
actively pursue fertility reductions in pre-transition societies. Fertility management is one 
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of the UN Population Fund’s key goals (UN Population Fund 2012). IGOs have 
sponsored major conferences—Bucharest in 1974, Mexico City in 1984, and Cairo in 
1994—all built on the idea that population growth and high fertility are impediments to 
development. These fertility and population growth goals were later coded as goals for 
women’s empowerment. While the adopted models of actorhood may not correspond 
directly to actions aimed at achieving the outcome of lower fertility, fertility declines may 
still occur through associated mechanisms precipitated by the broader acceptance of these 
models. Models of later marriage or higher education may lead to delayed age at first 
birth, which in turn would drive down total fertility. The widespread adoption of higher 
education may reduce family size and is itself fostered by the world-culture spread 
through world polity ties. We therefore expect nation-states that are connected to each 
other through common membership in IGOs to participate in greater material and 
schematic exchange relating to these scripts, thus producing isomorphism through 
normative change. Fertility convergence directly follows from the IGOs’ perpetuation of 
these scripts. This sets up the final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The formation of IGO connections between a pair of nation-states 
will result in a lesser difference between the two countries’ fertility rates. 
Data 
The empirical analysis uses panel data consisting of country-year pairs to generate 
dyadic network data. There are approximately 170 countries under analysis annually from 
1965 to 2009. In a standard cross-country analysis, each row of the data would contain 
data on a particular country in a given year (country-years). In this analysis, each row 
contains data on a particular pair of countries in a given year. The unit of analysis is thus 
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the dyad-year, representing two countries in a given year. If there were no missing data, 
the dataset would thus consist of  − 1 ×  observations, where  is the number of 
countries and  is the number of years in the data (see Appendix A for details on the 
structure of the dataset). The outcome variable of interest is fertility, and it is measured 
using the period total fertility rate (TFR) for each country in each year. The period TFR 
can be interpreted as the number of children a woman could expect to have over her 
lifetime if current rates of childbearing prevailed and if she survived through the end of 
her reproductive years. These TFRs are taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (WDI). TFR is a commonly used measure of fertility 
and is preferred to other measures because it has an intuitive interpretation and it is age-
standardized. Period fertility is the appropriate measure since the mechanism at play 
(schematic and material exchange) is theorized to operate in a period fashion. 
Furthermore, Ní Bhrolcháin (1992) showed that fertility declines within societies are 
simultaneously experienced by women of all childbearing ages. This period character of 
fertility decline implies that period TFR (as opposed to cohort TFR) is the more apt 
measure to use in studying fertility change. Data on countries’ GDP per capita (in 
constant 2000 US Dollars) and total trade as a percentage of GDP also come from the 
WDI. A country’s trade partner is designated as rich if the trade partner has a GDP per 
capita of at least $12,500 in constant 2000 US Dollars (roughly corresponding to the 
World Bank’s definition of high-income countries). The “rich” indicator measures the 
potential for a country to act as a model for others. 
The analysis also employs data on dyadic network relations relating to bilateral 
trade and participation in global institutions. I obtained data from the Correlates of War 
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(COW) project on participation in bilateral trade (Barbieri and Keshk 2012; Barbieri, 
Keshk, and Pollins 2009) and intergovernmental organizations (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, 
and Warnke 2004). These data contain entries that correspond to dyad-year pairs: each 
case in the dataset corresponds to a pair of countries in a given year (e.g., US-Indonesia 
1982). Some of the entries included countries that no longer exist because of mergers 
with other countries or because of dissolution. The latter were listwise deleted. This 
should have minimal impact since only two countries posed this problem. Mergers, as in 
the case of East and West Germany, were handled by combining the constituent countries 
for pre-merger years. For example, total trade for the constructed Germany before merger 
would simply be the sum of total trade for East and West Germany. The final variable 
used in the regression analysis was constructed using the bilateral trade data and is equal 
to the percentage of total imports coming from each trade partner. This can be thought of 
as a “trade portfolio” variable.2 
Six IGOs were selected for the analysis based on their size and capacity to effect 
global change: the World Bank; the World Trade Organization (WTO); the United 
Nations (UN); the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Eighteen major trade blocs recognized by the WTO and COW are included and are 
categorized into free trade agreements (FTAs), common markets, or monetary unions 
according to their stated policies (see Appendix Table B1). Indicators for single markets 
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 I also estimated the models using bilateral trade as a percentage of GDP, which led to 
similar results and conclusions. I thus maintain the “trade portfolio” variable 
specification. 
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and political unions are excluded because these types of organizations are still relatively 
rare. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Missing data was not a severe problem with this dataset—the IGO and bilateral 
trade data were missing for relatively few cases. Fertility data was also near complete 
(less than 6% missingness). The TFRs are measured on a five-year basis and interpolated 
by the World Bank for years between measurements. Because fertility tends to move 
fairly smoothly and because this analysis is focused on trends, interpolation is unlikely to 
change the direction of regression coefficients and thus should not bias estimates. GDP 
per capita and trade as a percentage of GDP are missing for some countries in earlier 
years (closer to 1965) and for some less developed countries (less than 13% missingness). 
Given the relatively small number of missing cases, any observations with missing data 
were listwise deleted in this analysis. 
Methods 
 I estimate the effect of the global network structure on fertility convergence by 
employing an autoregressive dyadic diffusion model. Rather than using the country-year 
as the unit of analysis, this model focuses on dyad-years: a pair of countries in a given 
year. Diffusion is often conceptualized as a process through which goods, people, 
institutions, and ideas flow from one place to another, so measuring network relationships 
at the dyadic level is a natural choice. In this analysis, fertility convergence is modeled as 
a function of country-specific structural variables and dyadic network ties. This statistical 
model is therefore explicitly derived from the theoretical model described above. 
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Convergence is a dynamic phenomenon, and as such it is easy to incorrectly 
specify the ordering of events in the theoretical model and thus mistake the direction of 
causality in the statistical model. One way to overcome this potential misspecification 
problem is to estimate effects at different time lags and thus trace out the full dynamic 
response of fertility differences. This strategy, while theoretically appealing, is limiting 
when the time range of data is not exceptionally long. Instead, I adopt a lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) specification. The LDV allows us to interpret the estimated coefficients 
as the effect of changes in the independent variables—that is, the effect of new shocks to 
the structural and network variables. This is desirable since it precludes the ordering 
issues discussed above, allowing for interpretation of the parameters as effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable and not vice versa. 
According to the theoretical model and hypotheses, the difference between any 
two countries’ fertility rates in a given year is a function of the extent of bilateral trade 
and common membership in trade blocs and intergovernmental organizations. Rather 
than focusing only on year  variables, I assume that all past lags of all variables affect 
the outcome. In other words, I explicitly take into account the entire history of dyadic 
network ties and control variables in the model. I assume that the relative importance of 
each variable changes in the same fashion over time. Formally, the statistical model is 
specified as follows: 
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where  refers to country ,  refers to country , and  is the year. The outcome is the 
absolute difference between 
, and 
,, which are country  and ’s respective total 
fertility rates in year . Since material and schematic diffusion reduce differences in 
countries’ fertility rates, this is the appropriate outcome measure indicated by the 
theoretical model. The #th dyadic network tie is represented by ,,$,, which equals 1 if 
countries  and  share the tie in year  and zero otherwise. For example, a given network 
tie variable may represent whether countries  and  are connected through a free trade 
agreement or through common membership in the World Health Organization (WHO). 
,,$, is a measure of the strength of network tie # between countries  and  at time . 
For membership in common organizations, the tie strength is standardized to equal 1. For 
dyadic relations where tie strength varies, ,,$, is a measure of the volume or magnitude 
of the tie. For bilateral trade, for example, ,,$, would be the proportion of country ’s 
total imports coming from country . The %, variables are controls specific to country  
(e.g., GDP per capita).   is a placeholder variable representing the sum of country , 
country , and dyad ,  fixed effects (note that this is the more general derivation, and 
fixed effects can be omitted without effect on the rest of the mathematics). These fixed 
effects sweep out factors that are time-invariant after 1965. ! is a mean-zero error term 
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with constant variance. The & terms (' = 0,… ,∞ are weight parameters (between 0 
and 1) indicating the relative importance of the 'th lag of the variables.  
Using some simplifying assumptions (see Appendix A), Equation (1) can be 
rewritten as: 
	
, − 
,	 = * +  ⋅ 	
,,- − 
,,-	 + 	./,0′ 1 +2$ ⋅ ,,$, ⋅ ,,$,$ +	3 + 3 + 3,
+ 4,, 
where ./,0 is an -dimensional vector of control variables specific to country .  is the 
autoregressive parameter (the first order autoregressive functional form is derived 
following the simplifying assumptions in Appendix A). The 3 terms are fixed effects for 
country , country , and dyad ,  respectively. They subsume time-invariant 
characteristics of countries and dyads, including variables like geographic adjacency, pre-
1965 colonial history and linguistic similarity, and climate. The error term 4,, is mean 
zero with constant variance and exhibits first-order autocorrelation. 
The main parameters of interest are the $’s, which measure the direction and 
magnitude of the effect of network ties on fertility convergence. These parameters can be 
interpreted as the one-year effect of strengthening the network tie by one unit. A negative 
sign indicates that the tie contributes to convergence in fertility levels. 
 This model is preferred to models based on country-year units of analysis because 
it takes dyadic network relationships into account, and dyadic ties are the theoretical 
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objects of interest.3 By incorporating the lagged dependent variable, this model also 
prevents incorrect inference about the ordering of fertility changes and global 
institutional change.4 This feature is helpful since it is unclear a priori whether 
globalization begets fertility change or fertility change begets globalization. One 
difficulty of this setup is that the estimator may be biased in small samples because of 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term. An instrumental 
variable strategy to overcome this potential bias is presented in Appendix C. 
Results 
 Tables 2 and 3 array the estimates of the autoregressive dyadic diffusion model 
described in the Methods section.5 Each of the numbered columns represents a different 
regression specification. GDP per capita and trade openness are controlled for in all 
regressions. The first row of each table contains estimates for the lagged dependent 
variable (LDV) coefficient. The second row in Table 2 shows the effect of bilateral trade 
ties on absolute TFR differences. In Table 3, the second and third rows decompose 
estimates for the effect of bilateral trade on the outcome into effects of trade with non-
                                                           
3
 I present country-year level estimates in Appendix Table B6 since they may be of 
interest to the reader. I omit them in the article since convergence is the theoretical object 
of interest, not absolute fertility rates. 
4
 I tested for optimal lag structure within each dyad pair and found that for the great 
majority of cases, a first order autoregressive model is the optimal specification. Because 
the number of tests was large, I do not present the test statistics here.  
5
 These estimates are based on a pooled OLS estimator. Fixed effects and GMM/IV fixed 
effects estimates are presented in Appendix C as a robustness check and are not 
qualitatively different from the pooled OLS estimates. 
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rich vs. rich countries (from the importing country’s perspective), respectively.6 Rows 
four through six in Table 3 show the coefficient estimates for variables representing 
different types of trade blocs. Finally, the last six rows in Table 3 contain estimates that 
describe the effect of common IGO membership on the outcome. Negative coefficients 
are consistent with the hypotheses: they indicate that a network tie contributes to 
convergence (i.e., a decrease in the difference between the TFRs of two countries). 
Coefficient estimates for country-specific controls for GDP per capita and trade openness 
are not shown but are both negative and statistically significant in almost all regressions. 
The first hypothesis predicted that bilateral trade is a form of social interaction—it 
acts as a vehicle for the diffusion of fertility-related schemas, so increased trade between 
two countries would produce convergence in fertility. Hypothesis 2 stated that this effect 
is highly asymmetric: rich countries exert convergent pressures on their non-rich trade 
partners’ TFRs whereas non-rich countries do not exert convergent pressures on non-rich 
countries. The effect of trade ties on rich countries is unspecified. 
 Regression two in Table 2 shows a negative and statistically significant effect of 
trade (imports from country  as a percentage of country ’s total imports) on dyad-
specific absolute differences in fertility. Trade between two countries is therefore 
associated with convergence in their TFRs. Thus there appears to be support for the 
generic hypothesis 1, since increased trade relations appear to drive countries closer 
                                                           
6
 These estimates are only from a non-rich country’s perspective, since these are the 
countries relevant for Hypothesis 2. The bilateral trade effects for rich countries are 
positive and statistically significant but are not shown here. 
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together in terms of their fertility rates (however, see Appendix C where this finding is 
shown to be sensitive to the model specification). 
I find strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2. I specify a model with a three-
way interaction between country ’s imports from country , whether country  is rich, 
and whether country  is rich. The reported coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of 
a non-rich country increasing trade with a non-rich country or a rich country. The 
findings show that increased trade with a rich country results in fertility convergence 
(Table 3, regressions 1 and 4). Increased trade with a non-rich country does not result in 
convergence. The estimates for regression 4 in Table 3 indicate that a unit increase in the 
trade variable is associated with a year-over-year decline in the difference between the 
two countries’ TFRs of 0.22 children per woman. This is a fairly sizable effect. Many 
less-developed countries (LDCs) currently have TFRs in the range of 4 children per 
woman, so a 0.22 children per woman decrease in the TFR corresponds to a decrease of 
roughly 12% of the difference between a contemporary LDC’s TFR and replacement 
level fertility.7 In summary, I find strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
bilateral trade with rich countries exerts convergent pressure on non-rich countries’ 
fertility rates. 
                                                           
7
 This is an approximation since replacement level fertility, defined as the TFR that 
would make the net reproductive rate (NRR) equal to 1, differs from country to country 
because of mortality differences. I use a TFR of 2.1 children per woman as an 
approximation. 
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 Hypothesis 3 predicted that trade bloc participation, an institutionalized form of 
regional integration, is another channel of social interaction that facilitates fertility 
convergence. Furthermore, hypothesis 4 stated that free trade is the most important 
property of trade blocs in reducing differences in fertility across co-members of trade 
blocs. I analyzed three properties of trade blocs: whether or not the bloc supports free 
trade, whether it includes a common market agreement, and whether it is a monetary 
union. Of these, free trade is predicted to result in the greatest extent of convergence 
because it incorporates a deeper level of material exchange than the other two properties. 
Monetary unions are expected to exert the next greatest amount of convergence. 
Monetary coordination can be accompanied by increased uniformity in the types of goods 
and services consumed by member countries of the monetary union. However, the effect 
of this type of coordination on fertility should be sufficiently weaker than allowing for 
free trade. Common markets, which allow for the free flow of labor and capital, are 
theorized to have the weakest effect. 
 The regression estimates from Table 3 provide support for hypotheses 3 and 4. 
Regressions 2 and 4 both show the same result: free trade agreements result in the 
greatest degree of convergence, while common markets result in fertility divergence. 
Monetary unions lie somewhere in between and yield divergence. While the relative 
ranking of the effects of these three types of blocs matches with the hypotheses, the 
direction of the effects is somewhat surprising. All of the regressions indicate that 
common markets and, to a lesser extent, monetary unions result in a divergence of 
fertility levels between the two countries in the dyad. Taken together, these findings 
indicate that while regional integration can result in fertility convergence, distortive trade 
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and labor policies may act against the free trade effect and hinder schematic and material 
diffusion. If one country in a dyad under common market policies is experiencing fertility 
declines, then restricting ideational diffusion in this manner may produce divergence in 
TFRs between the two countries. Joint monetary policies do not appear to produce 
convergence. These results highlight the importance of material exchange in driving 
fertility convergence, since free trade policies are the only properties of trade blocs 
examined in this analysis that produce convergence. 
 The final set of network ties I examine are common memberships in 
intergovernmental organizations. The third and fourth regressions in Table 3 show that of 
the six IGO ties analyzed, two result in reduction of fertility differences between 
countries. Bilateral ties through the UN and UNESCO both produce within-dyad 
convergence over time in TFRs. The UN, in particular, produces convergence at a 
quicker rate. In contrast to the other IGOs, the World Bank and the World Trade 
Organization fail to produce convergence. While joint participation in the WHO is 
associated with divergence, the magnitude of the effect is quite small. These results 
indicate the differential power of various IGOs to produce normative change relating to 
fertility at the global level. 
 Because of the dynamic nature of the estimated model, we can simulate fertility 
trajectories using stylized data and the estimates from Table 3 (regression 4). Figure 2 
presents four trajectories of absolute TFR differences simulated using various trade 
scenarios. Each trajectory is based on an imaginary country with a GDP per capita in 
1960 of $300 which grows at an annual geometric rate of 6%. It joins the World Bank in 
1967, the UN in 1962, the WHO in 1965, the IMF in 1980, the WTO/GATT in 1990, and 
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the UNESCO in 1963. It joins a free trade agreement with a rich country in 1985. This 
made-up country starts with a TFR of 5.5 children per woman in 1960 and begins to 
engage in a trade relationship with a rich country in the same year. The rich country has a 
TFR in 1960 of 2.1 children per woman, which can roughly be considered “replacement 
level” fertility. The absolute fertility difference between the two countries is allowed to 
change endogenously. There are four separate bilateral trade scenarios. The first (labeled 
T1 in Figure 2) is that the country does not engage in any trade with the rich country 
(i.e., imports from the rich country are zero for the entire 1960-2009 period). In scenario 
T2, it linearly increases its imports from the rich country from 1% to 10% of total imports 
between 1960 and 2009. In T3, imports with the rich country increase from 1% to 20%. 
Finally, in trade trajectory T4, the made-up country increases its imports from 1% to 
30%. T4 thus represents the greatest trade with a rich country scenario, whereas T1 
represents the baseline case of no trade with a rich country. 
Figure 2 plots the absolute TFR differences between the two countries according 
to each trade scenario. The T4 trajectory shows the greatest amount of convergence 
between the two countries. The absolute TFR difference starts at 3.4 children per woman 
in 1960 and declines to 0.20 children per woman by 2009. If we decrease the amount of 
trade with rich countries over time to only 10% (trajectory T2), the absolute fertility 
difference decreases from 3.4 to 1.3 children per woman. While this is smaller than the 
decline in the T4 trajectory, it still indicates a great degree of convergence: a decline in 
the absolute TFR difference of roughly 2.1 children per woman. If we restrict bilateral 
trade so that the first country doesn’t trade with a rich country at all, then we still see 
fertility convergence but not to as great a degree. The absolute TFR difference between 
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the two countries decreases from 3.4 to 1.8 children per woman. This confirms the idea 
that trade is an important channel of social interaction that can lead to fertility changes. In 
the T2 and T4 scenarios (i.e., the lower and higher trade variants) bilateral trade accounts 
for roughly 26% and 50% of the convergence in fertility, respectively. The T1 results also 
underscore the fact that while trade and globalization are vital to understanding 
contemporary fertility transitions, they do not explain the entirety of fertility 
convergence. Table 4 shows the absolute and percent contributions to fertility 
convergence for each facet of globalization. Trade with rich countries, economic 
development, and participation in trade blocs all make contributions between 19% and 
26%. Joint participation in the UN, UNESCO, and WHO contributes to 45% of 
convergence, but this is cancelled out by the effect of participation in the WTO, IMF, and 
World Bank. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This article employs a novel methodology and dataset to highlight the importance 
of global institutions in mediating schematic and material exchange at the global level, 
thus driving change in nation-states’ fertility rates through normative influence. Trade 
and economic change do matter—just not in the way we thought they did. Classical 
theories of fertility decline emphasized countries' transitions to modernity and the role of 
economic growth and development in driving fertility change (Notestein 1945). Recent 
work has moved in another direction, offering up the hypothesis that ideational diffusion 
is what really matters (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Cleland and Wilson 1987; Thornton 
2001, 2005). This article confirms that elements of both are true: beyond its pure 
economic effects, global institution-building is a social process. It is a form of social 
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interaction, and it embodies material and schematic diffusion. People, states, and 
societies take cues from materials circulated through trade and global institutions and 
reshape their schemas that impinge on fertility accordingly. Even after controlling for 
path dependence in fertility differences, socioeconomic development, dyad fixed effects 
(including factors like colonial history, linguistic similarity, and geographic proximity), 
and trade openness, I find that joint participation in free trade agreements, the UN, and 
UNESCO, and trading with a rich country lead to reduced fertility differences between 
the two countries. The trade effect is asymmetric, with non-rich nation-states converging 
with rich nation-states in the global network. 
Entry into IGOs like the UN that promote global scripts impinging on fertility 
yields convergence in fertility rates, whereas entry into IGOs that do not directly deal 
with fertility-related schemas, like the WTO, does not. Free trade agreements lead to 
fertility convergence whereas common markets and monetary unions yield divergence. 
The year-over-year magnitude of these effects, while still sizeable, is somewhat smaller 
than the trade effect. This may indicate the greater power of trade, which is a more direct 
form of social interaction, to effect fertility change compared to other institutions that are 
out of the hands of the average person. Trade is something that effects change on a much 
more personal level. Unlike with IGOs, people (whether knowingly or not) participate in 
trade daily and thus are directly exposed to this powerful channel of social interaction. 
One important qualification is that global network connections are not the only factors 
that explain fertility change; rather, globalization is one factor that has played an 
important role in affecting schemas that impinge on fertility.  
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These results confirm the macro-level mechanisms theorized by Bongaarts and 
Watkins (1996), Caldwell (2001), and Johnson-Hanks et al. (2011), among others, who 
write that globalization can lead to fertility transitions through development and a variety 
of international linkages or channels of communication. All of the hypotheses tested in 
this article are consistent with the idea that normative isomorphic pressures are at work in 
driving fertility convergence. The above results are thus in accord with recent findings 
that developmental idealism is widespread in both developing and developed countries 
(Thornton et al. 2012). However, these results also show that the effect of globalization 
on fertility and convergence more broadly is not unidirectional as predicted by a number 
of theories of social change (Meyer 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Notestein 1945). While the 
formation or strengthening of some types of institutional ties leads to convergence, this 
effect is not uniform. Ties through monetary organizations do not appear to yield 
convergence. Trade has varied effects depending on the nature of the trade relationship, 
indicating a limit to the ability of global ties to produce convergence. This article 
provides support for the Theory of Conjunctural Action as a framework for studying 
fertility change. It tests and refines aspects of TCA: we learned that on the global level, 
diffusion through trade is directed, with non-rich countries adopting the fertility 
characteristics of rich countries, albeit through different means. Studying the relationship 
between globalization and fertility is important because we do not yet know whether the 
global fertility transition was initiated by the same forces for many countries, or if there 
were different mechanisms for different countries. Because the growth of the global 
network coincided with the worldwide fertility transition, globalization is a strong 
candidate as a vehicle for the spread of fertility declines internationally (Caldwell 2001). 
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In terms of policy, one might be tempted to interpret these results as prescribing 
increased trade between rich and poor countries to facilitate fertility convergence. This is 
a mistaken construal of the above results, since it does not take into account the fact that 
trade is, to a great extent, a voluntary exchange. People and nation-states do not blindly 
accept the constraints of structure. Rather, they are social actors with agency who 
actively take part in defining their interaction on the global stage. While carefully 
fostering a trade relationship might yield convergence, forcing a developing country into 
a trade relationship is unlikely to result in fertility convergence. In other words, these 
results may not be externally valid. There are also examples of countries that commenced 
fertility transitions seemingly independent of trade ties (for example, Iran in the 1980s). 
What these results do say is that fertility change seems to have been partially patterned by 
the process of integration into the global economy and polity. 
The findings presented here suggest further work should be undertaken on the 
linkages between globalization and demographic processes. One limitation of the present 
study is that it could not take into account the specific actions of organizations or the 
differences in types of goods and services traded. Dummy variables and dollar or 
percentage amounts may not adequately capture the effects of global institutions on 
fertility. Future studies should examine the causal impact of the spread of specific 
materials across borders, whether through trade, IGOs, or regional trade blocs. This will 
help elucidate the meso and micro level mechanisms that drive schematic change 
throughout the world. Future studies can also extend the theoretical and methodological 
frameworks presented here to account for effects based on relationships spanning 
multiple degrees of separation. Even if two countries are not directly connected they may 
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still influence each other through higher-order network relationships. Finally, TCA 
emphasizes the fact that the distribution of schemas across social space is uneven. 
Empirical studies should therefore also consider how globalization may drive inequality 
in fertility outcomes within countries. Most importantly, future studies should consider 
the interaction of material and schematic structures rather than considering each in 
isolation.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for WDI and Correlates of War Data, 1965-2009 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Total Fertility Rate 984083 4.0 2.0 1.1 9.2 
Absolute TFR Difference 958012 2.1 1.6 0.0 7.9 
Bilateral Trade 1016385 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 
Rich 1016385 0.2 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Common Market 1016385 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 1016385 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
Monetary Union 1016385 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 
World Bank 838137 0.8 0.4 0.0 1.0 
UN 838137 0.9 0.2 0.0 1.0 
WHO 838137 1.0 0.2 0.0 1.0 
IMF 838137 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 
UNESCO 838137 0.9 0.3 0.0 1.0 
WTO 838137 0.9 0.4 0.0 1.0 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 887817 6136.6 8800.2 57.8 108111.2 
Trade Openness (trade as % of GDP) 887525 74.4 47.0 0.2 445.9 
Note: All summary statistics not pertaining to the dyad refer to country  within dyad , , except for “Rich”, which refers to country . 
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Table 2. Autoregressive Dyadic Diffusion Model Estimates for Absolute TFR Differences 
 (1) (2) 
LDV 0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
Bilateral Trade  
 
-0.071*** 
(0.006) 
N 801389 801389 
Note: All tests are two-tailed and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. LDV stands 
for Lagged Dependent Variable. All models include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness of  country . 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 3. Detailed Autoregressive Dyadic Diffusion Model Estimates for Absolute TFR Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LDV 0.995*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.994*** 
(0.000) 
0.995*** 
(0.000) 
Bilateral Trade     
Not Rich/Not Rich 0.017* 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
 
0.015 
(0.011) 
Not Rich/Rich -0.177*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
 
-0.224*** 
(0.010) 
Trade Blocs     
Common Market  
 
0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.023*** 
(0.002) 
Free Trade Area  
 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Monetary Union  
 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
IGOs     
World Bank  
 
 
 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
UN  
 
 
 
-0.020*** 
(0.002) 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
WHO  
 
 
 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.005* 
(0.002) 
IMF  
 
 
 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
UNESCO  
 
 
 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
WTO  
 
 
 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
N 801389 801389 672244 672244 
Note: All tests are two-tailed and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. LDV stands 
34 
for Lagged Dependent Variable. All models include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness of country . 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table 4. Contributions of Forms of Globalization to Fertility Convergence 
Form of Globalization Amount of Convergence 
  Children per Woman  Percent Contribution 
Trade with Rich  0.56  26% 
GDP Growth and Trade Openness  0.40  19% 
Participation in Trade Bloc  0.44  20% 
Participation in IGOs  -0.16  -7% 
WTO+IMF+World Bank  -1.11  -52% 
UN+UNESCO+WHO  0.96  45% 
Residual  0.51  24% 
Total  2.14  100% 
 
Note: These calculations are based on regression 4 in Table 3 and stylized data described in text. Negative quantities indicate that the 
variable contributed to divergence.  
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Figure 1. World Total Fertility Rate and Total Trade, 1960-2010 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
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Figure 2. Simulated Trajectories of Absolute TFR Differences, 1960-2009 
 
Note: T1 through T4 represent four different stylized bilateral trade trajectories, where T4 is the scenario where the most trade occurs 
and T1 is the scenario where zero trade occurs. T2 and T3 are intermediate scenarios. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on regression 4 in Table 3 and stylized data described in text.   
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Chapter II. Trends in U.S. Life Expectancy Gradients: The Role of 
Changing Educational Composition 
Introduction 
A wealth of research over the past four decades has documented enduring 
educational gradients in American mortality (Elo and Preston 1996; Kitagawa and Hauser 
1973; Meara, Richards, and Cutler 2008; Miech et al. 2011). This line of inquiry has 
recently led to claims that the widening gradient in mortality now encompasses actual 
declines in life expectancy among the least-educated non-Hispanic whites (henceforth 
whites) over the past two decades (Olshansky et al. 2012). If true, this could indicate a 
reversal in life expectancy gains spanning more than a century. 
Despite the importance of understanding educational gradients in life expectancy, 
there remain two limitations in contemporary assessments of these gradients. 
First, some studies use dual data sources (e.g., Olshansky et al. 2012)—death 
counts from death certificates and population counts from Census data—to calculate 
education-specific mortality rates. This is problematic when the assumed population at 
risk does not match the population accumulating deaths (Preston and Elo 1995; Rostron, 
Boies, and Arias 2010; Sorlie and Johnson 1996). For example, among those who died in 
1989 and were reported as high school graduates on their death certificates, 38% 
previously self-reported having less than a high school education (Sorlie and Johnson 
1996). This has previously led to overestimates of changes in mortality gradients for 
women(Preston and Elo 1995). The National Center for Health Statistics recommends 
against using dual data sources to compute education-specific mortality estimates above 
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age 64, which is limiting since roughly 84% of deaths occur above this age in the 2008 
U.S. life table (Arias 2012; Miniño et al. 2011). Also, death certificate data are based on a 
non-random sample of the 50 states since not all states record educational attainment on 
death certificates. In 1990, 22 states either did not include an educational attainment item 
on their death certificates or had unacceptably high levels of incompleteness on this 
measure as ascertained by the National Center for Health Statistics. These states 
contained over 63% of the U.S. population in that year. These states are also 
systematically different from other states—Figure B1 in Appendix B shows a map of the 
problematic states, and they align almost exactly with the so-called “Stroke Belt.” 
A better strategy uses survey data linked to mortality follow-up. While such data 
typically excludes young people living on the margins and older institutionalized persons, 
it allows us to make consistent comparisons over time devoid of dual data source bias. 
However, recent studies using follow-up data report highly variable and often inaccurate 
mortality estimates or only report hazard ratios without a baseline hazard (e.g., Masters et 
al. 2012; Montez and Zajacova 2013a; Montez et al. 2011; Rogers et al. 2005, 2010). 
These articles either do not report mortality levels or report mortality rates highly 
discrepant with national estimates of adult mortality. The discrepant results in these 
specific cited studies include mortality rates that lead to life expectancies that are too high 
by over 10 years; probabilities of death that are too high by 30-50%; and age patterns of 
mortality that are roughly correct at ages 25-50 but too low by 40-60% for ages 60-95. 
These errors in estimation are a serious limitation. 
Failing to report a baseline hazard is problematic for two reasons. First, if a study 
doesn’t report mortality levels then there is no way to judge the accuracy of the estimates 
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or to contextualize a specific study in the broader literature, because we cannot compare 
the level of mortality to that reported in other published estimates. Second, focusing on 
hazard ratios alone is problematic since hazard ratios can increase even as absolute 
differences in mortality decrease. This is an important point that is often ignored in the 
literature. For example, differences in infant mortality between blacks and whites in the 
U.S. have declined over time but the hazard ratio for infant mortality for blacks relative 
to whites has increased over time. Few would argue that we should return to the past 
situation simply because the hazard ratio was lower back then. We need to know both the 
hazard ratio and the baseline hazard to understand the extent of inequality.  
In order to understand the scale of this problem, I conducted a series of replication 
studies. What I found was disheartening—no published studies of educational gradients 
in U.S. mortality have accurately estimated death rates for the post-2000 period. I 
performed a systematic review of journal articles on educational differentials in adult all-
cause mortality to ascertain the completeness and accuracy of previous studies. I searched 
for the keywords “education” AND “mortality” in the Google Scholar database to 
identify relevant studies. Studies that attempted to construct mortality estimates using 
Census data only were excluded since those estimates are affected by migration patterns. 
For each article, I either replicated part of the analysis or compared the estimates to 
published life tables to determine whether they were “ballpark-correct”—that is, if they 
were within the normal range of U.S. mortality. The results of this review are shown in 
Appendix B Table B0 (the green highlighting indicates studies which were of acceptable 
quality). 
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Of 30 studies published since 1989, 8 reported ballpark-correct estimates of age-
standardized death rates, life expectancies, survival probabilities, or age-specific death 
rates. Of those 8 studies, 2 report estimates across the whole age range (25+ years) and 
none report estimates corresponding to the post-2000 period. Seven studies provided 
mortality estimates for the post-2000 period. Of these 7 studies, all reported incorrect 
estimates—5 reported anomalous levels or age patterns of mortality, and 2 used dual data 
sources resulting in incorrect time patterns of mortality. The estimation errors are not 
small. The mortality rates in these seven studies are often off by more than 50%, and thus 
produce life expectancies that are incorrect by several years. Each of these studies aims to 
state whether mortality gradients widened or narrowed over the last couple decades. But 
because the estimates are inaccurate, any conclusion about trends in SES gradients in 
mortality based on these studies would be misleading. Not only is the magnitude of the 
bias in these studies sizeable (for example, mortality rates that produce a 10 year 
overestimate of life expectancy), but the direction of error is inconsistent over time and 
across studies. This means that we cannot arrive at a conclusion about whether gradients 
widened by comparing existing studies. Because of these shortcomings, there are no 
recent and accurate published estimates of education-specific life expectancy at age 25 
(567) for whites. 
A second limitation is that the social categories encompassing the less educated 
have grown increasingly select. The same education category today represents a lower 
segment of the socioeconomic stratum than in the past. Even if mortality was reduced at 
every percentile of the educational distribution, compositional change—changes in the 
distribution of the population across educational categories—can lead to the conclusion 
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that the educational gradient in life expectancy has widened or that the less educated are 
worse off today than in the past. Educational upgrading as a health policy could widen 
the gap in 567 between the lowest and highest education groups simply by making the 
lowest education category even more select. It could also artificially narrow the gap by 
making the highest education category less select. If educational differences are used to 
proxy for inequality, it is more appropriate to use a composition-adjusted measure of 
education to estimate gradients rather than variable, socially-constructed categories like 
“less than high school” or “some college” (Begier, Li, and Maduro 2013; Dowd and 
Hamoudi 2014; Meara et al. 2008; Pamuk 1985; Preston and Elo 1995; Preston 2014). 
This article contributes to the debate by computing accurate education-specific 
life expectancy trends and confidence intervals for whites from 1990-2006 to determine 
whether life expectancy gradients have widened and whether 567 among the least-
educated whites has actually declined. Previous studies have focused on mortality 
inequality at older ages, leaving unclear whether younger-age mortality also plays a role 
(Crimmins, Preston, and Cohen 2011; Ho and Fenelon 2015; Montez and Berkman 2014; 
Montez and Zajacova 2013b; Panel on Understanding Divergent Trends in Longevity in 
High-Income Countries, Committee on Population 2010). I decompose gradients and 
trends into age-specific contributions to determine at which ages the life expectancy 
disadvantage of the least-educated is concentrated. Finally, I estimate composition-
adjusted life expectancy measures to assess the extent to which changes in educational 
gradients in 567 are attributable to changing educational composition. 
Education, Status, and Mortality 
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Education is correlated with mortality because of its role as a marker of status and 
because of the value inherent in education itself. Having higher status is associated with 
lower mortality because status confers more resources and because elements of certain 
status cultures pattern mortality (Elo 2009). Resources associated with status include 
greater knowledge about factors influencing mortality and higher purchasing power to 
procure better health and safer living conditions (Link and Phelan 1995; Phelan, Link, 
and Tehranifar 2010). Culture, which is both the product and unifying element of a status 
group, comprises behaviors, ways of understanding the world, and interaction with both 
other status groups and organizations attempting to appeal to the status culture (e.g., the 
way a status group responds to a cigarette company using cowboys or saxophone-playing 
dromedaries in their marketing). Status groups differ in their cultures, and thus have 
differentials in the prevalence of smoking, exercising, visiting the doctor, completing 
higher education, and taking risks (Ho and Fenelon 2015; Preston 2014). 
The second way that education is correlated with mortality is through the value 
inherent in education itself. Both the content of education and the educational system can 
affect mortality. A formal education often includes instruction on germs, infection, and 
elementary biology, thus endowing the educated individual with greater knowledge of 
infection and body systems and how certain behaviors or risk factors give rise to 
communicable and noncommunicable disease. Schooling also increases literacy and 
numeracy, both of which are required to maintain a well-functioning and healthy life. The 
educational system, on the other hand, provides the student with interaction and with 
experience in navigating bureaucracies and negotiating to achieve a certain goal or 
outcome. Thus, a more educated individual might be better able to navigate a highly-
44 
 
bureaucratic health care system which in turn might lead to better health or greater 
chance of survival. Interaction is important in the sense that it can inculcate a culture that 
is more (or less) beneficial for health. Interaction can also produce network effects: 
having friends or a spouse may lead to better (or worse) health outcomes. All of the 
above mechanisms describe the dense set of causal linkages between education, status, 
and mortality. 
Shifting Education Distributions and Composition Adjusted Life Expectancy 
As stated above, measuring socioeconomic gradients in life expectancy can be a 
tricky business when one relies on a measure of status that is not static with respect to 
time or context. However, if we follow the Weberian construction of status as a relative 
measure (that is, one can only have status, or social honor, in relation to another person or 
group), then we can make some headway. 
We would like to measure change in the relationship between socioeconomic 
status (SES) and life expectancy between two periods. However, we do not observe SES 
and thus use education as a proxy for SES. 
Let’s start with an example. Consider the following population of 8 people in an 
example world with two education categories (“High” and “Low”) and an SES index 
ranging from 1 to 8. We observe each individual’s age at death. 
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Example 1: Longevity by Education and SES in Example World 
Education Low High 
SES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Longevity 60 65 74 78 68 74 80 82 
 
 
In this example world, anyone with SES 5 or greater gets a “High” education while 
everyone else gets a “Low” education. Average longevity for the “Low” group is 69.25 
years and for the “High” group it is 76 years. Twenty years later, the world is repopulated 
with exact clones of this example world. They have the same SES and longevity values. 
The one thing that’s changed is that social norms have shifted so that now people with 
SES 3 or greater are assigned an education value of “High” while people with SES value 
2 or less get assigned a “Low” education. In this new population, the average longevity of 
the “Low” group is 62.5 years and the average longevity of the “High” group is 76 years. 
If we were to use education as a proxy for SES, then we would conclude that not only has 
the SES gradient in longevity widened, but average longevity has actually declined by 
6.75 years among those with low SES. In actuality, the only thing that’s changed is the 
function mapping SES to education. Let’s develop this idea more systematically by 
introducing some assumptions. 
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Assumption 1: 
Assume that in period , education is a strictly increasing function of SES, an 
index that lies between 0 and 1: 
 

 =  ', ' ∈ 90,1: '6 > '- →  '6 >  '- 
 
where ' is the SES percentile and 
 is education. 
 
We wish to measure the change between periods 1 and 2 in life expectancy, 5, 
corresponding to a given level of SES. Since we do not observe SES, we measure life 
expectancy as a function of education: 5
. 
In the extant literature, researchers have assumed that   does not change over 
time. They thus measure the change in the SES-life expectancy relationship as 56
 −
5-
. However, if the relationship between education and SES has changed over time 
then this is not a good estimator, since education 
 corresponds to different SES levels in 
periods 1 and 2. If the relationship between education and SES has steepened—that is, if 
high-SES people are increasingly likely to pursue higher education—then a given level of 
education would correspond to a higher SES in the earlier period than in the later period: 
 -,-
 >  6,-
. We thus impose the following assumption. 
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Assumption 2: 
The relationship between SES and education has grown steeper over time: 
 
 -,-
 >  6,-
. 
 
The estimator of change in the relationship between SES and life expectancy would thus 
yield: 
 56
 − 5-
 = 56 6> − 5- -? 1 
where > < ?. But then this estimate of the change in life expectancy corresponds to two 
different levels of SES rank, > and ?. It is well-understood in the literature on educational 
attainment that the relationship between education and SES has indeed steepened, likely 
as a result of rising credentialism (Collins 1971). 
We would instead like to know the change in life expectancy corresponding to a 
fixed SES, ?: 
 56 6? − 5- -? = 56 A 6 -,-
B − 5-
. 2 
We already have 5-
—it’s just the period 1 life expectancy corresponding to education 
level 
. We thus need only estimate 56 A 6 -,-
B, the period 2 life expectancy 
corresponding to SES ? =  -,-
. We do not know  -,-, but because education in a 
given period is determined entirely by SES rank, we do know  6 ∘  -,-—it is the 
education level that lies at the ?th percentile of the period 2 education distribution: 
 6 ∘  -,-
 = DE,6,-D&? = DE,6,-?, 
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where DE,6 is the period 2 cumulative distribution of education and D& is the cumulative 
distribution of SES. (Since ' is a percentile, D& is a uniform CDF so D&? = ?.) 
Thus, equation 2 reduces to: 
 56 6? − 5- -? = 56 ADE,6,-?B − 5-
. 3 
 
Equation 3 estimates the change in life expectancy specific to a fixed SES value ?. 
Assumption 1 has two components. First, it assumes that SES is a relative 
(ordinal) variable. This is in keeping with the literature on socioeconomic status and 
status more broadly, in which socioeconomic status is only defined for one group in 
relation to another. The second component of Assumption 1 is that education is a strictly 
increasing function of SES. Since we cannot directly measure SES, this is not a testable 
assumption. However, it keeps to the spirit of the literature on SES inequalities in health, 
which typically uses education as a proxy for SES and thus assumes that education is 
positively related to SES. When might this assumption not hold? It is possible that 
education may not always increase as a function of SES—the highest-SES individuals, 
for example, may not be the most educated. Nevertheless, though Assumption 1 may not 
always be true, it seems likely that on average education increases in SES. 
Assumption 2 appears to be more empirical fact than assumption. Several studies 
have theorized and documented evidence of a steepening association between status and 
education (e.g., Collins 1971). The same level of education in period 2 is associated with 
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a lower SES level now than it was in the past. Thus, a high school diploma was 
associated with higher SES levels in the past than it is now. 
Thus far, the discussion of assumptions has been theoretical and has made use of 
exact education 
. However, we do not observe exact level of education in reality, only 
educational credential (less than high school, high school, some college, or college or 
more). We must now introduce some further assumptions about the relationship between 
mortality and the process by which education gets assigned to SES. 
We know that over time, the education distribution shifted to the right. As status 
group competition intensified, people began to attain higher education. Individuals who 
otherwise would have not graduated high school were now getting their diplomas, and 
people who in the past would have only completed high school now attend college. We 
continue with Assumptions 1 and 2, that education is strictly increasing in SES and that 
this relationship has steepened over time, and now introduce a third assumption. 
Assumption 3: 
Let 
G be the education level that defines the cutoff for an educational category. 
For example, it might be the education level (12th grade completion) that lies on 
the boundary between “less than high school” and “high school.” Denote by A 
the set of individuals in period 2 with SES index values between  6,-
G and  -,-
G. We assume that A has the same average level of mortality as the 
education category lying just above 
G in period 2. 
 
Consider the example of the “less than high school” category. Assumptions 1 and 
2 imply that in period 2 the “less than high school” category has lower SES individuals 
than the same category in period 1. In period 1 (1990-1992), people with less than high 
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school had SES values between the 0th and 18th percentile and people with high school 
had SES values between the 18th and 60th percentile. In period 2 (2004-2006), the less 
than high school group had SES values ranging from the 0th to the 9th percentile and the 
high school group had SES values between the 9th percentile and the 42nd percentile. 
Then the set A consists of everyone in period 2 between the 9th and 18th percentile for 
SES. Assumption 3 implies that the average level of mortality in A is equal to the average 
level of mortality among high school graduates in period 2 (those with SES values 
between the 9th and 42nd percentile). In other words, the people in group A are assumed to 
lie in right tail of the life expectancy distribution for people in the 0th-18th percentile of 
the SES distribution. Under Assumption 3, the composition-adjusted life expectancy 
measure introduced in this paper would yield a consistent set of estimates summarizing 
the change in the SES-life expectancy relationship. 
 When might Assumption 3 hold and when might it fail? Typically, Assumption 3 
holds when SES and mortality are imperfectly correlated, so that the education category-
specific life expectancy distributions overlap. One example where it might hold is when 
variables other than SES also determine mortality. Suppose both SES and some variable, 
let’s call it X, determined both mortality and educational upgrading. Individuals who in 
the past would have been in a lower education group have higher X, which is associated 
with higher life expectancy and also leads them to upgrade to the higher education 
category. This variable, X, could be something like grit, hardiness, patience, 
perseverance, or luck. Then Assumption 3 may hold. 
Is it likely that people in group A lie in the right tail of the life expectancy 
distribution for people in the 0th-18th percentile of the SES distribution? Since, again, we 
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can’t observe exact SES, this is not empirically testable. However, based on back-of-the-
envelope approximations, it seems this condition holds: in both the 1990-1992 and 2004-
2006 periods, there is sufficient overlap in the less than high school and high school life 
table ndx distributions to produce this pattern. The average of the high school life table 
age at death distributions for these two periods is 75.8 and 77.9 years for 1990-1992 and 
2004-2005, respectively. These life expectancy values correspond roughly to lying in the 
right 45% of the longevity distribution for people with less than high school 
HI7.J< KL = 0.45 in 1990-1992, and the right 40% of the longevity distribution for 
people with less than high school HII.O< KL = 0.40 in 2004-2006 (that is, 
conditional on living to age 25, over 40% of the less than high school age at death 
distribution lies to the right of the mean of the high school age at death distribution). In 
other words, this method will produce a lower bound for education-specific life 
expectancy in 2004-2006 as long as people in group A lie in roughly the right 40% of the 
longevity distribution for people in the 0th-18th percentiles of the SES distribution. It 
seems highly likely that this 40% condition holds, since if it did not then there would 
likely need to be a reverse SES gradient in longevity for the 0th-18th percentiles of the 
SES distribution. 
Assumption 3 proposes that in 2005, group A has a mean age at death equal to the 
mean age at death of the high school graduate group. We can't observe the 9th to 18th SES 
percentile group in 2005, but if we instead use the 1991 data we can make some guesses 
as to where they are located in the mortality distribution. The less than high school group 
in 1991 consists of the 0-18th percentiles of the SES distribution. We would like to know 
if the 9th to 18th percentile of the SES distribution has a mean age at death at least as high 
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as the 9th to 42nd percentile of the SES distribution (the cutoffs for group A and the high 
school graduate groups, respectively, in 2005). Let's instead be even more conservative 
and try to show that the 9-18th percentile group has a mean age at death at least as high as 
the 18th to 60th percentile. In 1991, the mean age at death for the 18-60th percentile is 
simply 25+567 for the high school category, which is 75.8 years. We cannot observe the 
mean age at death for the 9-18th percentile without making some further assumptions. 
Let's make the rather plausible assumption that in 1991 the 9-18th percentile SES group 
lies in the right half of the age at death distribution for the less than high school group 
(i.e., the 9-18th SES percentile group lies in the right half of the age at death distribution 
for the 0-18th SES percentile group). Then their mean age at death is  + 5P where  is 
such that HP=0.50. We know that HIQ equals 0.59 and HI7 equals 0.47, and the 
corresponding 5IQ and 5I7 values are 12.2 and 9.6 years, respectively. Then  such that 
HP=0.50 lies somewhere between 70 and 75, and 5P such that HP=0.50 is between 9.6 and 
12.2. If we take the lower  and lower 5P values from the previous sentence, which are 70 
and 9.6, respectively, then +5P equals 79.6. This is higher than 75.8 years, providing 
evidence in favor of our initial proposition. 
Data and Methods 
 I use the 1986-2004 waves of the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) 
(Minnesota Population Center and State Health Access Data Assistance Center 2012; 
National Center for Health Statistics Office of Analysis and Epidemiology 2009) which 
are linked to the National Death Index through 2006, to generate a person-quarter-year 
file. The NHIS is a nationally-representative sample survey which is comparable across 
time and measures mortality among the civilian non-institutionalized U.S. population. 
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There are 811,711 respondents experiencing 67,037 deaths and 4,533,125 person-years of 
exposure (see Appendix B for a description of the NHIS data and Appendix B Table B7 
for comparisons to vital statistics data). Respondents are left-censored at interview date 
and right-censored at the earlier of December 31, 2006 or date of death (see Appendix B 
Figures B3-B5 for a robustness check using a fixed 5-year follow-up time). Educational 
attainment was measured as years of schooling completed for survey years prior to 1997, 
and as highest degree attained in later survey years. I compute occurrence-exposure ratios 
for 5-year age intervals to produce period life tables by sex for non-Hispanic whites in 
three periods (1990-1992, 1997-1999, and 2004-2006) for those with less than a high 
school education, a high school diploma or general educational development credential 
(GED), some college, and a college degree or more, since this education categorization 
has been used in prior studies of educational mortality gradients (Montez and Zajacova 
2013a, 2013b; Montez et al. 2011; Olshansky et al. 2012). In addition to 567, I compute 
	RSTΔVW, a measure of the educational gradient in life expectancy defined as the 
difference in 567 between the less than high school and college or more groups. 
I restrict analyses to individuals aged 25 years and older at interview, since 
college completion often occurs by this age (Elo and Preston 1996). I focus on non-
Hispanic whites because of their larger sample size and because of differential 
representativeness and poor linkage quality in NHIS for Hispanics and non-Hispanic 
blacks relative to whites (Lariscy 2011; Liao et al. 1998). 
I decompose educational differences in 567 into age-specific contributions using 
Arriaga’s decomposition (Arriaga 1984). This decomposition takes into account the 
impact of mortality both within a given age group and on the accumulation of person-
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years in subsequent age groups and is thus preferable to focusing only on age-specific 
mortality (Preston, Heuveline, and Guillot 2001). 
I also report temporary life expectancy between ages 25 and 85 (567|J7), since the 
NHIS may not be representative of the 85+ population due to greater institutionalization 
at those ages. 
 I produce composition-adjusted measures of life expectancy at age 25 for the 
1997-1999 and 2004-2006 periods. Within each age-sex group, I randomly reassign 
individuals from these periods to adjacent education categories (e.g., a high school 
graduate may be reassigned to less than high school) so that the population-weighted age-
sex-specific education distributions in each of these periods match the corresponding 
distributions in 1990-1992. I then compute composition-adjusted period life tables by sex 
for each reassigned education category. This method assumes that reassigned individuals 
are representative of people who, in earlier times, would have been in the reassigned 
category (see Appendix A for more detail on the composition adjustment procedure). 
I also estimate an alternative measure of the life expectancy gradient: the slope 
index of inequality (SII). The SII is a measure of the average difference in 567 between 
the least educated (0th percentile) and most educated (100th percentile) individuals in a 
population and, under a linearity assumption, is impervious to changes in educational 
composition (Pamuk 1985; Preston and Elo 1995). 
 Analyses are conducted in Stata 11.  Estimates are adjusted for complex survey 
design. Confidence intervals are computed using delta method coupled with Chiang’s 
formula (Chiang 1984; Greene 2008). 
55 
 
Results 
Table 1 shows education-specific estimates of 567 for 1990-1992, 1997-1999, and 
2004-2006 and estimates of changes between the first and last periods. Among white 
men, 567 increased from 46.9 to 47.9 years (0.9 year increase) for those with less than 
high school, from 50.8 to 52.9 years (2.0 year increase) for high school graduates, from 
52.1 to 53.4 years (1.3 year increase) for those with some college, and from 55.4 to 58.1 
years (2.7 year increase) for college graduates. Among white women, 567 decreased from 
55.0 to 51.9 years (3.2 year decline) for those with less than high school, from 58.5 to 
57.8 years (0.7 year decline) for high school graduates, and from 60.4 to 59.0 years (1.4 
year decline) for those with some college. College graduates experienced an increase 
from 60.9 to 61.6 years (0.7 year increase). 
In addition to life expectancy, the NHIS-based estimates allow us to assess 
educational gradients in 567 that are not subject to dual data source bias. Table 1 
indicates that among men, 	RSTΔVW was 8.5 years in 1991 and widened to 10.2 years by 
2005. For women, 	RSTΔVW was 5.8 years in 1991 and widened to 9.7 years by 2005. The 
gap thus widened by 1.7 years for men and 3.9 years for women over the 14 year period 
between 1991 and 2005. Using the SII, an alternative measure of life expectancy 
gradients that takes into account compositional change, I find that the gradient in life 
expectancy between the least and most educated widened by 0.7 years for men and 2.2 
years for women. 
Table 2 shows that these 567 values are higher than those reported in a previous 
study using dual data sources (Olshansky et al. 2012), except for the “Some College” 
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group for whom they are lower. The Olshansky et al. estimates also show a decline in 567 
among white men with less than high school that is not replicated in the NHIS-based 
estimates. The NHIS-based estimates indicate a widening in 	RSTΔVW that is 6.4 and 4.7 
years smaller than the widening reported by Olshansky et al. 
Figure 1 plots age decompositions of gradients, which indicate that almost all of 
the widening in life expectancy gradients for white men can be attributed to ages above 
50. For white women, this figure is four-fifths. At any given time, however, roughly 1/3 
of the life expectancy gradient for both white men and women can be attributed to ages 
below 50. Figure 2 plots age decompositions of education-specific changes in 567 in 
1991-2005. For men, much of the increase is concentrated in the prime ages for 
mortality—60-84 years. The 85+ age group accounts for 40-100% of the decline in 567 
for white women in the lower three education groups. This large age-specific contribution 
could be due to actual mortality changes or to changes in patterns of old-age 
institutionalization (see Appendix B, especially Table B8) (He and Muenchrath 2011). 
The rate of institutionalization at ages 85+ has declined between 1991 and 2006, and that 
decline has been faster for the more educated. The percentage decline in old-age 
institutionalization is twice as large for whites with college or more compared to those 
with less than high school (Appendix B Table B8). Because of this changing pattern of 
institutionalization, NHIS-based estimates for 85+ mortality may not be comparable over 
time (since NHIS would be sampling from different population bases in different time 
periods). To address this possibility, I estimate temporary life expectancy between ages 
25 and 85, which is less affected by old-age institutionalization. 
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Table 3 shows 567|J7 estimates by education for each of the three time periods 
under examination and estimates of changes in 567|J7 between the first and last periods. 
Among white men, 567|J7 increased from 45.7 to 46.5 years (0.8 year increase) for those 
with less than high school, from 49.1 to 50.6 years (1.5 year increase) for high school 
graduates, from 49.7 to 51.1 years (1.4 year increase) for those with some college, and 
from 52.4 to 54.1 years (1.7 year increase) for college graduates. Among white women, 
567|J7 decreased from 50.7 to 49.2 years (1.4 year decline) for those with less than high 
school and from 53.5 to 53.4 years (0.2 year decline) for high school graduates. 567|J7 
remained unchanged at 54.1 years for those with some college. White female college 
graduates experienced an increase from 54.5 to 56.0 years (1.5 year increase). 
Table 3 indicates that among men, 	RSTΔVW for temporary life expectancy was 6.7 
years in 1991 and widened to 7.6 years by 2005. For women, 	RSTΔVW for temporary life 
expectancy was 3.8 years in 1991 and widened to 6.7 years by 2005. The gap thus 
widened by 0.9 years for men and 2.9 years for women between 1991 and 2005. Using 
the SII, I find that the gradient in life expectancy between the least and most educated 
narrowed by 0.3 years for men and widened by 1.8 years for women. 
Figure 3 shows age-education distributions of the white population by sex and 
period. The most striking feature of this figure is the shrinking share of the less than high 
school group as a proportion of the population. The less than high school and high school 
graduate groups have grown smaller and more select and the some college and college or 
more groups have grown larger and potentially less select between 1990-1992 and 2004-
2006. This is particularly the case at ages where mortality rates are highest. The next set 
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of results addresses this compositional change by computing composition-adjusted life 
expectancies and gradients. 
Table 4 presents the estimates of composition-adjusted life expectancy between 
ages 25 and 85 (5̂67|J7) for each of the three periods under analysis (see Appendix B 
Table B9 for estimates of composition-adjusted 567). It also presents estimates of 
changes in 5̂67|J7 between the first and last period. Among white men, 5̂67|J7 increased 
from 45.7 to 47.3 years (1.6 year increase) for those with less than high school, from 49.1 
to 50.7 years (1.5 year increase) for high school graduates, from 49.7 to 51.5 years (1.8 
year increase) for those with some college, and from 52.4 to 54.1 years (1.8 year 
increase) for college graduates. Among white women, 5̂67|J7 decreased from 50.7 to 50.0 
years (0.7 year decline) for those with less than high school, remained constant at 53.5 
years for high school graduates, and increased from 54.1 to 54.5 years (0.4 year increase) 
for those with some college and from 54.5 to 56.0 years (1.5 year increase) for college 
graduates. 
Among men, 	RSTΔVW for 5̂67|J7 was 6.7 years in 1991 and widened to 6.8 years 
by 2005. For women, 	RSTΔVW for 5̂67|J7 was 3.8 years in 1991 and widened to 6.0 years 
by 2005. The gap thus widened by 0.1 years for men and 2.2 years for women between 
1991 and 2005. The SII increased by 0.3 and 2.5 years for white men and women, 
respectively. 
Discussion 
This article contributes several findings to the debate over life expectancy 
gradients in the last two decades. Life expectancy has increased among white men across 
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the socioeconomic spectrum and for the most-educated white women, but has declined 
for the least-educated white women. Educational gradients in life expectancy have also 
widened for women far more than for men. In a recent study, Olshansky et al. 2012 report 
that educational gradients in life expectancy widened by 8.1 and 8.6 years and that life 
expectancy among the least-educated declined by 3.4 and 5.3 years for white men and 
women, respectively. By contrast, my estimates show that gradients widened by only 1.7 
and 3.9 years for white men and women, life expectancy increased for the least-educated 
white men, and the decrease in life expectancy for the least-educated white women was 
3.2 years. Part of the discrepancy between these estimates lies in the types of data used—
the Olshansky et al. study relied on data which are non-representative and are subject to 
dual data source bias. This results in downward-biased mortality estimates for the least-
educated group, and could generate the above pattern if the bias dramatically diminished 
over time. The data used in this study are representative of the non-institutionalized 
population and are not subject to numerator-denominator biases. 
While the growth in the gradient has come mostly from ages above 50, roughly 
1/3 of the gradient at any given time is due to ages 25-49. Recent studies have 
concentrated on mortality above age 45 or 50, where the cause of death profile differs 
from that at younger ages (Crimmins et al. 2011; Ho and Fenelon 2015; Montez and 
Berkman 2014; Montez and Zajacova 2013b; Panel on Understanding Divergent Trends 
in Longevity in High-Income Countries, Committee on Population 2010). The age 
decompositions in this article suggest that causes of death more prevalent at younger ages 
may also play a role in maintaining socioeconomic gradients and merit greater attention 
in future research. 
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Another concern with temporal comparisons of educational gradients in mortality 
is compositional change. As the education distribution shifts rightward over time, the 
worry is that a given education category comes to represent a lower SES group. I address 
this possibility by estimating both composition-adjusted life temporary life expectancies 
and slope indices of inequality. I focus on temporary life expectancies because I find 
evidence suggesting that changing patterns of old-age institutionalization may be driving 
artifactual changes in mortality above age 85. These two independent methods of 
accounting for compositional change produce highly consistent estimates of the 
magnitudes of and trends in educational gradients in mortality. I find that compositional 
change explains 53% of the decline in temporary life expectancy for the least-educated 
white women, and, for white men and women, respectively, 87% and 26% of the 
widening in life expectancy gradients. These numbers reflect dramatic changes in 
educational attainment over the 20th century. For example, the “high school movement” 
of the 1920s made high school completion the new modal category (Goldin 1998). People 
in later cohorts who did not complete high school were a more negatively selected group 
than those who did not complete high school in earlier cohorts. These results suggest that 
compositional change explains much, but not all, of the steepening of educational 
gradients in life expectancy. 
The gradient has grown much more quickly for women than for men, though the 
magnitude of the gradient is still larger for men. Part of the explanation for the 
convergence of the female gradient towards the male gradient is the differential timing of 
the emergence of SES gradients in smoking. SES differences in smoking emerged much 
earlier for men than for women, and for women, the emergence of the gradient was more 
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rapid. This is consistent with a recent study which finds that smoking explains half of the 
recent widening of the educational gradient in life expectancy for women but not for men 
(Ho and Fenelon 2015). Another factor that may explain the faster steepening among 
women is the fact that education has only recently become a reliable marker of SES for 
women. Education used to be a very noisy measure of SES for women relative to men. 
As education became increasingly aligned with SES for women, that noise dissipated, 
causing the relationship between education and mortality to grow stronger for women 
relative to men. 
While this article presents new estimates that do not suffer from the drawbacks of 
prior studies, it presents its own limitations. Using NHIS results in underestimates of 
early-adult and old-age mortality. The composition-adjusted measures rely on 
assumptions which may not always hold and are not easily tested. Finally, because of 
poor linkage quality this study does not consider mortality among non-white racial/ethnic 
groups. 
While a limited set of articles examines the causal impact of education on 
mortality (e.g., Behrman et al. 2011), most research examining the association between 
education and life expectancy does not attempt to trace a causal path between the two 
variables. Instead, social demographic, sociological, and epidemiological studies of 
educational gradients in mortality show a correlation between education and adult 
mortality and then aim to find variables that diminish this association in a regression 
framework (Montez and Zajacova 2013a; Rogers et al. 2010). The central concern of 
these studies is socioeconomic inequality, not the causal effect of education on mortality. 
Embedded in the discussions of these articles is the idea that while education itself 
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matters for mortality, it is the mere existence of educational differentials in mortality that 
is important, since such differentials indicate a broader socioeconomic inequality. In this 
chapter, I show that while many of these prior studies eschew any causal estimation 
framework, even their more conservative claims that socioeconomic inequality in 
mortality has widened are problematic, since their measurement of status is not static 
with respect to time and context. In doing so, I make several assumptions described in 
detail in the sections above. It is natural to wonder whether these assumptions impose any 
restrictions on the causal relationship between education and life expectancy. 
The most immediate response is that this study does not examine education itself, 
but education as a marker of status, and thus does not restrict in any way the relationship 
between education and mortality (and in fact is entirely agnostic on the matter of the 
causality of this relationship). In particular, the composition-adjusted life expectancy 
does not assume anything about the causal effect of education on mortality. A more exact 
concern is that while this study may not restrict the relationship between education and 
mortality, it does restrict the three-way relationship between socioeconomic status, 
education, and mortality. This claim is correct. The composition-adjusted life expectancy 
imposes the assumption that the relationship between SES and education is ordinal: only 
relative education, and not the absolute amount of education itself, matters for status 
(Assumption 1). One can make statements like, “an 11th grade education is associated 
with higher status than a 5th grade education.” This allows for any type of nonlinearity or 
other parameterization in the relationship between education and mortality. Suppose that 
this assumption is incorrect. Suppose that, in fact, status is not ordinal but absolute, and 
thus one can make stronger statements like, “a 12th grade education is worth 7 times the 
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socioeconomic status of an 8th grade education.” If the relationship between education 
and SES is measured on an absolute scale and not as an index, then using fixed percentile 
cutoffs of education to measure SES differentials in life expectancy necessarily restricts 
the relationship among these three variables. 
The main contention of critics of this approach may be that the bottom  percent 
of the education distribution in 2005 has far lower SES than the bottom  percent in the 
early 1990s. This is due to a supposed worsening of the conditions of the worst off in 
society. At the same time, the top Z percent of society in terms of education is claimed to 
have a much higher SES than the top Z percent in the early 1990s. If this is the case and 
if we use fixed percentiles of the education distribution to measure SES, then we would 
overstate the decline or understate the increase over time in SES-specific life expectancy 
at the bottom of the SES distribution. Congruently, the composition-adjusted life 
expectancy would overstate gains in life expectancy at the top of the SES distribution. 
This would lead to an overestimate of the widening of the socioeconomic gradient in 
mortality. 
Another concern is that randomly redistributing people from one education group 
to an adjacent education group in order to maintain fixed relative sizes of the education 
groups over time is problematic because education does not fully determine SES. Within 
the less than high school group in 1991, for example, some people have higher SES than 
others and these are also the same people who, in 2005's stratification system, would be 
likely to instead have a high school education. Depending on a researcher's beliefs about 
who is likely to change education groups (low or high SES people within the group), this 
non-homogeneity could lead to the change in composition-adjusted life expectancy being 
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either a lower or upper bound as an estimate of the change in the SES gradient in life 
expectancy. This concern is discussed in detail as part of Assumption 3 and thus I will 
not devote more space to it here, except to point out that non-homogeneity of SES within 
education groups is a valid critique of any study that attempts to measure socioeconomic 
gradients in mortality using education, even those that control for other variables (e.g., 
income) or use another procedure to account for compositional change (e.g., 
composition-adjusted life expectancy or the slope index of inequality). 
Throughout this analysis and discussion, I have maintained that status is ordinal. 
This is consistent with the broad sociological literature on status, which only defines 
status in relation to another individual or group, and is reflected in measures of status like 
socioeconomic indexes, which are purely ordinal. This assertion can be made more 
concrete with an example. Consider a society with only one individual. We can endow 
him with any characteristics (property, knowledge, biology) we like. The question is: 
what is that individual's socioeconomic status? After only a few minutes of thought, any 
reasonable analysis would conclude that the individual does not have a well-defined 
status because there are no other individuals to compare him to. 
That compositional change plays a central role in explaining changing educational 
gradients in life expectancy suggests the need for novel measures of socioeconomic 
inequalities in mortality (Begier et al. 2013; Dowd and Hamoudi 2014; Preston 2014). 
Failure to account for compositional change may result in policy recommendations 
yielding unexpected results. Educational upgrading as a health policy may actually widen 
measured educational gradients in life expectancy by leaving the least-educated group 
increasingly negatively select. Still, compositional change does not fully account for the 
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alarming life expectancy declines among the least-educated white women and stagnation 
among high school-educated women. This trend is heretofore unseen in other high-
income countries, suggesting a need for policies addressing high mortality among the less 
advantaged. 
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Figure 1. Age Decompositions of Difference in Life Expectancy at Age 25 between High 
School Non-Completers and College Graduates, Non-Hispanic White Males and 
Females, 1990-2006 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 with mortality follow-up 
through 2006. 
Note: Bars in each graph sum up to the total sex and period-specific difference in life 
expectancy at age 25 between those with less than high school and those with college or 
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more. 567 LTHS and 567 C+ are life expectancies for the less than high school and 
college or more groups, respectively, and Δ567 is the difference in life expectancy at age 
25 between these two groups.
68 
A
ge
-
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
Co
n
tr
ib
ut
io
n
 to
 C
ha
n
ge
 
in
 L
ife
 
Ex
pe
ct
an
cy
 a
t A
ge
 
25
 (y
ea
rs
) 
Figure 2. Age Decompositions of Changes in Education-Specific Life Expectancy at Age 
25 by Sex, Non-Hispanic Whites, 1991-2005 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 with mortality follow-up 
through 2006. 
 
Note: Bars in each graph sum up to the total sex and education-specific change in life 
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expectancy at age 25. 567 ’91 and 567 ’05 are life expectancies in 1991 and 2005, 
respectively, and Δ567 is the change in life expectancy at age 25 between 1991 and 2005.
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Figure 3. Education Distribution by Age, Sex, and Period, non-Hispanic Whites, NHIS 
1990-2006 
(a) Males 
 
(b) Females 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1990-1992, 1997-1999, and 2004-2006 
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Table 1. Life Expectancy at Age 25 by Sex and Education for non-Hispanic Whites, 1990-2006 
 Males  Females 
 1990-92 1997-99 2004-06 [’91-’05  1990-92 1997-99 2004-06 [’91-’05 
Less than High School 46.9 [45.9, 47.9] 
47.9 
[47.3, 48.6] 
47.9 
[47.0, 48.7] 
0.9 
[-0.4, 2.3]  
55.0 
[54.1, 55.9] 
53.3 
[52.6, 53.9] 
51.9 
[50.7, 53.1] 
-3.2 
[-4.7, -1.7] 
High School or GED 50.8 [50.2, 51.4] 
51.8 
[51.4, 52.3] 
52.9 
[52.5, 53.2] 
2.0 
[1.3, 2.7]  
58.5 
[57.9, 59.0] 
57.5 
[57.1, 58.0] 
57.8 
[57.5, 58.1] 
-0.7 
[-1.3, 0.0] 
Some College 52.1 [51.2, 53.1] 
52.3 
[51.5, 53.1] 
53.4 
[52.9, 53.9] 
1.3 
[0.2, 2.4]  
60.4 
[59.5, 61.3] 
59.0 
[58.4, 59.5] 
59.0 
[58.5, 59.6] 
-1.4 
[-2.5, -0.3] 
College or More 55.4 [54.6, 56.2] 
56.0 
[55.5, 56.5] 
58.1 
[57.7, 58.5] 
2.7 
[1.8, 3.6]  
60.9 
[59.8, 61.9] 
60.5 
[59.9, 61.0] 
61.6 
[61.1, 62.0] 
0.7 
[-0.4, 1.8] 	RSTΔVW 8.5 [7.2, 9.8] 8.1 [7.3, 8.9] 10.2 [9.3, 11.2] 1.7 [0.1, 3.3]  5.8 [4.4, 7.2] 7.2 [6.3, 8.1] 9.7 [8.4, 11.0] 3.9 [2.0, 5.7] 
Slope Index of Inequality 9.8 [8.4, 11.3] 
8.7 
[7.7, 9.6] 
10.6 
[9.7, 11.5] 
0.7 
[-1.0, 2.4]  
7.0 
[5.5, 8.5] 
7.6 
[6.7, 8.5] 
9.2 
[8.1, 10.2] 
2.2 
[0.3, 4.0] 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004. 
Note: Δ’91-’05 indicates change between the 1990-1992 period and the 2004-2006 period. 	RSTΔVW refers to the life expectancy of the 
“College or More” group less the life expectancy of the “Less than High School” group. The slope index of inequality is the estimated 
difference in life expectancy at age 25 between the least educated (0th percentile) and the most educated (100th percentile). 
Approximate 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. 
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Table 2. Comparison of Educational Differentials in Life Expectancy at Age 25: Estimates Based on the National Health Interview 
Survey (NHIS) 1986-2004 versus Estimates from Olshansky et al. 2012 (MCD) 1990-2008, Non-Hispanic White Males and Females 
Males Early 1990s  Late 1990s  Mid 2000s 
 
1990 
(MCD) 
1991 
(NHIS) Difference 
 2000 
(MCD) 
1998 
(NHIS) Difference 
 2008 
(MCD) 
2005 
(NHIS) Difference 
Less than High School 47.0 46.9 0.1  45.3 47.9 -2.6  43.6 47.9 -4.3 
High School or GED 46.5 50.8 -4.3  47.9 51.8 -3.9  48.2 52.9 -4.7 
Some College 53.5 52.1 1.4  55.0 52.3 2.7  55.3 53.4 1.9 
College or More 52.1 55.4 -3.3  54.7 56.0 -1.3  56.7 58.1 -1.4 	RSTΔVW  5.1 8.5 -3.4  9.4 8.1 1.3  13.2 10.2 3.0 
    
 
   
 
   
Females Early 1990s  Late 1990s  Mid 2000s 
 
1990 
(MCD) 
1991 
(NHIS) Difference 
 2000 
(MCD) 
1998 
(NHIS) Difference 
 2008 
(MCD) 
2005 
(NHIS) Difference 
Less than High School 54.5 55.0 -0.5  51.4 53.3 -1.9  49.2 51.9 -2.7 
High School or GED 53.6 58.5 -4.9  53.8 57.5 -3.7  54.0 57.8 -3.8 
Some College 58.2 60.4 -2.2  58.9 59.0 -0.1  59.2 59.0 0.2 
College or More 56.4 60.9 -4.5  58.4 60.5 -2.1  59.7 61.6 -1.9 	RSTΔVW  1.9 5.8 -3.9  7.0 7.2 -0.2  10.5 9.7 0.8 
 
Source: Estimates for 1990, 2000, and 2008 come from Olshansky et al.’s (2012) Appendix Exhibit A7 and are based on data from the 
Multiple Cause of Death file and the American Community Survey. Estimates for 1991, 1998, and 2005 are the author’s calculations 
using the National Health Interview Survey (1986-2004) linked to mortality follow-up through December 31, 2006. 
Note: 	RSTΔVW is defined as the difference in 567 between those with less than high school and those with college or more. 
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Table 3. Life Expectancy Between Ages 25 and 85 by Sex and Education for non-Hispanic Whites, 1990-2006 
 Males  Females 
 1990-92 1997-99 2004-06 [’91-’05  1990-92 1997-99 2004-06 [’91-’05 
Less than High School 45.7 [44.7, 46.7] 
46.8 
[46.2, 47.4] 
46.5 
[45.6, 47.4] 
0.8 
[-0.5, 2.1]  
50.7 
[49.8, 51.6] 
50.4 
[49.7, 51.0] 
49.2 
[48.0, 50.4] 
-1.4 
[-2.9, 0.1] 
High School or GED 49.1 [48.5, 49.7] 
49.9 
[49.5, 50.3] 
50.6 
[50.2, 51.0] 
1.5 
[0.8, 2.2]  
53.5 
[53.0, 54.1] 
53.2 
[52.8, 53.6] 
53.4 
[53.0, 53.7] 
-0.2 
[-0.8, 0.5] 
Some College 49.7 [48.8, 50.7] 
50.2 
[49.4, 50.9] 
51.1 
[50.6, 51.6] 
1.4 
[0.3, 2.5]  
54.1 
[53.2, 55.0] 
54.0 
[53.5, 54.6] 
54.1 
[53.6, 54.7] 
0.0 
[-1.1, 1.1] 
College or More 52.4 [51.6, 53.2] 
53.0 
[52.5, 53.5] 
54.1 
[53.7, 54.5] 
1.7 
[0.8, 2.6]  
54.5 
[53.4, 55.5] 
55.2 
[54.6, 55.7] 
56.0 
[55.5, 56.4] 
1.5 
[0.4, 2.6] 	RSTΔVW 6.7 [5.4, 8.0] 6.2 [5.4, 7.0] 7.6 [6.6, 8.6] 0.9 [-0.7, 2.5]  3.8 [2.5, 5.2] 4.8 [3.9, 5.7] 6.7 [5.5, 8.0] 2.9 [1.0, 4.8] 
Slope Index of Inequality 7.6 [6.1, 9.1] 
6.3 
[5.4, 7.2] 
7.3 
[6.5, 8.2] 
-0.3 
[-2.0, 1.4]  
4.0 
[2.5, 5.6] 
4.6 
[3.6, 5.5] 
5.8 
[4.9, 6.7] 
1.8 
[-0.0, 3.5] 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004. 
Note: Δ’91-’05 indicates change between the 1990-1992 period and the 2004-2006 period. 	RSTΔVW refers to the life expectancy of the 
“College or More” group less the life expectancy of the “Less than High School” group. The slope index of inequality is the estimated 
difference in life expectancy at age 25 between the least educated (0th percentile) and the most educated (100th percentile). 
Approximate 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets.
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Table 4. Composition-Adjusted Life Expectancy Between Ages 25 and 85 by Sex and Education for non-Hispanic Whites, 1990-2006 
 Males  Females 
 1990-1992 1997-1999 2004-2006 [’91-’05  1990-1992 1997-1999 2004-2006 [’91-’05 
Less than High School 45.7 [44.7, 46.7] 
47.1 
[46.5, 47.7] 
47.3 
[46.5, 48.1] 
1.6 
[0.4, 2.9]  
50.7 
[49.8, 51.6] 
50.7 
[50.1, 51.4] 
50.0 
[48.9, 51.1] 
-0.7 
[-2.1, 0.7] 
High School or GED 49.1 [48.5, 49.7] 
50.0 
[49.6, 50.4] 
50.7 
[50.3, 51] 
1.5 
[0.8, 2.2]  
53.5 
[53, 54.1] 
53.3 
[52.8, 53.7] 
53.5 
[53.2, 53.8] 
0.0 
[-0.6, 0.6] 
Some College 49.7 [48.8, 50.7] 
50.1 
[49.3, 50.9] 
51.5 
[51, 52.1] 
1.8 
[0.7, 3.0]  
54.1 
[53.2, 55] 
54.2 
[53.6, 54.8] 
54.5 
[53.9, 55.1] 
0.4 
[-0.7, 1.5] 
College or More 52.4 [51.6, 53.2] 
53.0 
[52.5, 53.6] 
54.1 
[53.7, 54.5] 
1.8 
[0.8, 2.7]  
54.5 
[53.4, 55.5] 
55.1 
[54.5, 55.7] 
56.0 
[55.5, 56.5] 
1.5 
[0.4, 2.6] 	RSTΔVW 6.7 [5.4, 8.0] 6.0 [5.1, 6.8] 6.8 [5.9, 7.7] 0.1 [-1.5, 1.7]  3.8 [2.5, 5.2] 4.3 [3.5, 5.2] 6.0 [4.8, 7.2] 2.2 [0.3, 4.0] 
Slope Index of Inequality 7.6 [6.1, 9.1] 
6.7 
[5.7, 7.7] 
7.9 
[6.9, 8.9] 
0.3 
[-1.5, 2.1]  
4.0 
[2.5, 5.6] 
4.8 
[3.9, 5.8] 
6.5 
[5.3, 7.7] 
2.5 
[0.5, 4.4] 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 
Note: Δ’91-’05 indicates change between the 1990-1992 period and the 2004-2006 period. 	RSTΔVW refers to the life expectancy of the 
“College or More” group less the life expectancy of the “Less than High School” group. The slope index of inequality is the estimated 
difference in life expectancy at age 25 between the least educated (0th percentile) and the most educated (100th percentile). 
Approximate 95% confidence intervals are given in brackets. 
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Chapter III. The Dynamics of Assortative Mating and the Life Cycles of 
Married Couples 
Introduction 
The intertwined life cycles of husbands and wives have captured the interest of 
demographers interested in marriage, households, and well-being. It is likely that the life 
cycles of married couples—the expected number of years married men and women can 
expect to spend together, the probability that a marriage ends in divorce, the likelihood 
that a wife outlives her husband or vice versa, and the expected duration of widowhood—
have changed over the last half-century as a result of transformations in the social 
makeup of and demographic parameters governing the U.S. population. Rapid declines in 
mortality, changes in the age and education composition of the married population, 
higher rates of divorce, and the intensification of assortative mating are all contributing to 
changes in marital life cycles. Yet, it remains understudied whether the life cycles of 
married couples have changed in the past decades and, if so, which factors are driving 
this change. This gap in our understanding of marital life cycles is in part because we 
lack demographic models that can jointly model and incorporate heterogeneity in the 
characteristics of husbands and wives and also because, until recently, we did not have 
the data necessary to examine this question. 
In this study, I address the question of how marital life cycles have changed 
between 1960 and 2010. I incorporate data on age- and education-specific risks of 
marriage, mortality, and divorce along with information on assortative mating to uncover 
the extent to which marital life cycles have changed and the reasons for this change. 
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Potential explanations I explore include declines and widening educational differentials 
in mortality, narrowing sex differences in life expectancy, increases and widening 
educational differentials in the prevalence of divorce, changes in the age pattern of and 
educational selection into marriage, the rightward shift of the educational distribution, 
and the intensification of educational and age-based assortative mating. I extend prior 
models of marital life cycles to a multivariate setting and introduce heterogeneity across 
couples in age, educational attainment, and demographic rates. 
I ask the specific question: given the age and education distributions of married 
couples and the level of assortative mating, how long will the average marriage last and 
how likely is it to end in divorce or widowhood? These marital life cycle measures have 
changed over time because of changes in age at marriage and selection into marriage by 
education; changes in education-specific mortality risks and narrowing sex differentials 
in life expectancy; the intensification of assortative mating on age and education; and the 
tremendous expansion of divorce since 1960.  
I split the empirical analysis in this chapter into two parts. Part I explores the 
ramifications of changing mortality conditions and assortative mating for marital life 
cycles. In this part of the analysis, I focus on mortality as the only source of marital 
disruption in order to highlight the effect of rapid mortality change on shifting marital life 
cycles. Part I considers currently married couples rather than a purely synthetic cohort. I 
compute marital life cycle measures for people who are currently married, regardless of 
when that marriage took place or whether it is a first marriage or remarriage. This allows 
us to answer questions about how long currently married couples can expect to spend 
together if they do not believe they will get divorced. I decompose changes in the marital 
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life cycle into components due to mortality, assortative mating, and population 
composition. These analyses are applicable to pensions and entitlement programs like 
Social Security, whose benefits are disbursed based on death and marital duration, 
regardless of marital dissolution. 
In the second part of the analysis, I incorporate data on marriage and divorce into 
the life cycle computations, allowing marital life cycles to depend on ever-declining rates 
of marriage and the seemingly nonstop increase in rates of divorce. This underscores the 
phenomenon that even as intact marriages can be expected to last longer due to mortality 
declines, a greater proportion of marriages will end in divorce, thus truncating the overall 
marital life cycle. Furthermore, selection into marriage and divorce has changed over 
time and by education, leading to divergent outcomes between population subgroups. 
Part II of the analysis deals only with synthetic cohorts. In each year, a new cohort of 15-
year olds is subject to period marriage, divorce, and mortality rates prevailing in that 
year. While this approach may lead to life cycle measures that are not observed for any 
actual cohort, it allows us to summarize current marital life cycle conditions without 
having to wait several decades for a marriage cohort to become extinct. In a population 
that is stationary with respect to nuptiality (which is a close approximation to the United 
States over the last decade), the synthetic cohort approach is essentially a forecast of 
future marital life cycles under the assumption that mortality remains unchanged. These 
life cycle measures are of interest to demographers and also to policymakers and the 
general population, corresponding to a broad belief that there has been a decline in family 
life and retreat from marriage in the United States since the 1960s (Cherlin 2009; Murray 
2012). 
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Marital Life Cycles 
The life cycles of married couples are of interest to demographers and sociologists 
because marriage remains a central institution in American life. If longevity is the 
foremost measure of wellbeing for an individual then, for married individuals, having a 
living spouse is at least a close second. Having a living spouse is associated with better 
outcomes in many arenas of life, including financial status, health, and happiness. 
Married men and women maximize their well-being by having more years to spend 
together. By contrast, the death of a spouse is often cited as the most stressful life event 
an individual can experience (Holmes and Rahe 1967) and is associated with depression, 
financial loss, a long-term decline in happiness (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, and Diener 
2002), and even death of the surviving spouse (Elwert and Christakis 2008a, 2008b). 
Widows are among the most disadvantaged groups in the United States. Widowhood has 
consequences for family structure, the health and happiness of individuals (Avis et al. 
1991; Bennett 2005; Iwashyna and Christakis 2003; Silverstein and Bengtson 1994; Utz 
et al. 2002, 2012), the disbursal of pension and social security benefits (Holden and Zick 
1988), and savings and the economic security of older adults (Holden and Kuo 1996; 
Zick and Smith 1988). 
Beyond being an absolute measure of wellbeing, the life cycles of married 
couples have welfare implications. Public and private institutions like social security and 
private pensions are intimately linked with the life cycles of spouses, and often include 
payouts that are predicated on the circumstances surrounding the death of a spouse. For 
example, the Social Security Administration authorizes survivorship benefits for 
bereaved spouses, but only if they meet a set of requirements, including surviving to a 
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particular age and having been married for a particular length of time. All else being 
equal, people who had longer marriages and lost their spouses at older ages are better 
able to capture the benefits of public pension programs. Thus, in addition to the 
likelihood that one outlives one’s spouse, the duration of marriage and duration of 
widowhood are also important facets of the marital life cycle. 
The life cycles of married couples have changed as age- and sex-specific marriage 
and mortality rates have declined and divorce rates have increased. Furthermore, it is 
likely that the changes in marital life cycles are not patterned uniformly across couples. 
All else being equal, women married to more educated men are less likely to experience 
divorce or widowhood, can expect to spend fewer years in the widowed state, and can 
expect to spend more years in the married state. As assortative mating intensifies, the 
differences between couples in marital survivorship can be expected to widen. Prior 
studies of couples’ life cycles have either assumed homogeneity across couples (Schoen 
and Standish 2001) or have investigated the effect of changing ages at marriage 
(Goldman and Lord 1983), but with the advent of rich micro-level datasets linked to 
mortality records, we can now examine how changes in the makeup of the married 
population and the intensification of assortative mating on a variety of characteristics has 
influenced the survivorship of marriages. 
Assortative Mating, Marriage, Divorce, Population Composition, and Mortality 
Decline 
Assortative Mating, Marriage, and Divorce 
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Assortative mating configures the makeup of families by leading like individuals 
to marry. Couples tend to look similar in terms of education, age, and race (Mare 1991; 
Qian and Preston 1993). One of the major social transformations of the last century was 
the dramatic change in the demographic and educational composition of marriages. Men 
and women were increasingly graduating from high school and attending college and the 
gender gap in educational attainment narrowed considerably. This movement towards 
higher education was accompanied by profound changes in who marries whom. The rise 
of secondary and tertiary education, accompanied by more egalitarian gender norms and 
increased social distance between socioeconomic groups, has led spouses to become 
more similar on characteristics like educational attainment and age (Mare 1991; Schwartz 
and Mare 2005; Schwartz 2013). Demographers have documented the intensification of 
assortative mating, and have recently turned their attention to investigating the effects of 
assortative mating on outcomes affected by marriage. To date, researchers have examined 
the effects of assortative mating on income inequality, intergenerational mobility, cultural 
transmission, and age at marriage, among other outcomes (Breen and Salazar 2011; 
Kandler et al. 2012; Mare and Schwartz 2006; Oppenheimer 1988; Shafer and Qian 
2010). 
There is a growing awareness that the intensification of assortative mating may 
lead to greater socioeconomic differentiation across households, including greater 
concentration of wealth and decreased intergenerational mobility (Greenwood et al. 2014; 
Kremer 1997; Mare 2000; Schwartz and Mare 2005). But we may also expect assortative 
mating to impact other outcomes that are patterned by age and socioeconomic status, of 
which the prime example is mortality. The difference in life expectancy between the least 
81 
 
and most educated members of American society is now approaching 10 years (Hendi 
2015). We do not expect the average spousal difference in mortality to resemble the 
average sex difference in mortality because spouses should look more like one another 
than a randomly selected male and female from the population. I thus hypothesize that as 
the sorting process intensifies, the correlation in mortality between husbands and wives 
will increase and between-couple differences in marital survivorship will increase. 
Because assortative mating works to bring similar people together in marriages, 
ceteris paribus the intensification of assortative mating should lead to more highly 
correlated mortality profiles between husbands and wives. Consider the case of 
educational assortative mating. For both women and men, mortality decreases with 
education. Thus, if we were to match men and women into pairs (as in marriage), the 
pairing that would result in the highest correlation would be the one where men and 
women are matched based on their sex-specific educational rank. While more intense 
educational assortative mating leads to higher correlation between husbands’ and wives’ 
mortality rates, it need not result in smaller differences between husbands and wives in 
mortality. Men tend to have higher mortality than women at each education level, and in 
contemporary U.S. life tables by education, the absolute difference in age-specific 
mortality between men and women who are concordant on education is greater than the 
difference in mortality between men and women who are discordant on education. The 
effect of increasing assortative mating on marital outcomes thus depends on the specific 
outcome being considered, and how that outcome is related to the correlation between 
husbands’ and wives’ mortality versus the difference between husbands’ and wives’ 
mortality. 
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An increase in assortative mating can be expected to increase marital duration. 
The intuitive explanation for this claim is that an increase in assortative mating leads to 
more highly correlated mortality between husbands and wives, and marital duration is 
typically increasing in this correlation. 
Marital duration is a strictly increasing function of the sum of husbands’ and 
wives’ cumulative force of mortality (the marital survivorship function). In particular, 
marital duration is a weighted average of the quantity 5,\]^W]_, where the integrand in 
the exponent is the sum of the education-specific force of mortality functions for 
husbands and wives. Consider an example world where there are two education 
categories: high (H) and low (L). Further suppose that married couples can be HH, HL, or 
LL, where the first letter represents the husband’s education and the second represents the 
wife’s education. An increase in assortative mating would thus be a transfer of 
individuals from HL marriages to either HH or LL marriages. In this world, mortality is 
decreasing in education for both men and women. The longest surviving marriages are 
thus those of the HH couples, followed by the HL and LL couples. If we were to increase 
assortative mating by taking all HL couples and reassigning their constituents to generate 
either HH or LL couples, then the population average marital duration would change. 
Because marital survivorship decreases more rapidly at lower values of 3` + 3a, the 
expected increase in marital duration for people reassigned to HH would outweigh the 
expected decrease in marital duration for people reassigned to LL (the difference in 
marital survivorship between HH and HL is greater than the difference in marital 
survivorship between HL and LL).  This logic is not specific to this example, and extends 
to more general cases (see Appendix B for a proof of this claim). 
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While expected marital duration depends only on the timing of the first spouse to 
die (if all factors other than mortality are fixed), the likelihood that a wife outlives her 
husband and the number of years a wife can expect to spend widowed both depend on the 
time at death for both spouses. Because of this interaction term in the widowhood 
measures (which is not present in the marital duration measure), there is no 
mathematically clear expectation about what more intense assortative mating would do to 
the probability and duration of widowhood. Such expectations would depend not only on 
the sex-specific relationship between education, age, and mortality, but also on men’s 
age- and education-specific mortality relative to women’s. Intuitively, because the 
average difference in mortality between men and women who are concordant on 
education is greater than the average difference in mortality between men and women 
who are discordant on education, we might expect that more intense assortative mating 
would lead to greater probability of widowhood and longer durations of widowhood. 
Another consideration with respect to marriage patterns is that marriage rates 
have declined precipitously since 1960, pushing up the average age at marriage by 
several years (Cherlin 2009; Goldstein and Kenney 2001). Period estimates of marriage 
rates indicate that the overall probability of ever marrying has now declined to just over 
80% (see Results section). Changes in marriage patterns have been accompanied by 
widening educational differentials in marriage rates. Less educated women tend to marry 
at much lower rates than more educated women. Women with less than a high school 
diploma have less than a 75% chance of ever marrying, whereas women with a college 
degree have roughly a 90% chance of ever marrying. In the 1960s, there was hardly any 
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educational gradient in marriage—women in all education groups had well over a 90% 
chance of ever marrying.  
Divorce follows a similar temporal pattern. Starting in the mid-1960s and 
especially the 1970s, rates of divorce climbed to record highs, and by 2010, roughly half 
of all marriage could be expected to end in divorce. Again, these changes are patterned 
by education, though not as monotonically as for marriage. Women who are high school 
graduates or have some college are much more likely to divorce than women with less 
than a high school diploma or college graduates. In addition, marital duration and age at 
marriage are both inversely related to the likelihood that a marriage ends in divorce. 
According to theories of marital search, people who take longer to find optimal partners 
(often through college attendance) and thus marry later are less likely to experience 
divorce (Oppenheimer 1988). Thus, divorce and assortative mating are also interrelated. 
All else being equal, the aforementioned changes in marriage and divorce can be 
expected to lead to more truncated marital life cycles and fewer first marriages ending in 
widowhood or widowerhood. These effects will be felt especially by the less-educated 
and by people who marry earlier in life. 
Population Composition 
 Another factor that may have driven changes in the average life cycle of married 
couples is changes in population composition. Since 1960, the population of married 
couples has grown older and more educated. The aging of married couples is partly due 
to higher ages at marriage and also due to rapid declines in fertility and mortality in the 
general population (the latter phenomenon is only relevant for Part I—Part II is based on 
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an entirely synthetic cohort which is stationary with respect to fertility and to pre-marital 
mortality). For both men and women, the education distribution has shifted rightward. 
Whereas the modal type of marriage in 1960 used to be one where both husband and wife 
had less than a high school education, in 2010 the modal type of marriage was one where 
both spouses had a college degree or more. 
 The aging of the married population and the rightward shift in the education 
distribution likely have opposite effects on the expected duration of first marriage. Higher 
ages at first marriage would, all else being equal, lead to fewer years spent together by 
spouses. The effect of the rightward shift in education is less clear. On the one hand, 
more educated people tend to divorce less, marry more, and die later. On the other, 
increased education would likely delay marriage, leading to fewer years spent together. It 
is unclear what would happen to the probability that a wife outlives her husband and the 
expected number of years a wife spends widowed in response to changing age at 
marriage and education. One possibility is that increased education may be associated 
with a greater number of years spent widowed because of the negative education gradient 
in mortality. 
Mortality 
The final factor that could affect the life cycles of married couples is changing 
mortality. Mortality has declined rapidly since 1960, resulting in higher life expectancies 
for most population subgroups. The distribution of mortality decline across time, age, and 
socioeconomic groups, however, has been uneven. Mortality has declined more rapidly 
for the college-educated than for those with less education. Mortality has also improved 
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more rapidly for men than for women since the late 1970s. As a result of narrowing sex 
differences in life expectancy, we would expect that mortality changes would increase the 
number of years couples can expect to spend together and decrease the probability that a 
wife outlives her husband. The effect of mortality declines on years spent widowed is 
ambiguous—mortality declines at older ages among women would lead to more years 
spent widowed, but faster mortality declines among prime age men would lead to a later 
age at widowhood (and thus fewer years spent widowed). 
Demographic Models of the Life Cycles of Married Couples 
Models for Part I: Mortality as the Sole Source of Marital Dissolution 
In the absence of divorce, the life cycle for a married couple is determined 
entirely by the timing of marriage and mortality. The age at which each spouse marries 
and dies determines the duration of the marriage, whether the wife outlives the husband, 
and the duration of widowhood. In prior studies, spousal life cycles have been modeled as 
a function of age alone (Goldman and Lord 1983). We can extend these life cycle models 
to account for other characteristics, allowing us to incorporate assortative mating into our 
model. 
Consider a couple who marry when the wife is aged  and the husband is aged 
. 
They have characteristics (in this paper, education levels) bcd , c%e, where   stands for the 
wife and Z for the husband. They are subject to a particular life table from marriage 
through the ends of their lives, so that the wife’s survivorship function is Hd>	cd and 
the husband’s survivorship function is H%>|c%. Their respective force of mortality 
functions are 3d>	cd and 3%>|c%. If we assume conditional independence between 
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spouses’ mortality risks, then the probability that a wife becomes a widow at exact time  
years after marriage is: 
Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd, c% H
%
 + |	cd, c%H%
|	cd , c% 3%
 + |	cd , c%, 
The first ratio is the probability that the wife will survive from marriage to  years after 
marriage, the second ratio is the probability that the husband will survive from marriage 
to  years after marriage, and the third term is the instantaneous probability that the 
husband will die exactly  years after marriage. This equation is thus the instantaneous 
probability that the wife becomes a widow at exact time  years after marriage. We would 
like to know the probability that the wife ever becomes a widow (i.e., the probability that 
she outlives her husband), so we add up the above probability formula over all possible 
values of . This is just the integral of the formula with respect to  ranging from 0 to ∞: 
f Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd , c% H
%
 + |	cd , c%H%
|	cd , c%
g
Q
3%
 + |	cd , c%	h. 
But not all husbands and wives get married at exact ages 
 and , and couples 
also differ in their levels of educational attainment. Some couples consist of a husband 
with some college and a wife with college or more, while others may consist of husbands 
and wives who both have only a high school diploma. We observe the probability 
distribution of the characteristics of couples in the population, K, 
, cd , c%. K gives us 
the likelihood of observing a wife and a husband who got married at exact ages  and 
 
and who have vectors of characteristics cd and c%. In other words, K is the function that 
summarizes assortative mating. This distribution is estimated using the observed 
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characteristics of spouses in the United States. We thus compute the probability that a 
randomly selected wife outlives her husband by taking a weighted average of the above 
integral equation, where the weights are supplied by K: 
ijk 5	l!Hm5'	K!'?>h 	=  
f f Hd + 	|	cd, c%Hd|	cd , c% H
%
 + |	cd , c%H%
|	cd , c% 3%
 + |	cd , c%	h	hK, 
, cd , c%	
g
Qno,p,qr,qs
 
where ΩP,u,Gr,Gs is the support for the distribution K. The outer integral is a Stieltjes 
integral with respect to the distribution, K, of the husband’s and wife’s characteristics. In 
other words, this formula is simply a weighted average. We first take the probability that 
a woman becomes a widow at exact time  given her and her husband’s age at marriage 
and education levels. We then multiply this by the probability of observing a couple with 
those characteristics, and we sum up this product across all couples. This gives us the 
desired quantity: the probability observed in the population that a wife outlives her 
husband. 
 Equivalent expressions for the expected years spent together and the expected 
years spent widowed are: 
v9w5>j'	Lx5	yz5ℎ5j: =	 
f f Hd + 	|	cd, c%Hd|	cd , c% H
%
 + |	cd , c%H%
|	cd , c% 	h	hK, 
, cd , c%	
g
Qno,p,qr,qs
 
and v9w5>j'	Lx5	khy|5h: 	=	 
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f f
}~
~~
 Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd , c% 1 −	H
%
 + |	cd , c%H%
|	cd , c% 
\ Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd , c% H
%
 + |	cd , c%H%
|	cd , c% 3%
 + |	cd , c%	hgQ 

 	h	hK, 
, cd , c%	.gQno,p,qr,qs  
The Effect of Changes in Assortative Mating 
 The final step is to estimate the effect of changes in assortative mating on changes 
in the survivorship of marriages: how has increased similarity between husbands and 
wives affected changes over time in the average number of years spent in the married 
state, probability that a wife outlives her husband, and number of years the surviving 
spouse spends in the widowed state? To answer these questions, we can use a 
decomposition approach. 
 The joint distribution of husbands’ and wives’ characteristics, K, is essentially the 
assortative mating function. It tells us who marries whom in a given period. To estimate 
the probability in 2010 that a randomly chosen wife outlives her husband, we compute an 
integral with respect to the K function observed in 2010. We also want to answer the 
question: how much of the change in the probability that a wife outlives her husband is 
due to changes in mortality, assortative mating, and population composition, 
respectively? We therefore decompose the integral equations into each of these three 
components. 
 If we assume that ℎ, the density corresponding to K, is well-defined, we can 
decompose how much of the change in the survivorship experience of married couples is 
due to changes in mortality, changes in assortative mating versus, and changes in 
population composition. Let  
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 -, 
, , cd , c% = 	 H-d + 	|	cd , c%H-d|	cd , c%
H-%
 + |	cd , c%H-%
|	cd, c% 3-%
 + |	cd, c% 
denote the instantaneous probability in period 1 that a woman becomes a widow exactly  
years after marriage, conditional on her and her husband’s characteristics at marriage, and 
let  6, 
, , cd , c% denote the equivalent probability for period 2. Similarly, define 
ℎ-, 
, cd , c% and ℎ6, 
, cd , c% to be the probability density functions of the 
husbands’ and wives’ characteristics in periods 1 and 2, respectively. 
 We first decompose the joint density ℎ into the product of conditional and 
marginal densities: 
ℎ, 
, cd , c% = >, cd	
, c%	j
, c% 
where > is the period  assortative mating function (the density of wife’s age and 
education values for a given age and education value for the husband) and j is the period 
 population composition function (i.e., j summarizes the age and education distribution 
of the population). The period  probability that a wife outlives her husband is thus: 
f f  , 
, , cd , c% ⋅ >, cd|
, c%	j
, c%	h	h	h
	hcd	hc%	gQ .no,p,qr,qs  
Then the change between periods 1 and 2 in the probability of widowhood is: 
f f  6, 
, , cd , c% ⋅ ℎ6, 
, cd , c%h	h	h
	hcd	hc% − 		gQno,p,qr,qs  
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f f  -, 
, , cd , c% ⋅ ℎ-, 
, cd , c%h	h	h
	hcd	hc%	gQno,p,qr,qs = 
f f  6>6j6 −  ->-j-	h	h	h
	hcd	hc%gQno,p,qr,qs  
= f f >6j6 + >-j-3 + >-j6 + >6j-6   6 −  -	h	h	h
	hcd	hc%
g
Qno,p,qr,qs`u	ddG
+ f f  6j6 +  -j-3 +  -j6 +  6j-6  >6 − >-	h	h	h
	hcd	hc%
g
Qno,p,qr,qs&&	`	ddG
+	 f f  6>6 +  ->-3 +  ->6 +  6>-6  j6 − j-	h	h	h
	hcd	hc%
g
Qno,p,qr,qs	V%&	ddG
. 
This decomposition essentially gives the portion of the change over time in the life cycle 
measure that is due to each factor (mortality, assortative mating, population composition) 
while holding the other two factors at an average level between the two periods. 
Symmetric decompositions for the number of years spent together and number of years 
spent widowed can be calculated by substituting the relevant mortality functions in place 
of  , wherever it appears. 
 In Part I of the empirical analysis, we focus on prevailing (current) marriages. 
Thus, instead of “ages at marriage”  and 
, we use age at survey of a currently married 
couple. In Part II, described below,  and 
 represent the true ages at marriage. 
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Models for Part II: Incorporating Marriage and Divorce 
The demographic models presented above have so far assumed that mortality is 
the only source of marital disruption and have focused only on prevailing marriages. 
However, since we are also interested in the effects on marital life cycles of changing 
selection into marriage and higher incidence of divorce, we can incorporate these two 
elements into the model fairly simply. First, we note that the density ℎ corresponding to 
the K function—the joint distribution of husbands’ and wives’ ages at marriage and 
educational attainments—can be decomposed into four components:  
ℎ, 
, cd , c% = 	ℎ
	, c%, cd × ℎ	c%, cd × ℎcd	c% × ℎc%, 
where the first component is the density of husband’s age at marriage given wife’s age at 
marriage and both spouses’ education levels; the second component is the density of 
wife’s age at marriage given both spouses’ education levels; the third component is the 
conditional probability mass function for education (i.e., the educational assortative 
mating function); and the fourth component is the probability mass function for education 
of husbands. If we assume that the wife’s age at marriage depends only on her own 
education and not her husband’s, then we can recover fairly accurate age and education-
specific marriage rates to construct this decomposition. 
 In addition to the density function for spouses’ education levels and ages at 
marriage, the marital life cycle measures consist of marriage, divorce, and mortality rates. 
In specific, the probability that a marriage survives to duration  is simply the probability 
that neither spouse dies and that the marriage does not end in divorce by duration . The 
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former component is just as before: rPW	|	Gr,GsrP|	Gr,Gs 
suW|	Gr,Gssu|	Gr,Gs . We can rewrite this joint 
survivorship function as follows: 
Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd , c% H
%
 + |	cd , c%H%
|	cd, c% =
H%
 + |	cd, c%H%
|	cd , c%Hd + 	|	cd, c%Hd|	cd , c%
×	Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd, c% 
6
= , 
, , cd , c% Hd + 	|	cd , c%Hd|	cd , c% 
6
 
so that  is a function of only the difference in mortality between males and females and 
the second term is the probability that a marriage does not end in death as of duration  if 
both spouses had the same mortality rates. The survivorship function for divorce, x, 
is the associated single decrement probability that a married woman has not divorced by 
marital duration . 
The expected duration of marriage is thus: 
f f , 
, , cd , c%	Hd + 	cdHd	cd 
6 ×g
Qno,p,qr,qs
ℎ
	, c%, cd × ℎ	c%, cd
× ℎcd	c% × ℎc% × x	h	h	h
	hcd	hc% 
The interpretation of this measure is as follows. If a cohort of 15-year old boys and girls 
were subject to period mortality, marriage, and divorce rates and followed the period 
schedule of assortative mating, then they could expect to spend the estimated number of 
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years in their first marriage.8 Note that  is a decreasing function of the difference in 
mortality between men and women, and not a function of male-female mortality ratios. 
Thus, marital durations depend on absolute differences in mortality and not on relative 
differences. Since the marital duration and other marital life cycle measures use period 
marriage, divorce, and mortality rates, they summarize the marital life cycle for a 
synthetic cohort of 15 year olds. The remaining life cycle measure formulas incorporating 
divorce and marriage data are constructed in a similar manner. Note that all of the above 
life cycle measures are based on a multiple decrement framework. 
 Because we have written the expected duration of marriage integral as a product 
of seven factors, we can decompose changes over time in this measure into the effect of 
changes in each of these seven factors in the style of Das Gupta (1993). This 
decomposition clarifies how much of the change over time in, for example, duration of 
first marriage is due to changes in sex differences in mortality, secular declines in 
mortality, increasing age at marriage, changes in assortative mating on age, 
intensification of educational assortative mating, the rightward shift of the educational 
distribution, and increasing rates of divorce. The sex difference in mortality factor (as 
separate from the secular declines in mortality factor) is included in the decomposition 
only for two measures: duration of first marriage and the probability that a first marriage 
ends in divorce. This is because the functional form for the remaining life cycle measures 
do not admit a multiplicative representation that includes an easily-interpreted sex 
                                                           
8
 Not all of these 15-year olds will eventually get married, since in general the ℎ	c%, cd function does not integrate to 1 (referred to as “unconditional” on marriage). 
For some of the estimates in the results section, I normalize this function to sum to one 
and thus provide “conditional on marriage” estimates, which are concerned only with the 
ever-married population.  
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difference in mortality factor. Thus, for the remaining life cycle measures, a single 
mortality component is used, capturing both changing sex differences and secular 
declines in mortality. 
Data and Methods 
I use data from nine different sources: complete life tables by single year from the 
Human Mortality Database (HMD) for years 1960 through 2010; the 1960 U.S. Census; 
the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for 1962 and 1964-2001; the June CPS 
Fertility and Marital History Supplement for 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; vital statistics 
on marriage for 1960 through 1990; the American Community Survey (ACS) for 2002-
2013, including data on marriage and divorce in 2008-2013; the National Health 
Interview Survey (NHIS) for 1986-2009 linked to the National Death Index with 
mortality follow-up through 2011; the National Longitudinal Mortality Study (NLMS) 
centered at 1983 with 11 years of mortality follow-up; and education-specific mortality 
ratios for 1960 based on the Matched Records Study reported in Kitagawa and Hauser 
(1973). 
Throughout Part I of this analysis I focus on opposite-sex couples where both 
spouses are aged 25 or older in a given year. Because of the lack of annual national 
marriage life tables and because it is not always possible to identify new marriages in 
survey data, I focus on all prevailing marriages and do not differentiate based on 
marriage order. In order to present a parsimonious analysis, all computations in Part I are 
“cause-deleted” in that they assume the absence of divorce. Thus, estimates of years 
spent together can be considered an upper bound. Another interpretation is that the Part I 
estimates represent the average marital life cycle for couples who place a zero probability 
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on ever getting divorced. I restrict the analysis to couples where both spouses are at least 
25 years of age in order to maximize the chance that both spouses have completed their 
highest level of education. 
In Part II of the empirical analysis, I incorporate marriage and divorce rates by 
education and expand the sample to include all first marriages for people aged 15 and 
above. I include people aged 15-24 in Part II because in the 1960s and 1970s, many 
people still married below age 20, and most women were married by age 25. I choose to 
concentrate on first marriages because the likelihood that an individual ever marries is a 
salient dimension of marriage. Furthermore, in the 2009 ACS roughly 75% of ever-
married people were only married once. The analysis in Part II is based entirely on a 
synthetic cohort. The estimates pertain to a synthetic cohort of 15-year old boys and girls 
who are subject to period rates and patterns of assortative mating throughout their lives. 
Unlike the estimates in Part I, the measures in Part II are thus not mechanically affected 
by fertility or by pre-marital mortality (though the rates themselves may be influenced by 
factors like unusually high or low sex ratios at birth etc.). 
Mortality Differentials 
 There are two main data components to the analysis in Part I. The first is to 
compute mortality statistics, and the second is to compute the joint distribution of 
spouses’ characteristics. Then, I combine these two components to compute the life cycle 
measures described in the previous section. For the mortality component, I estimate 
education-specific mortality by sex and 5-year age groups for ages 25-85+ for people 
with less than high school, high school graduates, those with some college, and people 
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with a college degree or more. This education categorization is the most fine-grained 
categorization available across all of the datasets I employ. I use NHIS and NLMS to 
compute the ratio of age-sex-education-specific mortality to the age-sex-specific 
mortality rate for the general surveyed population in 5-year age groups for the single 
years 1983 and 1990-2010. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I discuss the reliability of the 
NHIS-based estimates and conduct some sensitivity analyses showing that the estimates 
are robust to different specifications of the mortality estimator. I then linearly interpolate 
these hazard ratios across age groups to compute hazard ratios for single-year age groups. 
I set mortality ratios to 1 for ages 90+ since the estimates for those ages are less reliable. 
Because nationally-representative data on mortality by education is unavailable prior to 
the 1980s, I borrow the hazard ratios for 1960 reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.8 in Kitagawa 
and Hauser (1973) and combine them to reproduce education-specific mortality estimates 
by 5-year age groups. I then linearly interpolate the hazard ratios between 1960 and 1983, 
and then between 1983 and 1990. 
 I apply these education-specific hazard ratios to the mortality estimates from the 
HMD and compute education-specific complete life tables for ages 25-110+ for each year 
between 1960 and 2010. For all age intervals except 110+, I assume the mean years lived 
by life table decedents ( >P	 ) is 0.5 years. For 1990-2010, I find that applying the hazard 
ratios to HMD leads to life expectancy estimates that differ from the NHIS education-
specific life expectancy estimates by roughly 0.3 years (likely due to the fact that NHIS is 
representative of the civilian non-institutionalized population, whereas HMD life tables 
for the U.S. represent the mortality experience of the entire country). 
Husbands’ and Wives’ Characteristics at Survey 
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The second component of Part I consists of computing the joint density of 
husbands’ and wives’ ages and educational attainments using various micro-level 
datasets. For 1960, I use data from the U.S. Decennial Census, and for 1962 and 1964-
2001, I use data from the CPS March Supplement. Because the CPS top codes age below 
90 for 2002 onwards, I use data from the ACS for 2002-2010. I use 90+ as an open-ended 
age group when considering husbands’ and wives’ characteristics. For the years 1960, 
1962, and 1964-2010, I estimate the joint density of husbands’ and wives’ ages and 
education levels at the time of survey. 
Estimation of the Joint Density of Spouses’ Characteristics 
We would like to estimate the joint density of husbands’ and wives’ 
characteristics, including their respective ages and education levels at time of survey. 
Ideally, we would like our estimator of the joint density to rely as little as possible on 
parametric assumptions. One nonparametric solution to density estimation is the kernel 
density estimator (KDE). The KDE uses a smoothing approach to generalize and improve 
upon the discrete histogram. In the multivariate setting, given a series of  h-dimensional 
data points , … , , corresponding sample weights |-, … , | ∑ | = 1, and a 
positive-definite and symmetric h × h bandwidth matrix , the KDE for a point  is: 
   = 	 ||,-6 2|

¡- 	 ,
-6	 − ¢ 
where :ℝ¥ → 	ℝ is a scalar-valued kernel function, often taking the form of a 
probability density function.    is an estimator for  ., which is the true 
(unobserved) density function. In a crude sense, we are sorting our data points into bins 
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in ℝ¥ whose sizes are determined by . For a given point , we are looking for whether 
there are any points in nearby bins. We weight these nearby points by the value of the 
kernel function—the farther away a point is from , the lower is the value of the kernel 
function. Every point in the dataset gets assigned a value from the kernel function. The 
closer are data points to , the higher the density estimate for  . If there are relatively 
few points nearby, then the density estimate will be lower. Unlike the common 
histogram, the kernel density estimator uses every point in the dataset to estimate the 
density at . Thus, if there are no points in the bin containing , the estimate of  . need 
not be 0. The KDE smooths the estimate of  . using the kernel function and bandwidth 
matrix. The KDE allows for estimation of multivariate density functions for continuous 
random vectors (like husbands’ and wives’ ages). 
In practice, the choice of kernel function rarely matters for the accuracy of the 
KDE. In this study, I choose  to be the standard multivariate normal kernel, so the KDE 
reduces to 
   = 	 ||,-6 2|

¡- 	2¦,
¥6 	exp	ª−12,«	 − ¢
¬ ,«	 − ¢­ 
The choice of the bandwidth matrix  is the determining factor for the kernel density 
estimate (Wand and Jones 1995). Specifying a bandwidth matrix that corresponds to 
larger swathes of space leads to smoother estimates, while specifying a bandwidth matrix 
corresponding to smaller swathes of space allows the estimate to depend more on the data 
and less on the smoothing. Different kernel density estimators differ in how they select 
the bandwidth matrix. So-called optimal bandwidth selection techniques which minimize 
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loss functions have recently been developed, leading to theoretically more accurate 
density estimation. 
One commonly-used objective (loss) function is the mean integrated square error 
of the kernel density estimator: 
®Lv = v ¯ f A  ° −  B6 hℝ± ². 
Because the MISE does not admit a closed-form expression, optimal estimators are often 
defined as those which minimize the asymptotic mean integrated square error (AMISE): 
³®Lv° = ,-||,-6	´ +	14 366vech¬	 ¹¸vech	 
where ´ is the integral of the squared kernel function, 36º¥ =	\ »		hℝ± , 
vech is the vector half operator (that is, for a square h × h matrix ¼, vech¼ is the 
vector of length ¥¥,-6  that stacks the lower triangle portions of the columns of ¼ on top 
of each other), and ¹¸ = \ vech	2D6  − hzD6 		vech¬2D6  −ℝ±
hzD6 		h is a matrix of integrated fourth order partial derivatives of   (D is the 
hessian operator). 
I use the plug-in bandwidth selector of Duong and Hazelton (2003, 2005), which 
converges in probability to the matrix that minimizes ³®Lv°. I first estimate the 
joint probability mass function for husbands’ and wives’ education levels (a 4 × 4 table 
in each year). Then, for each husband’s education/wife’s education combination I 
estimate the joint density of husbands’ and wives’ ages at survey. For Part I, I compute 
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density estimates over a 300 × 300 grid of ages ranging from 25.125 years to 99.875 
years for each spouse, with a resolution of 0.25 × 0.25 years squared for each of the 16 
education pairings in each of the 49 years in the dataset, resulting in 70.56 million density 
estimates. I normalize each matrix to sum to 1, and then sum to reduce each matrix to a 
66 × 66 matrix, where each cell corresponds to a particular combination of husband’s 
age and wife’s age, where age is between 25 and 90+ (90+ is the open-ended age group). 
For Part II, I compute density estimates over a  340 × 340 grid of ages ranging from 
15.125 years to 99.875 years for each spouse, with a resolution of 0.25 × 0.25 years 
squared for each of the 16 education pairings in each of the 49 years in the dataset, 
resulting in over 90.63 million density estimates. I normalize each matrix to sum to 1, and 
then sum to reduce each matrix to a 76 × 76 matrix, where each cell corresponds to a 
particular combination of husband’s age and wife’s age, where age is between 15 and 
90+ (90+ is the open-ended age group). 
Marriage and Divorce Rates 
 I estimate rates of first marriage and divorce by education for people on their first 
marriage in 5 year age/duration groups for 1960 through 1989 using data from the June 
CPS Fertility and Marital History supplements for 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990. These 
rates are based on retrospective reports, which has advantages and disadvantages. One of 
the main disadvantages is recall bias—individuals may not accurately remember (or may 
actively choose to forget) the dates of their past marriages or divorces. Others may 
purposely misstate whether or not they went through a divorce because being divorced 
carries with it a great deal of stigma. On the other hand, retrospective marital histories are 
helpful when examining trends by education level, since the rates correspond to the group 
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of people that will eventually have a given education level. If a woman marries at age 20 
and hasn’t yet completed college, then at the time of marriage we might consider her 
education level to be “some college,” even though she may eventually complete college. 
However, if we use retrospective data we are more likely to mark her down as a college 
graduate (if that is her highest level of education). I form the age-specific first marriage 
rates by computing the ratio of women who married in a given year to women who were 
single in that year for a given age group. For example, using the 1990 June CPS, I can 
compute the number of marriages in 1982 among women who were aged 20-25 by 
calculating the number of women aged 28-33 at survey who reported first marrying in 
1982. I compute the denominator—the number of women aged 20-25 who were subject 
to first marriage in 1982—by summing the numerator with the number of women aged 
28-33 at survey who had not married as of 1982. The divorce rate for first marriages is 
formed similarly: the number of women who divorced in a given year at a given duration 
of first marriage divided by the number of women who were on their first marriage at a 
given duration in the specified year. Both estimators rely on the Hajnal-type assumptions 
that mortality and migration rates are the same for the population at risk and the 
population accruing occurrences (divorce or marriage). Because both measures are ratios 
of occurrences to exposure, they are consistent estimators of marriage and divorce rates 
(that is, they are not simply estimates of “proportion married” but actual rates). In order 
to get smooth estimates, for a given year I compute symmetric five-year moving averages 
(i.e., for 1987, the estimate is the average of the 1985-1989 estimates). I assume rates are 
constant within five-year age/duration intervals. 
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 The marriage and divorce statistics are graphed in Figures 17-22b. Figures 17-
19b compare the CPS-based marriage statistics to those based on U.S. vital statistics. The 
figures marked “a” are based on associated single decrement estimates and the figures 
marked “b” are based on a multiple decrement framework. I present both types of 
estimates in order to make clear any deficiencies in the data and the magnitude of the 
effect of these deficiencies (some of the deficiencies occur at ages or durations where 
high mortality or low prevalence of marriage negate any adverse effect of poor data 
quality). For marriage rate estimates in a given year, I use the June CPS wave whose 
estimates most closely correspond to the vital statistics estimates. Marriage rates for 
1960-1969 are based on the 1971 CPS; 1970-1972 on the 1976 CPS; 1973-1976 on the 
1980 CPS; and 1977-1989 on the 1990 CPS. The correspondence between the vital 
statistics and CPS estimates is fairly close. The largest discrepancies are in the early 
1960s and late 1970s/early 1980s, where the probability of ever marrying differs by 1-
2%. The estimates of the probability that a marriage ends in divorce match fairly closely 
to estimates of divorce probabilities presented in Preston (1975) and vital statistics 
estimates for 1965 forward. Estimates for 1960-1964 are too low by roughly 4 percentage 
points. 
 For the years 2008-2010, I use data from the 2008-2013 ACS to compute 
marriage and divorce rates. In these years, ACS asked respondents whether they 
experienced a marriage or divorce in the prior 12 months. I focus on individuals who 
have only been married once in order to compute rates of first marriage and divorce for 
people on their first marriage (to match with the CPS estimates). Because these estimates 
correspond to the prior 12 months and are thus centered on January 1 of the survey year, I 
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take the average of adjacent survey year estimates to retrieve marriage and divorce 
estimates centered on July 1 of the survey year. I then linearly interpolate the rates 
between 1987 (based on CPS data) and 2008 (based on ACS data) to fill in the marriage 
and divorce rate estimates for 1988-2007. 
Computing Marital Life Cycle Measures 
 I compute the integral equations and decompositions described in the previous 
section numerically by summing the product of the vital rate components and joint 
density components over the support of the distributions at the level of single-year age 
groups. In order to convey the maximum amount of information in a limited amount of 
space, I present the trajectories of the life cycle measures in graph form. In addition, I 
provide some of the decompositions in tabular form in Appendix C. 
 The decompositions of the life cycle measures into mortality, sex differences in 
mortality, divorce, assortative mating on age, educational assortative mating, age at 
marriage, and education distribution components is carried out in a similar manner, using 
mortality, marriage, divorce and joint density data centered on single-year age groups. 
Results 
Trends in Assortative Mating 
 The first factor hypothesized to have influenced the change in the life cycles of 
married couples is the intensification of assortative mating.  
Figure 1 plots the difference in age between husbands and wives between 1960 
and 2010. The top panel shows kernel density estimates of the difference between 
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husband’s age and wife’s age for 1960 and 2010. Over that fifty-year period, the age 
difference distribution shifted left by slightly more than one year, indicating that 
husbands and wives have grown closer in age. The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots trends 
in the mean and standard deviation of the age difference distribution between 1960 and 
2010. There has been a secular downward trend in the mean age difference between 
husbands and wives—the mean age difference declined from 3.4 years to 2.4 years over 
this period. Similarly, the standard deviation declined from over 5.3 years to 4.7 years in 
the mid-1980s. Since then, it has climbed back to 5.0 years.  
 Figure 2 plots isodensity curves for the joint distribution of husbands’ and wives’ 
ages in 1960 and 2010. The solid red line indicates that the husband’s age equals the 
wife’s age, and the area between the dashed blue lines corresponds to adherence to the 
so-called “half your age plus seven” rule (in the United States, a rule of thumb is that a 
suitable partner must be at least half your age plus seven years). It is clear that between 
1960 and 2010, the joint distribution of husbands’ and wives’ ages has grown tighter 
around the 45 degree line. Furthermore, the married population has aged over this period. 
In both years, well over 95% of the married population adheres to the “half your age plus 
seven” rule. In general, husbands and wives tend to be of similar age, and this tendency 
has grown stronger over time. 
 Figure 3 plots the mean age difference between husbands and wives by education 
level between 1960 and 2010. The education values on the left side of the figure indicate 
the husband’s level of education, and the values on the bottom side of the figure indicate 
the wife’s level of education. This figure shows that the secular decline in the mean age 
difference is shared across almost all marriage types. In the prior literature, it’s been 
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hypothesized that college attendance has structured marriage markets, leading to more 
similar ages at marriage for college-educated husbands and wives. This figure shows that 
in addition, age differences have declined for most other education pairings as well. This 
may be due to equilibrium effects—if expectations have changed so that, for example, a 
high school graduate no longer expects to marry a college graduate, and instead expects 
to marry a high school graduate, then this could lead to reduced age differences among 
spouses across education groups.  
 Figure 4 plots the joint distribution of husband’s and wife’s education in 1960 
and 2010. The size of each block represents the relative size of each type of marriage, 
where the wife’s education is indicated on the vertical axis and the husband’s education is 
indicated on the horizontal axis. In 1960, the modal couple type consisted of a marriage 
where both spouses had less than a high school diploma. By 2010, the modal couple type 
consisted of a marriage where both spouses had at least a college degree.  
Figure 5 plots the proportionate distribution of marriages by spouses’ education 
levels. Four of the lines represent educationally-homogamous marriage types, and the 
fifth, labeled “other”, represents non-homogamous marriages. From this figure, it is clear 
that the distribution of the types of homogamous marriages changed over time. Marriages 
consisting of spouses who are either both high school graduates or college graduates have 
increased in proportion whereas the proportion of marriages consisting of spouses who 
both have less than high school has decreased dramatically. Part of this is due to shifts in 
the marginal distribution of education (i.e., the availability of spouses of a particular 
education level), but part of the change is also due to intensified educational assortative 
mating.  
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Trends in Differential Mortality  
 A second factor hypothesized to propel change in the life cycles of married 
couples is declining mortality. Mortality declined dramatically between 1960 and 2010, 
and it did so faster for some education groups than among others. Figures 6 and 7 plot 
mortality ratios by age and education group in 1990 and 2010 for men and women, 
respectively. Several facts are readily apparent from these figures. First, mortality ratios 
tend to be greatest in magnitude at the younger adult ages and tend to asymptote towards 
1 as age increases towards 90. This is not simply a result of the interpolation assumptions 
made in this analysis—education-specific mortality ratios for ages 85+ were estimated to 
be very close to 1. This is consistent with prior literature documenting a flattening of 
educational gradients in mortality with age in period data.  
Second, the mortality ratios of education groups have diverged from each other 
over time. Figures 8 and 9 plot mortality ratios by age and education for males and 
females, respectively. The red lines represent earlier years, and the blue lines represent 
later years. It is clear from these figures and from Figures 6 and 7 that mortality ratios 
have increased for the less than high school group and decreased for the college or more 
group between 1960 and 2010. In the earlier years, male high school graduates had a 
fairly flat age profile in mortality ratios (i.e., mortality ratios that were fairly close to 1 at 
all ages). Similarly, female high school graduates had mortality ratios below 1 at most 
ages in the earlier period. In more recent years, their mortality ratios have climbed to 
much higher levels, well above 1. As the education distribution shifted rightward and the 
size of the high school graduate group shrunk relative to the size of the college graduate 
group, the mortality ratios for high school graduates increased at the prime adult ages. 
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For both men and women, trends in the mortality ratios for the some college group are 
less clear, but it appears that they have also increased at most ages over time. Despite the 
fact that the mortality ratios are growing more extreme, there has been a secular decline 
in mortality, so relative differences do not necessitate increased absolute differences.  
Part I: Mortality as the Sole Source of Marital Disruption 
Trends in the Life Cycles of Married Couples 
 Using the mortality and density data discussed above, I compute the population 
average life cycles for married couples. 
 Figure 10 plots the life cycle measures for married couples between 1960 and 
2010. The top panel in Figure 10 plots the number of years spouses can expect to spend 
together (i.e., they are both alive) given their ages at the time of survey in the absence of 
divorce. In 1960, couples could expect to spend on average around 22 years together and 
by 2010, they could expect to spend 26 years together. This roughly 4-year (18%) 
increase in years spent together can be considered an improvement in well-being for 
married couples since it is likely couples derive a wide range of benefits from increases 
in years lived together.  
 The middle panel of Figure 10 plots the probability that a wife can expect to 
outlive her husband. This number declined from a peak of over 70% to roughly 64% 
between the late 1960s and 2010. While the magnitude of change in this probability may 
seem small, it corresponds to a very large shift in the expected life cycle of married 
individuals. This represents roughly 1 in 20 marriages ending in widowerhood rather than 
widowhood.  
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The bottom panel of Figure 10 graphs the number of years a wife can expect to 
spend widowed conditional on outliving her husband. This number peaked in the late 
1960s at almost 16.5 years and declined to below 14.5 years by 2010. This 2-year (12%) 
decline in expected years spent widowed accompanies a large decline in the probability 
of widowhood (discussed above), representing a very real improvement in the 
circumstances of older married couples. Women’s mortality declined monotonically 
throughout this 50-year period so the decline in expected years spent widowed is an 
unambiguously positive change. This decline in expected years spent widowed is not due 
to women living shorter lives—they aren’t—but due to husbands living longer lives 
relative to their wives, thus shortening the duration of widowhood. In sum, couples are 
spending more years together; widowhood is becoming less common; and women who 
outlive their husbands can expect to spend less time in widowhood.  
Decomposition of Changes in Marital Life Cycles into Mortality, Assortative Mating, and 
Population Composition Components 
 We would like to understand the sources of the positive changes in the life cycles 
of married couples described above. To do so, I employ standard decomposition 
techniques to separate the independent effects of mortality declines and changes in 
mortality differentials; the intensification of assortative mating on age and education; and 
the rightward shift in the marginal distributions of age and education for the married 
population (changing population composition). 
 Figures 11-13 plot the three component decompositions of changes in the life 
cycles of married couples described above. In each figure, the line consisting of open 
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circles represents the mortality component; the line consisting of triangles represents the 
assortative mating component; and the line consisting of plus signs represents the 
population composition component (i.e., the rightward shift in the marginal distributions 
of age and education for the married population). Figure 11 decomposes the increase in 
years spent together between year  and 2010, where  is represented by the value of the 
x-axis. It is clear that most of the increase in years spent together stems from changes in 
mortality. Starting in the late 1960s and continuing through 2010, there was a secular 
decline in mortality that was stronger for men than for women. This is in part because of 
men’s and women’s differential smoking histories. Men’s smoking-attributable mortality 
peaked in the early 1990s, whereas years of life lost due to smoking for women has 
continued to rise or has recently leveled off (see Appendix Figures A1 and A2). Note 
that the divergence in mortality ratios between education groups does not offset the 
impact of the secular mortality decline. The increased mortality ratios were coupled with 
a declining prevalence of marriages consisting of spouses with low education. In 
equilibrium, this led to a better outcome for the average couple in the population in terms 
of years spent together. Assortative mating does not seem to have played much of a role 
in driving changes in years spent together. The contribution of this component is almost 
flat at 0 for the entire period. Changes in the composition of married couples seems to 
have worked in the opposing direction of the mortality component—rightward shifts in 
the education distribution of married couples led to fewer years spent together on 
average. However, this was offset by the gains produced by mortality declines. 
Figure 12 graphs the decomposition for the probability that a wife outlives her 
husband. Once again, assortative mating plays a relatively small role, though its relative 
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impact is larger for this outcome than for years spent together. Changes in assortative 
mating are responsible for roughly 5% of the decline in the probability that a wife 
outlives her husband. The bulk of the decline can be attributed to changes in mortality. 
This makes sense, since men’s mortality converged towards women’s mortality in this 
50-year period. As husbands’ mortality converged to their wives’ mortality, the 
likelihood that a wife outlived her husband became lower. Changes in population 
composition (aging and increased education) played a relatively small role, similar in 
magnitude to the effect of assortative mating.  
 Figure 13 plots the decomposition of the number of years a wife can expect to 
spend in the widowed state conditional on outliving her husband. Most of the change in 
this life cycle measure can be attributed to changes in population composition. This is 
surprising because population aging should not play much of a role in the expected years 
spent widowed, so much of the effect for population composition derives from changes in 
the educational distribution. Surprisingly, mortality plays a relatively small role in 
explaining changes in this life cycle measure between 1960 and 2010. Assortative mating 
explains close to 20% of the decline in years spent widowed and its effect size is greater 
than twice as large as the mortality component for the change between 1960 and 2010. 
This suggests that years spent widowed is more sensitive to assortative mating than the 
other two life cycle measures. 
 The remaining three figures (Figures 14-16) plot the three life cycle measures 
under two scenarios: the actual (observed) scenario, and a scenario under which there is 
no educational assortative mating. In other words, men and women mate at random with 
respect to education (but not age). Under the random mating scenario, we see that the 
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expected number of years spent together is lower by roughly 0.9 years at the peak 
difference (Figure 14). Figures 15-16, on the other hand, show that there is no major 
difference between the observed and random mating scenarios for the widowhood 
probability and years spent widowed. 
Part II: Marriage, Divorce, Mortality, and Marital Life Cycles 
 This second part of the empirical analysis incorporates changing marriage and 
divorce rates into the marital life cycle computations. Figure 17 plots the rate of first 
marriage for women aged 20-24 between 1960 and 1990. This is the age group where 
marriage was most common in this time period. We see that while the CPS data matches 
fairly closely to the vital statistics estimates from 1965 forward, the discrepancy is much 
larger for 1960-1964. In Figures 18-22, each figure has an “a” and “b” component. The 
“a” component graphs trends using an associated single decrement estimator, which does 
not take into account mortality (or changing age at marriage for the divorce measure). 
The “b” component graphs trends using the multiple decrement framework described 
above. By including both types of figures, we can arrive at a more complete picture of the 
data. Figures 18a and 18b plot the period probability of ever marrying using data from 
each of the four June CPS surveys and the U.S. vital statistics. Again, while we see a 
fairly close match in most years, the CPS data underestimates marriage by 1-2 percentage 
points from 1960-1968 in 18a. CPS-based marriage estimates are slightly higher than 
vital statistics around the year 1980 in 18b. For the purposes of computing the integral 
equations described above, I combine data from four different June CPS surveys, where 
the survey used in a given year is chosen based on closeness to vital statistics estimates. 
Figures 19a and 19b plot the composite marriage series using the four different CPS 
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surveys. Figures 20a and 20b plot the same composite series but include marriage data 
from ACS for the years 2008 through 2012. 
Figures 21a and 21b plot the probability of ever marrying by education for 1960-
2012. The estimates are interpolated for 1988-2007. We see that the vital statistics 
estimate (the purple triangles) are situated in the center of the education-specific 
estimates, suggesting these estimates of education-specific marriage probabilities are 
reasonable. According to Figure 21b, in the 1960s over 88% of single women could 
expect to eventually get married (based on period rates). College-educated women had 
the lowest likelihood of marriage, at roughly 83% in 1960. With the rise of tertiary 
education among women, marriage rates declined through the 1960s and 1970s. By 2010, 
just over 80% of single women could expect to get married. Furthermore, a very clear 
educational gradient had emerged. Whereas college-educated women were the least 
likely to get married in 1960, by 2010 they were the most likely to eventually marry. 
Roughly 87% of college-educated women could expect to get married in 2010, compared 
to 73%-78% for women in the remaining three education groups. Women with less than a 
high school education were the least likely to marry—their marriage probability was 
roughly 73% in 2010. 
Figures 22a and 22b plot the probability that a marriage will end in divorce 
(according to period rates). Divorce was relatively uncommon in the early 1960s. Based 
on Figure 22b, in 1965, approximately one quarter of women on their first marriages 
could expect to get divorced. By 1970, that number was closer to 35%, and by the 1980s 
the divorce probability for first marriages was around 45% for three of the four education 
groups. For most of the period under consideration, college-educated women have been 
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the least likely to experience divorce from a first marriage. Divorce probabilities 
plateaued in the 1980s and have stayed fairly constant since for those with less than high 
school or college or more and increased for the middle two education groups. Around 
40% of college-educated women can expect their first marriage to end in divorce as of 
2010. For women with a high school diploma or some college, that number is much 
higher—closer to 53%. Women with less than a high school diploma have a divorce 
probability of 39%. 
 Figures 23-27 each contain two data series per graph. The first data series, 
labeled “unconditional,” indicates that the outcome refers to the general population while 
second data series, labeled as “conditional on marriage”, refers to people who ever marry. 
In other words, the unconditional series describes trends for a cohort of 15 year-old girls 
and boys who are subject to the period rates and assortative mating schedules while the 
conditional on marriage series is representative of only the portion of that cohort who will 
eventually go on to marry. As might be expected, in Figures 23-27, the unconditional 
data series always lies below the conditional data series. Generally, the time trends are 
similar for the two series. The unconditional data series may not seem sensible for some 
of the measures. For example, a marriage cannot end in widowhood if there was no 
marriage to begin with. The exact interpretation of the unconditional data series would be 
the probability that a 15 year-old marries and that first marriage ends in widowhood. The 
interpretation of the conditional data series is that a 15 year-old’s first marriage ends in 
widowhood given that they got married. Thus, in the paragraphs that follow, I focus on 
the conditional data series.  
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Figure 23 plots the expected duration of first marriage, taking into account 
changing marriage and divorce rates. In 1960, a 15 year-old could expect to spend 34.5 
years in their first marriage. By 2010, that number had declined to 25.6 years, an almost 
9-year decline. The decline was especially rapid between 1960 and 1980. Since 1980, the 
expected duration of first marriage has stayed fairly constant. This constancy in marital 
duration since 1980 coincides with the less rapid increases in divorce following 1980 and 
the plateauing of divorce rates for those with less than high school or college or more. 
Figure 24 shows the probability that a first marriage will end in widowhood (i.e., 
the death of the husband). In 1960, the probability that a first marriage ends in 
widowhood was 57% and by 2010, that probability was 34%. Similar to the trends in 
marital duration, the probability that a marriage ends in widowhood decreased 
dramatically from 1960 through the late 1970s and then declined more gradually from 
1980 through 2010.  
Figure 25 plots the probability that a first marriage ends in widowerhood (i.e., the 
death of the wife). In 1960, the probability that a first marriage ends in widowerhood was 
24% and by 2010, that probability was 17%. The time trend of this measure is very 
similar to that of the previous two measures. 
Figure 26 shows the probability that a first marriage ends in divorce. In 1960, this 
probability was roughly 19% and by 2010, it had climbed to 48%. Most of the increase 
occurred between 1960 and 1978. Since around 1980, there’s been a more gradual rate of 
increase in the divorce probability.  
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Figure 27 graphs the expected duration of widowhood following a first marriage. 
Note that these estimates are not conditional on a marriage ending in widowhood and 
thus can be influenced by, for example, divorce probabilities. The expected duration of 
widowhood more than halved between 1960 and 2010 (due largely to the dramatic 
increase in divorce, which competes with widowhood as a cause of marital dissolution). 
In 1960, a 15 year-old could expect a period of 11.4 years of widowhood following their 
first marriage and by 2010, this number was 5.5 years. The decline in duration of 
widowhood is smoother than the declines in other measures reported in Figures 23-26. 
Though the slope of the decline is steeper between 1960 and 1980 compared to 1980 and 
2010, these slopes are more similar for the duration of widowhood than for the other 
measures.  
Figure 28 plots the prevalence of widowhood by age and sex based on data from 
the 2010 ACS. These estimates are based on the general population and are not derived 
from calculations based on a synthetic cohort. This figure demonstrates that there is a 
strong age gradient to widowhood, which is very different for men than for women. 
Women are more likely to be widows than are men at every age, and the rate of increase 
by age in widowhood is steeper for women than for men. Except for the very oldest ages 
(95+ years), fewer than 50% of men are widowers. This figure is a cross-sectional 
estimate, and thus represents the past experience of multiple birth cohorts. To the extent 
that the population is not stationary (i.e., there have been changes in marriage, divorce, 
mortality, and assortative mating), this figure will be non-representative of the experience 
of actual birth cohorts and will be inconsistent with life table estimates of widowhood 
(like those graphed in Figures 24 and 25).  
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Figure 29 uses the synthetic cohort assumption and the mathematics described 
above to compute the mean age at widowhood and widowerhood for women and men, 
respectively, between 1960 and 2010. The mean age at widowhood increased from 60.8 
years in 1960 to 69.3 years in 2010. The mean age at widowerhood increased from 65.6 
years in 1960 to 72.8 years in 2010. The increase for both men and women has been 
fairly linear over time. 
Figures 30-34 plot decompositions of changes over time in the synthetic cohort 
marital life cycle measures. The decompositions for duration of first marriage and 
probability that a first marriage ends in divorce include 7 factors: changes over time in 
sex differences in mortality (SDM), overall mortality (Mortality), age at marriage 
(Marriage), assortative mating on age (AMA), rates of divorce (Divorce), assortative 
mating on education (AME), and the education distribution (Education). The 
decompositions for the remaining three life cycle measures (probability of widowhood, 
probability of widowerhood, and duration of widowhood) include only 6 factors, omitting 
sex differences in mortality for reasons described above. For any given year, the bars in 
each decomposition add up to the change over time between 1960 and year  in the 
relevant outcome. These figures are also available in table form in Appendix C. 
Figure 30 graphs a decomposition of the change between 1960 and year  in the 
expected duration of first marriage between 1960 and 2010. Over this time period, the 
expected duration of first marriage decreased by roughly 8.8 years. Most of this decline is 
due to increases in rates of divorce and increasing age at first marriage. Declines in 
mortality, narrowing sex differences in mortality, the intensification of educational 
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assortative mating, and the rightward shift of the education distribution have offset 
further declines in the duration of first marriage.  
Figure 31 plots a decomposition of the change between 1960 and year  in the 
probability that a first marriage ends in widowhood between 1960 and 2010. The great 
majority of the change over time in the probability of widowhood can be attributed to 
increasing rates of divorce. In the earlier period, between 1960 and the mid-1980s, 
changes in mortality worked to increase the probability that a marriage ends in 
widowhood whereas between 1985 and 2010, changes in mortality led to decreases in this 
probability. Assortative mating on age had the exact opposite pattern: prior to the mid-
1980s, changes in assortative mating on age produced declines in the probability of 
widowhood whereas in more recent years, changes in assortative mating on age have 
prevented further declines in the probability that a marriage ends in widowhood. Changes 
in educational assortative mating and age at marriage have both led to slightly higher 
probabilities of widowhood whereas rightward shifts in the education distribution have 
led to lower probabilities that a marriage ends in widowhood. 
Figure 32 graphs the decomposition of the change between 1960 and year  in the 
probability that a first marriage ends in widowerhood. Most of the trends in the early 
period (through 1990) were driven by changes in divorce, leading to lower probability 
that a first marriage ends in widowerhood. Starting in the early 1990s and continuing 
through 2010, changes in mortality, age at marriage, and education prevented further 
declines in the probability of widowerhood. Prior to 1990, however, changes in mortality 
worked alongside changes in divorce to decrease the probability of widowerhood. 
Changes in educational assortative mating has also led to lower widowerhood 
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probabilities. Changes in assortative mating on age led to higher probabilities of 
widowerhood in the 1960s and 1970s and slightly lower probabilities in the 2000s. 
Figure 33 shows the decomposition of the change over time between 1960 and 
year  in the probability that a first marriage ends in divorce. This decomposition is 
dominated by the effect of changes in divorce rates. Rising age at marriage, especially 
since the late 1980s, has had a slight countervailing effect, preventing further increases in 
the probability that a marriage ends in divorce. The remaining factors had very small 
effects. 
Figure 34 plots a decomposition of the change between 1960 and year  in the 
expected duration of widowhood following first marriage. Much of the change in the 
duration of widowhood has been driven by changes in divorce, changes in age at 
marriage, and the shifting education distribution, which have all led to shorter durations 
of widowhood. Between 1960 and the early 1990s, changes in mortality led to longer 
durations of widowhood. But from the mid-1990s through 2010, changes in mortality 
have produced declines in the duration of widowhood. In the most recent period, changes 
in both education- and age-based assortative mating have produced slight increases in the 
duration of widowhood. From 1960 through 1980, changes in assortative mating on age 
led to slightly lower durations of widowhood. 
Discussion 
 This chapter presents several key findings on the life cycles of married couples. 
The analysis was split into two parts. Part I focused on changes in marital life cycles 
considering the effect of changing mortality conditions alone (i.e., in the absence of 
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divorce). Part II incorporated changing marriage and divorce rates into the analysis. In 
Part I, I find that married couples who do not divorce can expect to spend four more years 
together in 2010 relative to 1960. Much of this change is due to changing mortality 
conditions. Mortality declined in the general population, but it declined much more 
quickly for men than for women starting in the late 1970s. This narrowing sex difference 
in life expectancy led to more time spent together for husbands and wives, lower 
probabilities of widowhood (and, consequently, higher probabilities of widowerhood) in 
the absence of divorce, and less time spent in the widowed state conditional on a wife 
outliving her husband. The probability that a wife outlives her husband is 5 percentage 
points lower in 2010 compared to the late 1960s. This probability declined from around 
70% to below 65%, and has stayed constant around 65% since the turn of the 21st 
century. Finally, the expected duration of widowhood is shorter by 2 years in 2010 
compared to the 1960s; it declined from roughly 16.5 years at its peak in 1970 to less 
than 14.5 years in 2010. 
 The three explanations proposed for changing marital life cycles—changes in 
mortality, changes in assortative mating by age and education, and changes population 
composition (i.e.,  the rightward shift in age and education distribution)—had different 
effects for each of the three outcomes: expected duration of marriage, probability that a 
wife outlives her husband, and expected duration of widowhood. Assortative mating was 
responsible for almost none of the change over time in years spent together and around 
5% of the change in the probability that a wife outlives her husband, but was responsible 
for a much larger share of the change in years spent widowed. Over one-fifth of the 
decline since 1960 in years spent widowed is due to changes in assortative mating, 
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compared to less than one-tenth for changes in mortality. While changes in mortality 
played a smaller role in driving changes in years spent widowed, it had an outsized 
impact on changes in the probability that a wife outlives her husband and the expected 
number of years spent together. It was responsible for almost all of the change in years 
spent together and roughly 90% of the decline in the probability of widowhood. 
Population composition, which consists of changes in the age and education distribution, 
had its biggest impact on changes in years spent widowed. 
 In addition to the decomposition results, Figures 14-16 presented the results of a 
thought experiment: if we entirely removed educational assortative mating, what would 
happen to marital life cycles? We found that for the most part, marital life cycles 
wouldn’t change in terms of widowhood probabilities and years spent widowed. 
However, removing assortative mating results in up to 0.9 fewer years spent together. 
The fact that imposing random mating affects years spent together but not the other two 
measures suggests that assortative mating acts on life cycles by decreasing sex 
differences in the age pattern of mortality prior to widowhood. The probability of 
widowhood itself doesn’t change. What changes is the distribution of deaths prior to that 
point. Note that the expected duration of widowhood and expected duration of marriage 
do not, in general, sum to the life expectancy for women, since the expected duration of 
widowhood is conditional on a woman eventually becoming a widow (whereas the 
expected duration of marriage is not). Assortative mating thus leads to men dying on 
average at ages closer to their wives’ ages at death, but only for the younger part of the 
age distribution. The difference between the observed and random mating lines is fairly 
constant for years spent together. This suggests that while assortative mating does 
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influence the number of years spouses can expect to spend together, it has not driven 
changes over time in that measure. 
 The fact that educational assortative mating has a relatively small impact on 
changes in marital life cycles is not what would be expected based on theories of social 
stratification and health. As described in the introductory sections of this chapter, the 
intensification of educational assortative mating is predicted to narrow differences in a 
multitude of characteristics between husbands and wives. Education is described as a 
prime measure of social distance in the literature on assortative mating (Schwartz and 
Mare 2005; Schwartz 2013). As more educationally similar people marry, the social 
distance between husbands and wives should decline as well. 
As described in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, education is not a static measure of 
status. It is socially constructed and thus its utility as a marker of social honor is variable 
across time and contexts. In the past, most people didn’t go to college and many didn’t 
even graduate from high school. This had little bearing on their status. In 1960, a husband 
with a college degree may have married his high school sweetheart who never attended 
college. This type of couple pairing was just as common as two college graduates 
marrying. The fact that they had different education levels did not indicate that they came 
from different status groups or social strata. Over time, the way social honor was 
assigned changed, so education became more aligned with status. In the present period, it 
is far less likely that a randomly selected college-educated person would be married to 
someone with only a high school diploma. However, the difference in status between 
husbands and wives may not have changed at all. 
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In short, the minimal effects of changes in assortative mating on changes in 
marital life cycles suggests one of two possibilities: (1) differences in education are not a 
static marker of social distance and thus are not a perfect measure of assortative mating; 
(2) education differences are a good measure of social distance, but some other factor 
offset the narrowing mortality differences that would have been due to assortative 
mating. Either possibility is likely. The first has been described thoroughly in Chapter 2. 
The second possibility could arise from reverse educational gradients in some 
mortality risk factor for men and women that do not manifest for some multiple-decade 
time lag. One example is smoking (Ho and Fenelon 2015). For women in the early to 
mid-20th century, smoking was fairly uncommon (but among those who did smoke, it was 
more common among the less-educated). For men, on the other hand, the more-educated 
tended to smoke at higher rates. Over the course of the 20th century this so-called 
“inverse educational gradient” in smoking for men reversed itself, leading to smoking 
becoming concentrated among less-educated men. If education is a good (and static) 
measure of social honor, because educational assortative mating grew stronger over time 
and because of the inverse smoking gradient for men in the cohorts who are being 
considered, it could appear in the recent period that more intense assortative mating has 
not led to changes in marital life cycles. As a future extension of this study, one could test 
this smoking and assortative mating hypothesis using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study, which is the only mortality-linked survey in the United States to have 
data on the smoking behavior of both husbands and wives. 
Part II of the analysis focuses on the effects of changing marriage and divorce 
rates on marital life cycles. This part of the analysis shows that above all else, divorce has 
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been the primary determinant of changing marital life cycles since 1960. Increasing rates 
of divorce have not only decreased the likelihood that a marriage ends in divorce, but 
have also shortened the duration of first marriages, decreased the likelihood of a marriage 
ending in widowhood or widowerhood, and shortened the expected duration of 
widowhood. 
Part II also included an examination of educational differences in marriage and 
divorce. The two main findings were that, over time, women in different education 
groups have diverged in the probability of ever marrying and the probability that a 
marriage will end in divorce. Whereas college-educated women can expect to get married 
with nearly a 90% probability, women without a college degree only have around a 77% 
change of ever marrying. This is especially striking considering that in 1985, all four 
education groups had roughly the same probability of ever-marrying (around 83%). 
Similarly, there has been an educational divergence among women in the probability that 
a first marriage ends in divorce. For the most-educated and least-educated women, the 
probability that a first marriage ends in divorce was roughly 40% in 2010. The equivalent 
probability for women with some college or a high school diploma was around 53%. As 
shown in Figure 22b, these probabilities were closer in the 1970s and 1980s, but have 
diverged since then. 
Though divorce played a major role in driving changes in marital life cycles 
between 1960 and 1985, its role was more muted between 1985 and 2010. In these years, 
increasing age at first marriage, declining mortality and rapidly narrowing sex differences 
in mortality, shifting education distributions, and more intense educational assortative 
mating all began to play a larger role in shaping the contours of the marital life cycle. 
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Overall, there were four major themes that can summarize explanations of 
changes over time in the marital life cycle: narrowing sex differences in mortality, likely 
driven by sex-specific changes in smoking-attributable mortality; the rise of divorce and 
the decline of marriage; the intensification of educational assortative mating; and the 
rightward shift in the education distribution. Each of these themes will emerge and re-
emerge in the discussion that follows, so it is worthwhile to point out some of their 
features now. For many of the life cycle measures, we see a crossover in the effect of 
mortality occurring in the 1980s or early 1990s. More often than not, these crossovers 
coincide with changes in smoking-attributable mortality. The sex difference in smoking 
attributable mortality peaked in the late 1970s, and men’s smoking attributable mortality 
peaked in the early 1990s. Women’s smoking-attributable mortality has continued to rise 
through 2010. Thus, it is likely that narrowing sex differences in smoking-attributable 
mortality have led to changes in the marital life cycle. As mentioned above, rising 
divorce rates, delayed age at first marriage, and declines in the likelihood of ever 
marrying have swamped all other effects on the marital life cycle, leading to more 
truncated marriages. The effects of more intense educational assortative mating may be 
unexpected. As claimed in the beginning of this chapter and proved in Appendix B, 
stronger assortative mating leads to longer marital durations under relatively weak 
conditions. At the same time, the rightward shift in the education distribution leads to 
narrower average mortality differences between spouses, since sex differences in 
mortality narrow with education.  
The expected duration of a first marriage has decreased from 34.46 to 25.65 years, 
a roughly 8.8-year decline between 1960 and 2010. Much of this decline can be attributed 
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to the rapid increase in divorce (whose effect is shown in royal blue in Figure 30). As 
divorce increased, marriages were cut short. A related trend is the increase over time in 
age at marriage (gray). As young people began to delay their marriages, the average 
duration of first marriages decreased in direct correspondence. Together, increases in 
divorce rates and age at marriage explain nearly all of the decline in duration of first 
marriage between 1960 and 2010. 
The effect of mortality on first marriage durations can be decomposed into two 
parts: secular declines in mortality (orange) and changes in sex differences in mortality 
(light blue). Throughout this time period, mortality declined for both men and women, 
which led to longer durations of first marriage. Sex differences in mortality, however, had 
a non-monotonic pattern over time. Between 1960 and 1980, sex differences in mortality 
widened, due in part to growing sex differences in smoking-attributable mortality. Sex 
differences in life expectancy peaked in 1977, and sex differences in years of life lost due 
to smoking also peaked in the late 1970s. After the turning point around 1980, mortality 
declined more rapidly for men than for women, and this narrowing sex difference in 
mortality led to longer expected marital durations. By the late 1990s, secular declines in 
mortality and narrowing sex differences in mortality since 1960 had similar effects (in 
terms of magnitude) on the expected duration of first marriage. The decomposition for 
the most recent years indicates that narrowing sex differences in mortality have now 
overtaken secular declines in mortality as a driver of changes in expected duration of first 
marriage. 
Since 1960, the education distribution has shifted rightward (effect shown in dark 
blue), which has in turn led to longer durations of first marriage. The main explanations 
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for this effect are that more educated people tend to have lower mortality, tend to marry 
closer in age to their spouses, and tend to divorce less. Thus, as more people acquired 
higher education, marriages lasted longer, since spouses were closer in age and were less 
likely to die at any given age or divorce at any given marital duration. 
The green bar shows the effect of changes in educational assortative mating on 
changes in the expected duration of first marriage. Educational assortative mating grew 
stronger between 1960 and 2010. When couples are more similar on education, their 
marriages tend to last longer because of greater correlation between husbands’ and wives’ 
mortality schedules (see Appendix B for a proof of this claim). Couples who are more 
similar on education tend to be closer in age (see Figure 3), which both also lead to 
longer marital durations. Increased assortative mating on age had a very small effect on 
changes in the duration of first marriage. 
The rightward shift in education has led to lower probability of a marriage ending 
in widowhood and a higher probability of a marriage ending in widowerhood. This is 
likely due to the fact that more educated people have smaller sex differences in mortality 
at the older ages, where widowhood/widowerhood is most likely to occur. As the married 
population grew more educated, the mean sex difference within couples narrowed, 
leading to higher incidence of widowerhood and lower incidence of widowhood. 
Increased divorce rates led to lower probabilities of marriage ending in 
widowhood or widowerhood. This is simply the effect of competing risks. Because more 
marriages were ending in divorce, a smaller proportion of marriages could possibly end 
in death of a spouse. 
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Sex differences in mortality narrowed over time, leading to higher incidence of 
widowerhood and lower incidence of widowhood. The temporal pattern in Figures 31 
and 32 indicates that changes in mortality had a negative impact on widowhood and a 
positive impact on widowerhood starting in the early 1990s, which is consistent with 
prior evidence on the timing of the peak of men's smoking-attributable mortality (Preston 
and Wang 2006; see also Appendix A Figures A1 and A2). 
Changes in assortative mating on age had negligible impacts on the probability 
that a marriage ends in widowhood or widowerhood. The effect of changes in age at 
marriage is more pronounced. Higher ages at first marriage led to higher probabilities of 
both widowhood and widowerhood. This is likely due to the fact that people who marry 
later are less likely to divorce, so their marriages are more likely to end in the death of a 
spouse. 
More intense assortative mating on education led to higher probabilities of 
widowhood and lower probabilities of widowerhood. Couples who are more similar on 
education have wider sex differences in mortality than couples who are more different on 
education. Thus, when couples become more similar on education, all else being equal, 
the average mortality difference within couples increases, leading to higher probabilities 
of widowhood and lower probabilities of widowerhood. Note that this explanation is 
consistent with the above statement that more educated people have smaller sex 
differences in mortality (that is, these two statements obey the triangle inequality). 
The probability that a marriage ends in divorce increased by 29 percentage points 
between 1960 and 2010. Unsurprisingly, the major driver of this trend has been changes 
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in divorce rates. Divorce rates increased rapidly from the 1960s through the 1980s, 
leading to more marriages ending in divorce. Higher age at marriage had a countervailing 
effect, preventing further increases in the probability that a marriage ends in divorce. This 
is because age at marriage and divorce are negatively correlated, due both to more 
optimal matching (Oppenheimer 1988) and to the fact that later marriage leaves less 
exposure time for divorce to occur. Thus, as people began marrying later, the increase in 
divorce was dampened. Mortality and sex differences in mortality both worked to 
increase the likelihood that a marriage ends in divorce. This is likely due to the fact that 
decreasing mortality and narrowing sex differences in mortality both lead to longer 
marriages (all else being equal), and thus increase the amount of exposure time in which 
a divorce can occur. This in turn increases the cumulative hazard of divorce, and thus the 
probability that a marriage ends in divorce. Changes in education and in assortative 
mating on age and education have negligible impacts on the likelihood that a marriage 
ends in divorce.  
The expected duration of widowhood declined by 5.9 years between 1960 and 
2010. The major reason for this decline was the rapid increase in divorce rates. Because 
more marriages were ending in divorce and fewer in widowhood or widowerhood, the 
expected duration of widowhood would obviously be shorter. The rightward shift in the 
education distribution also led to declining durations of widowhood. More educated 
people have narrower sex differences in mortality, so as the population grew more 
educated, the difference in longevity between husbands and wives narrowed. This led to 
shorter durations of widowhood. 
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In the period before the early 1990s, changes in mortality since 1960 tended to 
increase the duration of widowhood. During this period, women's mortality declined 
more rapidly than men's mortality, in part due to the greater burden of smoking-
attributable mortality for men than for women (Appendix A Figure A2; see also Ho and 
Elo 2013; Preston and Wang 2006). Mortality continued to decline for both men and 
women in the 1990s and 2000s, but men's mortality declined more rapidly. This 
narrowing sex difference in mortality led to lower incidence of widowhood (see Figure 
31) and shorter durations of widowhood. 
Increasing age at first marriage for women led to lower durations of widowhood. 
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that women who marry later tend to 
marry men nearer to them in age. Thus, as more women began marrying later, the age 
difference between spouses narrowed and thus directly led to lower incidence and 
duration of widowhood. 
The intensification of educational assortative mating appears to be associated with 
longer durations of widowhood. Again, this is because couples who are more similar on 
education tend to have greater sex differences in mortality than couples who are 
discordant on education. Thus, as educational assortative mating intensified, the average 
sex difference in mortality within couples increased, leading to more marriages ending in 
widowhood (see Figure 31) and longer durations of widowhood among the widowed. 
The effect of changes in assortative mating on age are negligible in magnitude. 
All of the measures reported in Part II of the analysis and the mortality rates in 
Part I rely entirely on period data. Thus, one must take care when interpreting these 
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measures, as they will only represent the true future experience of the currently married 
population (for Part I) or the current cohort of 15 year-olds (Part II) under the condition 
that future rates and probabilities of mortality, marriage, divorce, and marital sorting are 
equal to the current rates and probabilities. In reality, these rates and probabilities are 
likely to change. If they follow current trends, then we are likely to see a decline in 
marriage and mortality rates. It is a subject of much debate whether divorce rates will 
increase in the future (see, for example, Kennedy and Ruggles 2014), though they seem 
to have been stationary in recent decades. If rates of divorce do not change in the future, 
then declining marriage and mortality rates are likely to result on net in shorter marital 
durations than predicted by the measures reported above. The effects of non-stationarity 
on measures of widowhood and divorce are less clear. Thus, the marital life cycle 
measures described in this chapter should be interpreted as summary measures, or 
simulations, which assume that present rates and probabilities will remain constant into 
the future. 
A related concern is that period rates, especially those for marriage and divorce, 
are subject to so-called tempo distortions. Tempo distortions occur when a change in a 
demographic rate for a cohort in one year is followed up by a corresponding change in 
the opposite direction for the same group in a future year relative to the current 
age/duration-specific period rates. Between 2008 and 2010, for example, marriage rates 
dropped precipitously, especially for people aged 20-24. This is likely due to the 2008 
financial collapse and consequent economic recession. However, this decline in marriage 
in 2008-2010 may not lead to a lifetime decline in the probability of ever-marrying for 
the affected cohorts. The same groups may marry at higher rates in the future (at older 
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ages). This delaying of marriage makes it appear that the probability of ever marrying has 
declined if we focus only on period rates. Once marriage picks up again, it might then 
seem that the probability of ever-marrying has increased. However, if we were able to 
follow the affected cohorts into the future, we might see that there was no change at all in 
the probability of ever-marrying for cohorts. Thus, year-to-year fluctuations in the life 
cycle measures should not be interpreted as harbingers of a long-term trend. Instead, the 
life cycle measures should be considered in the context of changes over many years in 
order to minimize the effect of tempo distortions on the outcomes. 
One final limitation is that the demographic relations used throughout this 
analysis assume that husbands’ and wives’ mortality is conditionally independent—that 
is, husbands’ and wives’ probabilities of survival are correlated with each other only 
through own age and education levels. There are also, of course, other factors that might 
lead to husbands’ and wives’ survival probabilities being correlated: shared behaviors or 
exposures, broken heart syndrome, or unobserved selection into a specific marriage may 
all lead to correlated survival which is only partially captured by the effects of education 
and age. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine how changes in the 
correlation between husbands’ and wives’ survivorship have affected martial life cycles. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter covered a lot of ground, presenting broad and detailed analyses, so it 
is difficult to distill its contents into a few nuggets of wisdom. The main contributions of 
this study are (1) an assessment of the availability and quality of data on marriage, 
divorce, education-specific mortality, and assortative mating in the United States over the 
past half-century; (2) the development and extension of a two-sex marital life cycle 
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model that incorporates heterogeneity in the vital rates and characteristics of individuals 
at risk of marrying; (3) a broad demonstration of the tremendous change over time in 
marital life cycles; and (4) the finding that there has been a sizeable divergence over time 
in marital life cycles by education. One of the important features of this study is that it 
considers many demographic and social processes in conjunction with one another, rather 
than in isolation. The power of the demographic toolkit lies in its ability to 
simultaneously model interrelated processes. This study has demonstrated that by 
applying simple demographic principles to a range of phenomena, we stand to gain 
valuable insight into the way populations change and the well-being of individuals within 
these changing populations.  
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Figure 1. Difference in Age between Husbands and Wives, 1960-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, Current Population Survey 1962 and 1964-2001, and ACS 2002-2010. 
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Note: Age difference is husband’s age minus wife’s age. The top panel is a kernel density estimate (bw = 0.75) of the age difference 
for 1960 and 2010. The bottom panel is the mean and standard deviation of the age difference for 1960, 1962, and 1964-2010.
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Figure 2. Isodensity Plot of Joint Distribution of Husbands’ and Wives’ Ages, 1960 and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960 and ACS 2010. 
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Note: Each isodensity curve represents a series of points on the joint density surface corresponding to the same density value and 
encompassing a given percentage of marriages. The solid red line is where husband’s age equals wife’s age, and area between the 
dashed blue lines corresponds to adherence to the “half-your-age-plus-seven” rule.
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Figure 3. Mean Difference in Age between Husbands and Wives by Education, 1960-2010 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, Current Population Survey 1962 and 1964-2001, and American Community Survey 
2002-2010. 
Note: Age difference is husband’s age minus wife’s age. The education labels on the left and bottom sides of the figure correspond to the 
husbands’ and wives’ education levels, respectively. LTHS stands for “less than high school” and College+ stands for “college or more.” 
140 
Figure 4. Joint Distribution of Husband’s and Wife’s Education, 1960 and 2010
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960 and American Community Survey 2010. 
Note: Size of each block represents the relative size of each type of marriage, where the wife’s education is indicated on the vertical 
axis and the husband’s on the horizontal axis. LTHS stands for “less than high school,” HS stands for “high school,” SC stands for 
“some college,” and C+ stands for “college or more.” 
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Figure 5. Proportionate Distribution of Marriages by Spouses’ Education Levels, 1960-2010 
 
Source: Panel (a): Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, and ACS 2002-2010; Panel (b): CPS 1962 and 1964-2010. 
Note: LTHS stands for “less than high school.” Other is the proportion of marriages that are non-homogamous. The five lines add to 
100%. Points between the dashed vertical lines are based on educational credentials as opposed to years of school completed. 
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Figure 6. Mortality Ratios by Age and Education Group, Males, 1990 and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Mortality ratios are interpolated over 5-year age intervals and are set to zero at ages 90 and above.
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Figure 7. Mortality Ratios by Age and Education Group, Females, 1990 and 2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Mortality ratios are interpolated over 5-year age intervals and are set to zero at ages 90 and above.
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Figure 8. Mortality Ratios by Age and Education, Males, 1960-2009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Kitagawa and Hauser (1973); NCHS (1964); NLMS with 11-year mortality follow-up; and NHIS 
1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Red and blue lines represent earlier and later years, respectively, and correspond to the years 1960 through 2009 by 7 year increments.
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Figure 9. Mortality Ratios by Age and Education, Females, 1960-2009 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Kitagawa and Hauser (1973); NCHS (1964); NLMS with 11-year mortality follow-up; and NHIS 
1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Red and blue lines represent earlier and later years, respectively, and correspond to the years 1960 through 2009 by 7 year increments. 
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Figure 10. Average Life Cycle of Married Couples, 1960-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 
2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), NLMS, and NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality 
follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Years spent together, probability wife outlives husband, and years spent widowed 
are computed based on period mortality conditions accounting for heterogeneity across 
couples.
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Figure 11. Decomposition of Changes Over Time in the Number of Years Spouses Can Expect to Spend Together, 1960-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), 
NLMS, and NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011.
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Figure 12. Decomposition of Changes Over Time in the Probability that a Wife Outlives Her Husband, 1960-2010
 Source: 
Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), NLMS, and 
NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011.
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Figure 13. Decomposition of Changes Over Time in the Number of Years a Wife Can Expect to Spend Widowed, 1960-2010
 Source: 
Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), NLMS, and 
NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
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Figure 14. Years Spent Together with and without Assortative Mating 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), 
NLMS, and NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Mating at random indicates that potential spouses are matched randomly with respect to education (but not age).
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Figure 15. Probability Wife Outlives Husband with and without Assortative Mating 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), 
NLMS, and NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Mating at random indicates that potential spouses are matched randomly with respect to education (but not age).
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Figure 16. Years Spent Widowed with and without Assortative Mating 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Census 1960, CPS 1962 and 1964-2001, ACS 2002-2010, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973), 
NLMS, and NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011. 
Note: Mating at random indicates that potential spouses are matched randomly with respect to education (but not age).
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Figure 17. Rate of First Marriage at Ages 20-24 Years, Females, 1960-1990
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990. 
Note: Probabilities are based on period rates and are assumed to be zero above age 90.
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Figure 18a. Associated Single Decrement Period Probability of Ever Marrying, Females, 1960-1990
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990. 
Note: Probabilities are based on assumptions of zero mortality prior to age 65 and zero first marriage above age 65.
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Figure 18b. Period Probability of Ever Marrying, Females, 1960-1990
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990; and HMD 1960-2010. 
Note: Marriage probabilities are based on multiple decrement period measures.
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Figure 19a. CPS vs. Vital Statistics Associated Single Decrement Period Probability of Ever Marrying, Females, 1960-1990
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990. 
Note: Probabilities are based on assumptions of zero mortality prior to age 65 and zero first marriage above age 65.
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Figure 19b. CPS Composite versus Vital Statistics Period Probability of Ever Marrying, Females, 1960-1990 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990; and HMD 1960-2010. 
Note: Marriage probabilities are based on multiple decrement period measures.
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Figure 20a. Associated Single Decrement Period Probability of Ever Marrying, Females, 1960-2012
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990 and ACS 2008-2013. 
Note: Probabilities are based on assumptions of zero mortality prior to age 65 and zero first marriage above age 65.
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Figure 20b. Period Probability of Ever Marrying, Females, 1960-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; ACS 2008-2012; and HMD 1960-2010. 
Note: Marriage probabilities are based on multiple decrement period measures. Estimates for 2011-2012 use 2010 mortality rates.
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Figure 21a. Associated Single Decrement Probability of Ever Marrying by Education, Females, 1960-2012
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990; and ACS 2008-2013. 
Note: Probabilities are based on assumptions of zero mortality prior to age 65 and zero first marriage above age 65. Estimates by 
education are interpolated from 1988 through 2007 (indicated by dashed vertical lines).
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Figure 21b. Probability of Ever Marrying by Education, Females, 1960-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, and 1990; Vital Statistics 1960-1990; ACS 2008-2012; HMD 
1960-2010; NLMS; NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011; and Kitagawa and Hauser (1973). 
Note: Marriage probabilities are based on multiple decrement period measures. Estimates for 2011-2012 use 2010 mortality rates. 
Estimates by education are interpolated from 1988 through 2007 (indicated by dashed vertical lines).
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Figure 22a. Associated Single Decrement Probability that a First Marriage Will End in Divorce, Females ,1960-2012
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on June 1990 CPS and ACS 2008-2013. 
Note: Probabilities are based on assumptions of zero mortality prior to age 90 and zero divorce above age 90. Estimates by education 
are interpolated from 1988 through 2007 (indicated by dashed vertical lines).
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Figure 22b. Probability that a First Marriage Will End in Divorce by Wife’s Education, 1960-2012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Census 1960; CPS 1962, 1964-2001 and June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, 1990; ACS 
2002-2012; HMD 1960-2010; NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011; NLMS; and Kitagawa and Hauser (1973). 
Note: Divorce probabilities are based on multiple decrement period measures. Estimates for 2011-2012 use 2010 mortality rates. 
Estimates by education are interpolated from 1988 through 2007 (indicated by dashed vertical lines).
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Figure 23. Expected Duration of First Marriage, 1960-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Census 1960; CPS 1962, 1964-2001 and June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, 1990; ACS 
2002-2010; HMD 1960-2010; NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011; NLMS; and Kitagawa and Hauser (1973). 
Note: Unconditional measures are for the general population, and conditional on marriage measures are for people who ever marry.
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
2
2
2
4
2
6
2
8
3
0
3
2
3
4
Year
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
M
a
r
r
i
a
g
e
 
(
Y
e
a
r
s
)
Unconditional
Conditional on Marriage
165 
 
Figure 24. Probability that a First Marriage Ends in Widowhood, 1960-2010 
 
Source: See Figure 23. 
Note: Unconditional measures are for the general population, and conditional on marriage for people who ever marry.
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Figure 25. Probability that a First Marriage Ends in Widowerhood, 1960-2010 
 
Source: See Figure 23. 
Note: Unconditional measures are for the general population, and conditional on marriage for people who ever marry.
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Figure 26. Probability that a First Marriage Ends in Divorce, 1960-2010 
 
Source: See Figure 23. 
Note: Unconditional measures are for the general population, and conditional on marriage for people who ever marry.
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Figure 27. Expected Duration of Widowhood Following a First Marriage, 1960-2010 
 
Source: See Figure 23. 
Note: Unconditional measures are for the general population, and conditional on marriage for people who ever marry. 
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Figure 28. Prevalence of Widowhood by Age and Sex, 2010 
 
Source: ACS 2010.
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Figure 29. Mean Age at Widowhood and Widowerhood, 1960-2010
 
Source: See Figure 23. 
Note: ‘Females’ refers to women’s mean age at widowhood, and ‘Males’ refers to men’s 
mean age at widowerhood. Estimates are based on period rates and are conditional on a 
marriage ending in widowhood for ‘Females’ and widowerhood for ‘Males.’ 
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Figure 30. Decomposition of Change Between 1960 and Year  in Expected Duration of First Marriage, 1960-2010 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Census 1960; CPS 1962, 1964-2001 and June CPS 1971, 1976, 1980, 1990; ACS 
2002-2012; HMD 1960-2010; NHIS 1986-2009 with mortality follow-up through 2011; NLMS; and Kitagawa and Hauser (1973). 
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Note: The bars in each year sum to the total change in the outcome between 1960 and that year. SDM stands for sex difference in 
mortality, Mortality for overall mortality, Marriage for the age pattern of marriage, AMA for assortative mating on age, Divorce for 
rates of divorce, AME for assortative mating on education, and Education for the education distribution.
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Figure 31. Decomposition of Change Between 1960 and Year  in the Probability that a First Marriage Ends in Widowhood, 1960-
2010 
 
Source, Note:  See Figure 30. 
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Figure 32. Decomposition of Change Between 1960 and Year  in the Probability that a First Marriage Ends in Widowerhood, 1960-
2010
 
Source, Note:  See Figure 30. 
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Figure 33. Decomposition of Change Between 1960 and Year  in the Probability that a First Marriage Ends in Divorce, 1960-2010 
 
Source, Note:  See Figure 30. 
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Figure 34. Decomposition of Change Between 1960 and Year  in Expected Duration of Widowhood Following First Marriage, 1960-
2010 
 
Source, Note:  See Figure 30.
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Appendices 
Chapter I 
APPENDIX A: Structure of Dataset, Derivation of Statistical Model, and Estimation 
Structure of Dataset 
 The dataset for this analysis consists of dyad-years: that is, each row in the data is 
a particular pair of countries in a given year (e.g., Indonesia-U.S. 1982). Consider the 
example data extract below. There are seven countries in the year 2002 for which we 
have data on fertility, national income, and WTO membership. Our outcome variable is 
the absolute value of the difference between two countries’ fertility rates. For India and 
Indonesia in 2002, the absolute difference in fertility is |2.99 − 2.39| = 0.61 (due to 
rounding). We are interested in the effect of country 1’s GDP per capita on the countries’ 
absolute TFR difference. India’s 2002 GDP per capita is 479. Finally, we are interested in 
the effect of the countries’ joint membership in the WTO on the outcome variable. Both 
India and Indonesia were in the WTO as of 2002. We can thus use the Country-Year Data 
table below to produce the Dyad-Year Data table. 
 
Country-Year Data 
Country Year Total Fertility 
Rate 
GDP per capita WTO 
membership 
India 2002 2.99 479 1 
Indonesia 2002 2.39 816 1 
Iran 2002 2.00 1680 0 
Iraq 2002 5.15 871 0 
Ireland 2002 1.97 27518 1 
Israel 2002 2.89 18853 1 
Italy 2002 1.27 19764 1 
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Dyad-Year Data 
Country 1 Country 2 Year TFR 
Difference 
1’s GDP p.c. Both in WTO 
India Indonesia 2002 0.61 479 1 
India Iran 2002 1.00 479 0 
India Iraq 2002 2.16 479 0 
India Ireland 2002 1.02 479 1 
India Israel 2002 0.10 479 1 
India Italy 2002 1.72 479 1 
Indonesia India 2002 0.61 816 1 
Indonesia Iran 2002 0.39 816 0 
Indonesia Iraq 2002 2.76 816 0 
Indonesia Ireland 2002 0.42 816 1 
Indonesia Israel 2002 0.50 816 1 
Indonesia Italy 2002 1.12 816 1 
 
 
Derivation of Statistical Model 
Equation (1) can be written more compactly as 
	
, − 
,	 = 0 +2 #2'#,−'	#,−'	∞'=0 	

#=1
+2 ZZ=1 2'Z,−'
∞
'=0
+   + ! 
where # is an index for network ties that ranges from 1 to , since there are  different 
network ties under consideration (bilateral trade, common membership in a regional bloc, 
common membership in an IGO, etc). 
This model has an infinite number of parameters and thus is not parametrically 
identified. I impose the following restriction to reduce the dimensionality of the 
parameter space: & = &, where  ∈ 0,1 is a one-dimensional parameter. This is one 
way to formalize the assumption that older lags of variables are less important in 
explaining current outcomes (that is, more recent values are given greater weight). Using 
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the lag operator À (the operator such that for any time series {Â} and any nonnegative 
integer ', À&Â = Â,&), we can now write the model as: 
	
, − 
,	 = 	 Q +2 # 11 − À #, ⋅ #,

#=1
+2 ZZ=1
11 − À Z, +   + ! 
where --,ÄÅ represents the infinite-order lag polynomial ∑ &À&g&¡Q . Multiplying the 
equation by 1 − À and rearranging terms yields: 
	
, − 
,	 = 	 Q1 −  +  ⋅ 	
,,- − 
,,-	 +2 ##, ⋅ #,#=1 +2 Z

Z=1
Z,
+ 1 −   + ! −  ⋅ !,−1. 
This can be rewritten as: 
	
, − 
,	 = * +  ⋅ 	
,,- − 
,,-	 + 	./,0′ 1 +2$ ⋅ ,,$, ⋅ ,,$,$ +	3 + 3 + 3,
+ 4,, 
where ./,0 is a vector of the %, variables, the 3 variables are country , country , and 
dyad ,  fixed effects, and 4,, is a serially correlated error term. 
 The derivation of this model assumes that the ! error term is uncorrelated 
across dyads. In particular, this means that ! is uncorrelated with !Æ for all , ℎ. This 
assumption may not hold if the dyad-year-specific error term contains a time-varying 
component that is shared for all dyads involving . This would lead to invalid standard 
errors but still unbiased estimators of the regression coefficients. The estimation of robust 
standard errors in the presence of this type of correlation is still an open area of research, 
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and is challenging because unlike temporal autocorrelation, correlation across dyads is 
not ordered. 
Estimation 
 Because of potential serial correlation, this class of models breaks the standard 
least squares assumptions. One can use the Newey-West estimator (Newey and West 
1987) to correct for potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error terms. In 
Stata 12.1, this can be accomplished using the in-built newey command with the lag 
option. I specify a lag length of 3 for all estimates. The fixed effects version of this model 
can be estimated using the xtivreg2 Stata command with the fe, robust, and bw options. 
In this paper, I specified a bandwidth of 3 and use the default Bartlett (Newey-West) 
kernel. To estimate the IV-fixed effects model, one can use the xtivreg2 command and 
specify that the lagged exogenous variables are the excluded instruments. One can also 
use the gmm option to implement a two-step feasible efficient GMM estimator.
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APPENDIX B. Supplementary Tables 
Table B1. Trade Bloc Classifications 
 
Type of Bloc Names of Blocs 
Free Trade Area Andean Community, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), East 
African Community (EACM), East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM), Economic and 
Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC), Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), European Union (EU), Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), Mercosur, Monetary Union of Central 
Africa (UMAC), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), West African 
Monetary Union (UMOA) 
Common Market Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EACM), East Caribbean 
Common Market (ECCM), European Union (EU), Mercosur 
Monetary Union Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa 
(CEMAC), Euro Area (Eurozone), Monetary Union of Central Africa (UMAC), West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), West African Monetary Union 
(UMOA) 
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Table B2. Fixed Effects Autoregressive Dyadic Diffusion Model Estimates for Absolute TFR Differences 
 (1) (2) 
LDV 0.984*** 
(0.000261) 
0.984*** 
(0.000261) 
Bilateral Trade  
 
0.0642*** 
(0.0109) 
N 801086 801086 
Note: All tests are two-tailed and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. LDV stands 
for Lagged Dependent Variable. All models include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness of country . 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table B3. Fixed Effects Detailed Autoregressive Dyadic Diffusion Model Estimates for Absolute TFR Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LDV 0.984*** 
(0.000261) 
0.984*** 
(0.000261) 
0.981*** 
(0.000315) 
0.981*** 
(0.000315) 
Bilateral Trade     
Not Rich/Not Rich 0.102*** 
(0.0122) 
 
 
 
 
0.122*** 
(0.0148) 
Not Rich/Rich -0.0349* 
(0.0162) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0533** 
(0.0186) 
Trade Blocs     
Common Market  
 
0.0349*** 
(0.00300) 
 
 
0.0417*** 
(0.00327) 
Free Trade Area  
 
-0.0238*** 
(0.00278) 
 
 
-0.0229*** 
(0.00302) 
Monetary Union  
 
0.0283*** 
(0.00363) 
 
 
0.0293*** 
(0.00487) 
IGOs     
World Bank  
 
 
 
0.00636* 
(0.00255) 
0.00651* 
(0.00255) 
UN  
 
 
 
-0.0252*** 
(0.00252) 
-0.0255*** 
(0.00252) 
WHO  
 
 
 
-0.0202*** 
(0.00395) 
-0.0200*** 
(0.00395) 
IMF  
 
 
 
-0.00499* 
(0.00248) 
-0.00500* 
(0.00248) 
UNESCO  
 
 
 
-0.00713*** 
(0.00105) 
-0.00714*** 
(0.00105) 
WTO  
 
 
 
0.0243*** 
(0.000674) 
0.0244*** 
(0.000674) 
N 801086 801086 671957 671957 
Note: All tests are two-tailed and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. LDV stands 
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for Lagged Dependent Variable. All models include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness of country . 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table B4. IV-Fixed Effects Autoregressive Dyadic Diffusion Model Estimates for Absolute TFR Differences 
 (1) (2) 
LDV 0.951*** 
(0.00664) 
0.961*** 
(0.00587) 
Bilateral Trade  
 
0.111*** 
(0.0159) 
N 793980 793980 
Note: All tests are two-tailed and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. LDV stands 
for Lagged Dependent Variable. All models include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness of country . 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table B5. IV-Fixed Effects Detailed Autoregressive Dyadic Diffusion Model Estimates for Absolute TFR Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LDV 0.976*** 
(0.00563) 
0.977*** 
(0.00562) 
1.050*** 
(0.00488) 
1.050*** 
(0.00459) 
Bilateral Trade     
Not Rich/Not Rich 0.116*** 
(0.0157) 
 
 
 
 
0.0290 
(0.0168) 
Not Rich/Rich -0.0164 
(0.0212) 
 
 
 
 
-0.202*** 
(0.0214) 
Trade Blocs     
Common Market  
 
0.0365*** 
(0.00313) 
 
 
0.0295*** 
(0.00372) 
Free Trade Area  
 
-0.0239*** 
(0.00280) 
 
 
-0.0252*** 
(0.00335) 
Monetary Union  
 
0.0282*** 
(0.00370) 
 
 
0.0400*** 
(0.00514) 
IGOs     
World Bank  
 
 
 
0.0274*** 
(0.00323) 
0.0277*** 
(0.00319) 
UN  
 
 
 
-0.0226*** 
(0.00280) 
-0.0227*** 
(0.00280) 
WHO  
 
 
 
-0.0107** 
(0.00396) 
-0.0106** 
(0.00396) 
IMF  
 
 
 
-0.00374 
(0.00283) 
-0.00381 
(0.00284) 
UNESCO  
 
 
 
-0.0117*** 
(0.00119) 
-0.0116*** 
(0.00119) 
WTO  
 
 
 
0.0158*** 
(0.000836) 
0.0159*** 
(0.000826) 
N 793980 793980 657296 657296 
Note: All tests are two-tailed and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. LDV stands 
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for Lagged Dependent Variable. All models include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness of country . 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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Table B6. Country-Level IV-Fixed Effects Regression of Total Fertility Rate on Indicators of Globalization 
 (1) 
LDV 1.004*** 
(0.002) 
Bilateral Trade  
Not Rich/Not Rich -0.045** 
(0.016) 
Not Rich/Rich -0.086*** 
(0.015) 
Participation in Any 
Regional Trade Bloc 
-0.014* 
(0.006) 
Participation in Any IGO -0.086*** 
(0.023) 
N 3538 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed and HAC standard 
errors are in parentheses. LDV stands for Lagged Dependent Variable. Model include controls for GDP per capita and trade openness. 
*
 p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
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APPENDIX C. Robustness of Results 
These results can be interpreted as showing that global institutional change in its 
many forms is an important channel of social interaction that drives fertility diffusion. In 
particular, bilateral trade with rich countries promoted a great degree of convergence. 
There are other possible interpretations. One might argue that these results tell us 
that free market orientation is what matters, not necessarily trade itself. Countries that are 
more free market-oriented, as the argument goes, are also more likely to converge with 
their exchange partners. While this is certainly a possibility, I have controlled for trade as 
a percentage of GDP, which is a measure of trade openness and free market orientation. 
Another possible explanation is that ideational diffusion isn’t occurring at all—rather, as 
trade expands, populations are exposed to a greater number of luxury goods and 
consumption of these luxury goods is incompatible with high fertility. This is not 
incompatible with the theoretical predictions outlined in the main text. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely this is the case. If the trade variables employed in this analysis were in absolute 
terms, this could be a possible explanation. However, the bilateral trade variables are 
defined as a percentage of total trade, so they only contain information on the relative 
strength of trade ties with a particular country. This same logic precludes the explanation 
that fertility change might be occurring alongside trade because expanded trade allows 
for changes in labor demand, which in turn would drive fertility change. A fourth 
possible explanation for these results is that they don’t measure the effect of social 
interaction at all, and that they actually measure the effect of socioeconomic 
development. While development has shown to be a strong correlate of fertility in prior 
research, the model specification adjusts for GDP per capita, which is the most 
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commonly-used measure of development. It is therefore unlikely that the trade and IGO 
results are being driven by trends in development or free market orientation. Finally, as 
stated above, economic and political globalization is not the only factor that drives global 
fertility change but should be recognized as part of the process. 
While the diffusion model estimates shown in Table 3 indicate that certain types 
of global network ties produce convergence in fertility, they must be interpreted with 
caution. These estimates are sensitive to the model specification, and thus are only 
correct insofar as the assumed model is correct. One potential problem is that the error 
terms in the dyadic diffusion model may be correlated over time. I account for this 
possibility by estimating heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) 
standard errors based on a lag length of 3 years (Newey and West 1987). All standard 
errors in Tables 2 and 3 and Appendix Tables B2 through B5 are thus adjusted for 
potential serial correlation. 
Another difficulty is the possibility that there are unobserved factors influencing 
the dependent variable. If these unobserved variables are correlated with the other 
explanatory variables, then the pooled OLS estimates in Tables 2 and 3 may be biased. 
While it is possible that important variables have been omitted from this analysis,9 I 
                                                           
9
 Note that I do not control for more proximate determinants of fertility like education, 
contraceptive prevalence, or family planning programs. This is by design, since the aim 
of this study is to understand what global factors have led to fertility convergence. The 
aforementioned proximate variables are mechanisms resulting from globalization, and 
thus lie along the causal pathway between global institutions and fertility. 
191 
 
employ dyad and country-specific fixed effects to sweep out any of these variables that 
are time-invariant. These variables include such factors as colonial history, geographic 
proximity, linguistic similarity, and time-invariant cultural affinities. The fixed-effects 
estimates for the autoregressive dyadic diffusion model are shown in Appendix Tables 
B2 and B3. The fixed effects estimates do not differ substantially from the pooled OLS 
estimates, indicating that the pooled OLS results are robust. 
The fixed effects estimates, however, may still be biased since the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term. I account for this possibility by 
estimating an instrumental variable (IV) fixed effects model, where lagged values of the 
explanatory variables act as instruments for the LDV. These estimates are shown in 
Appendix Tables B4 and B5 and are not very different from the pooled OLS results. Two 
differences between the IV-fixed effects and the pooled OLS estimates are that in the 
former, the effects of joint participation in the WHO and the IMF change signs. Joint 
participation in WHO now results in convergence, whereas joint participation in the IMF 
no longer has a statistically significant effect. Another major difference is shown in Table 
B4: the effect of generic bilateral trade ties now results in divergence as opposed to 
convergence. The effect of trade thus leads in general to divergence, and only produces 
convergence when a non-rich country imports from a rich country. We therefore find 
mixed evidence for hypothesis 1, but strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 2. The 
remaining parameter estimates (in particular, the effect of bilateral trade with a rich 
country) match closely with the pooled OLS estimates and thus increase our confidence 
in these results. 
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Because nation-states came into and went out of existence between 1965 and 
2009, country mergers and dissolutions were dealt with through combination of data and 
listwise deletion, respectively. Since the number of mergers and dissolutions was small, 
the decision about how to treat these events is unlikely to affect the results. Nevertheless, 
as a robustness check for mergers, any countries that eventually merged with each other 
(e.g., East and West Germany) were listwise deleted, showing no qualitative difference 
from the combined data results (i.e., the results based on collapsing East and West 
Germany into one country prior to German reunification). For dissolutions, keeping 
former nation-states in the analysis (subject to data availability) did not have any 
appreciable effect on the results. 
One final potential issue with this analysis is the arbitrary cutoff for what value of 
GDP per capita defines a country as “rich.” The cutoff used in this article is $12,500, but 
it is arguable whether this value is too high or too low. As a robustness check, I explore 
higher and lower cutoffs (ranging between $9,266 and $20,000) for whether or not a 
country is rich and find that the results are robust to this cutoff specification. 
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Chapter II 
APPENDIX A: Detailed Description of Composition Adjustment Procedure 
We are interested in measuring the SES-mortality gradient, but since SES is not 
directly observed we use education as a proxy for SES. However, an abundance of 
sociological research has shown that the relationship between education and SES is not 
static (e.g., Berg 1971; Collins 1971, 1979). Collins (1979), for example, posits a 
Weberian model wherein increased status group competition leads to rightward shifts in 
the education distribution. Under this model, the function mapping status to education has 
changed. Thus, education categories have a different “meaning” in different time periods. 
Education does not stand in for the same latent SES values as it did in the past, but we are 
treating it as if it does. 
I produce composition-adjusted measures of life expectancy at age 25 for the 
1997-1999 and 2004-2006 periods. I randomly reassign individuals from these periods to 
adjacent education categories (e.g., a high school graduate may be reassigned to less than 
high school) so that the population-weighted age-sex-specific education distributions in 
each of these periods match the corresponding distributions in 1990-1992. The 
reassignment procedure is done within age groups in each of the last two periods (1997-
1999 and 2004-2006), since changes in educational attainment over the 20th century 
varied by birth cohort. The composition adjustment procedure is illustrated in Figure A1 
below. 
First, I used NHIS 1990-1992, 1997-1999, and 2004-2006 to estimate the 
education distribution by five-year age group and sex for non-Hispanic whites in each 
period. For non-Hispanic white NHIS respondents between 1986 and 2004, I randomly 
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selected individuals who contributed person-years of exposure in 2004-2006 from the 
high school group and reassigned them to the less than high school group until the 
weighted share of people contributing person-years in 2004-2006 who have less than high 
school matched the equivalent observed quantity for 1990-1992. I then completed the 
same exercise for the other education groups, redistributing people from some college to 
high school and from college or more to some college (note: each individual is only 
reassigned once, so that nobody is reassigned from college or more to some college and 
then from some college to high school). In a few cases the age-sex-specific education 
distribution shifted left, so I reassigned individuals from a lower to a higher education 
group. I repeated this same procedure for the 1997-1999 period, randomly reassigning 
individuals until the education distribution of people contributing person-years in 1997-
1999 matched that of the 1990-1992 period. For each age-sex-period group, I performed 
this random selection procedure once and the sampling is done without replacement. 
This procedure resulted in tens of thousands of reassignments from one education 
category to another. I have cross-tabulated the observed education and reassigned 
education values for 1997-1999 and 2004-2006 in Tables A1 and A2 below. Note that the 
cross-tabulations are unweighted and thus represent individual respondents. 
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Table A1. Cross-Tabulation of Observed Education and Reassigned Education Used to 
Compute 1997-1999 Composition-Adjusted Life Expectancy 
 
Less than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College or 
More Total 
Less than High 
School 
92,285 0 0 0 92,285 
High School 28,440 240,726 207 0 269,373 
Some College 0 46,008 122,805 1,419 170,232 
College or More 0 0 19,443 169,526 188,969 
Total 120,725 286,734 142,455 170,945 720,859 
 
 
Table A2. Cross-Tabulation of Observed Education and Reassigned Education Used to 
Compute 2004-2006 Composition-Adjusted Life Expectancy 
 
Less than 
High 
School 
High 
School 
Some 
College 
College or 
More Total 
Less than High 
School 
97,225 0 0 0 97,225 
High School 10,323 225,415 275 0 236,013 
Some College 0 17,025 114,144 962 132,131 
College or More 0 0 6,436 142,664 149,100 
Total 107,548 242,440 120,855 143,626 614,469 
 
Based on the reassigned education values, I computed period life tables for 1997-
1999 and 2004-2006. Though these new life table quantities are labeled as corresponding 
to “Less than High School,” “High School,” and so on, they actually correspond to the 
education groups that would prevail if the social sorting scheme of 1990-1992 prevailed 
in the relevant period (either 1997-1999 or 2004-2006). These composition-adjusted life 
tables correspond to fixed percentiles of the education distribution over time.
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Figure A1. Illustration of the Composition Adjustment Procedure 
 
Note. The top half of the figure represents the education distribution in Period 1. The <HS and HS groups are relatively larger than in 
the education distribution prevailing in Period 2 (the bottom half of the Figure). The goal is to randomly re-allocate individuals from 
Period 2 to adjacent education groups until the adjusted education distribution (brackets in middle of Figure) is the same as that in 
Period 1. This adjustment is performed within age groups. 
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APPENDIX B: Replications, Quality of NHIS and Vital Statistics Mortality Data, and Robustness Checks 
Table B0. Characteristics of Previous Studies of Educational Differentials in Mortality in the United States 
Authors 
Year of 
Publicat
ion 
More 
than 
Hazard 
Ratio?a 
Linked 
Mortali
ty File 
Used? 
Mortality 
Estimates 
Ballpark 
Correct?b 
Full 
Age 
Rang
e?c 
Represent
ative 
Sample?d 
Correct Standard 
Errors for 
Mortality/Life 
Expectancy 
Estimates?e 
Covers 
Recent 
Years?f 
Backlund, Sorlie, and Johnson 1999 No Yes NA No Yes NA No 
Elo, Martikainen, and Smith 2006 No Yes NA No Yes NA No 
Kunst and Mackenbach 1994 No Yes NA No Yes NA No 
Mackenbach et al 1999 No Yes NA No Yes NA No 
Everett, Rehkopf, and Rogers 2013 No Yes NA No Yes NA Yes 
Sorlie, Backlund, and Keller 1995 No Yes NA Yes Yes NA No 
Zajacova 2006 No Yes NA Yes Yes NA No 
Denney, Rogers, Hummer, and Pampel 2010 No Yes NA Yes Yes NA Yes 
Rogers, Everett, Zajacova, and Hummer 2010 No Yes NA Yes Yes NA Yes 
Rogers, Hummer, and Everett 2013 No Yes NA Yes Yes NA Yes 
Zajacova and Hummer 2009 No Yes NA Yes Yes NA Yes 
Pappas, Queen, Hadden, and Fisher 1993 Yes No No No Yes No No 
Olshansky et al. 2012 Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Miech, Pampel, Kim, and Rogers 2011 Yes No No No No No Yes 
Molla, Madans, and Wagener 2004 Yes No Yes No No No No 
Montez and Zajacova (AJPH) 2013 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Montez and Zajacova (JHSB) 2013 Yes Yes No No Yes NA Yes 
Duleep 1989 Yes Yes No No Yes No No 
Masters, Hummer, and Powers 2012 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Montez and Berkman 2014 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
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Montez, Hummer, Hayward, Woo, and 
Rogers 2011 Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Montez, Hummer, and Hayward 2012 Yes Yes No Yes Yes NA No 
Rogers, Hummer, Krueger, and Pampel 2005 Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Elo and Preston 1996 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Preston and Elo 1995 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Brown, Hayward, Montez, Hummer, 
Chiu, and Hidajat 2012 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No 
Feldman, Makuc, Kleinman, and 
Cornoni-Huntley 1989 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Meara, Richards, and Cutler 2008 Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Lin, Rogot, Johnson, Sorlie, and Arias 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Rogot, Sorlie, and Johnson 1992 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Note: This table includes studies of U.S. mortality that were published in peer-reviewed journals and were found using the search terms 
“education” AND (“mortality” OR “life expectancy”) in Google Scholar. International comparisons that presented new estimates of U.S. 
education-mortality gradients were included. Studies that attempted to construct mortality estimates using Census data only (for example, 
Lauderdale 2001 or Lleras-Muney 2005) were excluded since those estimates are affected by migration patterns and will be less precise. Articles 
are sorted lexicographically by the last seven columns (in the order “NA”, “No”, “Yes”). Studies highlighted in green at the bottom of the table 
had a “Yes” for the first three items in the table—they reported more than just hazard ratios, used linked mortality data, and had ballpark-correct 
estimates of mortality. 
aIndicates whether a study presented any quantity summarizing mortality. This includes hazard ratios with baseline hazards, age-standardized 
death rates, age-specific death rates, life expectancies, survival probabilities, or regression coefficients that can be used to recover mortality rates. 
Studies that get a “No” on this item only reported hazard ratios without reporting baseline hazards, so mortality estimates of any kind cannot be 
recovered from the study. 
bIndicates whether a study’s estimates of mortality are within the normal range of U.S. mortality and have not been shown to be inaccurate by 
previous published studies. Studies that get a “No” on this item presented mortality/survival/life expectancy estimates that either reported very 
high or very low levels of mortality, an anomalous age or time pattern of mortality, or both. Studies get an “NA” if they only report hazard ratios. 
Having “ballpark correct” mortality estimates does not imply that a study’s estimates are completely correct. 
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cIndicates whether a study used a sample that contained individuals aged 25 through 100 (so a study that had 85+ as the final age group would get 
a “Yes” but a study that only covered ages 25-84 would get a “No”). 
dIndicates whether a study’s sample was representative of the population being studied. Studies that get a “No” typically did not cover at least 90% 
of the population being considered or used data sources that exclude data from specific states. 
eIndicates whether a study presented standard errors or confidence intervals for mortality/life expectancy estimates, taking into account sampling 
variance and complex survey design. Studies get an “NA” if they only report hazard ratios. 
fIndicates whether a study presented estimates covering any year after 2000. If estimates used data from multiple years to produce a single death 
rate, then the center of the time period was used to judge whether an estimate was recent (e.g., an estimate of a life table for the entire 1986-2006 
period is centered at 1996 and thus does not count as recent). 
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Comparison of Dual Data Sources and NHIS for Estimation of Education-Specific 
Mortality 
The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) is an in-person sample survey of 
the civilian, non-institutionalized population of the United States. It has been conducted 
annually since 1957. For the 1986 wave forward, records on adult respondents have been 
linked to death certificates in the National Death Index (NDI) to ascertain whether a 
previously interviewed individual is still living as of a given date. The most recent 
publicly-available mortality linkage contains follow-up through December 31, 2006 for 
one randomly selected adult per family interviewed between 1986 and 2004. 
Death status is ascertained through a probabilistic procedure matching NHIS 
records to death certificates in the NDI. Individuals are deemed eligible for mortality 
follow-up if their NHIS records contain enough information to carry through the 
matching process. To be eligible, NHIS records must contain at least one of the following 
combinations of data: (1) Social Security number, sex, and full date of birth; (2) last 
name, first initial, month of birth, and year of birth; or (3) last name, first initial, and 
Social Security number. Variables used for the matching procedure include Social 
Security number, first name, last name, middle name, date of birth, race, sex, state of 
birth, state of residence, father’s surname, and maiden name (for women). The NDI then 
produces a score and an associated code indicating the presumed quality of the match and 
selects the best match according to criteria described elsewhere 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/datalinkage/matching_methodology_nhis_final.pdf). The 
NHIS linked mortality file covers hundreds of thousands of person-years of exposure and 
tens of thousands of deaths, allowing for high-precision estimates for population 
subgroups. 
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Table B1 details important advantages and disadvantages to using NHIS versus 
Multiple Cause of Death (MCD) data to estimate educational mortality differentials. The 
most important advantage of NHIS is that it avoids the dual data source bias: in MCD, 
the education levels for the dead are drawn from death certificates and levels for the 
living are drawn from survey data. This has previously been shown to lead to 
overestimates of educational differentials in mortality (see Preston and Elo 1995). 
The educational attainment item was introduced on death certificates in 1989, and 
for early years, especially prior to the mid-1990s, there is a great degree of incomplete 
reporting of education or outright exclusion of the educational attainment item on the 
death certificate. From 1989 through the 1990s, many states did not have education or 
were judged by NCHS to have unacceptably high rates of incompleteness in the 
educational attainment item on the death certificate. The bias is potentially very large. 
For death certificates in 1990, NCHS reports that 22 states either do not report education 
on the death certificate or have unacceptably high rates of incompleteness in educational 
reporting. These states contained 63% of the U.S. population. Worse still is that these 
states are systematically different from the other states. Figure B1 shows a map of 
inclusion of the educational attainment item on 1990 death certificates. We can see from 
this map that almost the entirety of the “Stroke Belt” is included among the excluded 
states. These are all states with higher rates of smoking and stroke and tend to have lower 
life expectancy than other states. Thus, an analysis of mortality by education based on 
death certificate data would necessarily omit a large (and not randomly selected) segment 
of the U.S. population. Table B2 documents coverage of the education item on death 
certificates by state. In 2003 the death certificate was revised to measure educational 
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attainment by credential rather than number of years of schooling completed. Different 
states adopted the 2003 revised death certificate in different years, and as of 2008 many 
states continued to use the older 1989 version. Table B3 shows an example 
correspondence between 1989 and 2003 revised death certificate education values. It is 
clear from this table that the credential-based educational attainment item in the 2003 
revised death certificate can correspond to any number of configurations of the 1989 
death certificate, and the “typical” correspondence shown in the table may not actually 
hold. 
The main limitations of the NHIS are that it topcodes age at 85 years from 1997 
forward, it does not sample institutionalized people, and it may undersample young 
people living on the margins. The NHIS sampling frame is also only updated decadally, 
so NHIS-based estimates may not be representative of very high-growth regions for years 
directly preceding the introduction of a new sampling frame. The advantages and 
limitations of NHIS and MCD for analyzing educational differences in mortality are 
summarized in Table B1 below. Table B4 shows the number of respondents and deaths in 
the NHIS data as of December 31, 2006. 
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Table B1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Using MCD vs. NHIS Data to Compute 
Education-Specific Mortality 
 Multiple Cause of Death File National Health Interview 
Survey 
Dual Data Source 
Bias 
Yes No 
   
Precision / Sample 
Size 
High precision / All recorded 
deaths in U.S. population 
Subject to sampling variability 
/ Large sample size for a 
survey, thousands of deaths per 
year 
   
Education observed For recent years, but in 1990 
only available at 90% or 
more completeness for 29 
states (representing 63% of 
the population) 
Yes, but educational 
attainment question changed in 
1997 
   
Time Range 1989-2012 1986-2006 
   
Age Groups All ages For later years, age is top-
coded at 85+; Public-use files 
only record deaths for adults 
aged 18+ 
   
Representativeness Education-specific estimates 
do not cover all states. 
Coverage of states differs by 
year—63% of non-Hispanic 
white population covered in 
1990, 97% in 2008. 
Representative of the civilian 
non-institutionalized 
population (but possibly not 
representative of some high-
growth areas). Not 
representative of younger 
adults living on the margins. 
   
Coverage of all 
major racial/ethnic 
groups 
Yes, but possible undercount 
of deaths among Native 
Americans, Hispanics, and 
Asians since race report is 
sometimes based on 
observation instead of next of 
kin’s report (Arias et al. 
2008) 
Yes, but small sample sizes 
and differential undersampling 
for some race/ethnic groups 
prevent precise estimation of 
mortality for those groups 
   
Ease of calculation of 
death rates 
Easy (computing ratios) Less easy (generating a 
person-year file and then 
computing weighted ratios)  
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Note: Characteristics of the MCD and NHIS samples are as of October 2014. Green 
shading indicates either the MCD or the NHIS is superior on a certain characteristic. 
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Table B2. Coverage of States in Estimates of Education-Specific Mortality Based on 
1990 and 2008 Multiple Cause of Death Files 
State 
Included in Education-
Specific Estimates 
Using 1990 MCD 
Included in Education-
Specific Estimates 
Using 2008 MCD 
Death Certificates Used 
Revised Education Item 
in 2008 MCD 
Alabama X X  
Alaska  X  
Arizona X X  
Arkansas  X X 
California X X X 
Colorado X X  
Connecticut  X X 
Delaware X X X 
Washington, 
DC X X X 
Florida X X X 
Georgia    
Hawaii X X  
Idaho X X X 
Illinois X X X 
Indiana  X X 
Iowa X X  
Kansas X X X 
Kentucky  X  
Louisiana  X  
Maine  X  
Maryland  X  
Massachusetts X X  
Michigan X X X 
Minnesota X X  
Mississippi  X  
Missouri X X  
Montana X X X 
Nebraska X X X 
Nevada  X X 
New 
Hampshire X X X 
New Jersey  X X 
New Mexico  X X 
New York  X X 
North Carolina  X  
North Dakota X X X 
Ohio X X X 
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Oklahoma  X X 
Oregon X X X 
Pennsylvania X X  
Rhode Island    
South Carolina X X X 
South Dakota  X X 
Tennessee  X  
Texas X X X 
Utah X X X 
Vermont X X * 
Virginia  X  
Washington  X X 
West Virginia  X  
Wisconsin X X  
Wyoming X X X 
 
*Vermont used the old education item on their death certificates in the first half of 2008 and the 
new education item on their death certificates in the second half of 2008. 
Note: X indicates that a state has an educational attainment item on the death certificate 
with at least 90% completeness and thus can be included in estimates of education-
specific mortality using MCD data. 
Source: 1990 Multiple Cause of Death File (NCHS 1990) and Miniño et al. (2011) 
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Figure B1. Inclusion of Educational Attainment on 1990 Death Certificates by State
 
Note: The District of Columbia, not shown in the above map, included education on its 1990 death certificate. Inclusion is defined as a 
state including an educational attainment item on the death certificate with at least 90% completeness.
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Table B3. Typical Correspondence Between Educational Attainment Levels on 1989 and 
2003 Death Certificate Revisions 
1989 Death 
Certificate Education 
Levels 
2003 Death Certificate Education Levels 
No formal education 
8th grade or less 
1 year of elementary 
school 
2 years of elementary 
school 
3 years of elementary 
school 
4 years of elementary 
school 
5 years of elementary 
school 
6 years of elementary 
school 
7 years of elementary 
school 
8 years of elementary 
school 
1 year of high school 9-12th grade, no 
diploma 
 
2 years of high school  
3 years of high school  
4 years of high school  High school graduate or GED 
completed 
1 year of college Associate’s 
degree 
Some 
college 
credit, 
but no 
degree 
   
2 years of college    
3 years of college  
   
4 years of college   Bachelor’s 
degree   
5 or more years of 
college 
  
 
Master’s 
degree 
Doctorate or 
professional 
degree 
Not stated Unknown 
 
Note: The correspondences between the 1989 and 2003 education levels are determined 
by the author and are not defined by NCHS. Correspondence is defined as the typical 
number of years of education corresponding to a given credential or diploma. 
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Table B4. Number of survey participants by mortality followup, eligibility status and 
NDI match status: NHIS 1986-2004 survey years 
  
Eligibility Status for Mortality 
Follow-up 
Survey 
Year 
Sample 
Total Eligible 
Ineligible, 
insufficient 
data 
Assumed 
Deceased 
1986 62,052 60,922 1,130 10,814 
1987 122,859 120,665 2,194 20,354 
1988 122,310 120,116 2,194 19,206 
1989 116,929 114,550 2,379 17,095 
1990 119,631 117,835 1,796 16,207 
1991 120,032 117,786 2,246 15,123 
1992 128,412 125,715 2,697 14,695 
1993 109,671 107,239 2,432 11,698 
1994 116,179 113,026 3,153 11,831 
1995 102,467 99,916 2,551 8,939 
1996 63,402 61,422 1,980 4,851 
1997 103,477 94,855 8,622 6,844 
1998 98,785 88,533 10,252 5,668 
1999 97,059 86,743 10,316 4,745 
2000 100,618 90,266 10,352 4,107 
2001 100,760 89,577 11,183 3,319 
2002 93,386 82,350 11,036 2,525 
2003 92,148 79,353 12,795 1,888 
2004 94,460 83,025 11,435 1,279 
 
Source: Table reproduced from NHIS Mortality Linkage Eligibility document 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/datalinkage/nhis_mortality_linkage_eligibility.pdf) 
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Sample Characteristics 
The final sample consists of non-Hispanic whites aged 25 years or older at time of 
survey who are not missing on age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, or death status. There 
are 811,711 individuals in the sample contributing a total of 67,037 deaths and 4,533,125 
person-years of exposure. The age-sex-education-period specific death and person-year 
counts are arrayed in Tables B5 and B6 below. 
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Table B5. Deaths and Person-Years of Exposure for Non-Hispanic White Males 
 1990-1992 
 Less than HS High School Some College College or More 
Age Group Deaths PY Deaths PY Deaths PY Deaths PY 
25-29 5 2,735 17 10,176 7 5,456 2 5,842 
30-34 10 5,692 22 21,333 21 10,700 10 13,142 
35-39 14 4,603 31 19,026 20 11,814 20 15,385 
40-44 25 4,358 44 15,199 19 11,208 16 16,666 
45-49 32 5,059 49 13,366 28 7,658 15 12,405 
50-54 47 5,374 82 12,158 23 5,566 32 8,295 
55-59 101 6,006 103 10,653 32 4,383 39 7,102 
60-64 205 7,742 174 9,691 75 3,892 67 6,371 
65-69 275 8,322 210 9,017 85 3,564 97 5,162 
70-74 344 7,586 283 7,402 110 2,832 82 3,511 
75-79 437 6,356 272 4,412 76 1,666 87 2,089 
80-84 437 4,170 185 2,017 70 893 100 1,187 
85+ 467 3,014 139 935 58 464 62 561 
Total 2,399 71,015 1,611 135,384 624 70,095 629 97,717 
 
Continued on next page 
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-Continued- 
 1997-1999 
 Less than HS High School Some College College or More 
Age 
Group 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
25-29 - 1,179 3 4,591 4 3,527 2 3,869 
30-34 15 5,426 26 20,798 10 12,913 12 14,748 
35-39 25 10,929 64 41,941 34 22,573 16 26,954 
40-44 48 10,173 92 41,648 42 25,331 23 31,915 
45-49 51 8,357 138 32,457 73 25,007 69 34,737 
50-54 84 9,229 166 28,009 96 18,746 88 30,244 
55-59 145 10,128 224 24,688 122 12,888 110 19,985 
60-64 211 10,434 291 21,396 128 9,365 116 14,927 
65-69 401 12,032 397 18,738 191 8,035 215 12,817 
70-74 670 13,642 584 15,548 216 6,465 272 10,653 
75-79 793 11,064 709 12,628 290 5,475 285 7,091 
80-84 812 8,061 624 7,089 227 2,969 258 3,705 
85+ 1,230 6,780 562 3,605 261 1,714 316 2,225 
Total 4,485 
117,43
1 3,880 
273,13
6 1,694 
155,00
6 1,782 
213,86
7 
 
Continued on next page  
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-Continued- 
 2004-2006 
 Less than HS High School Some College College or More 
Age 
Group 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
25-29 1 617 2 2,647 3 2,671 - 2,407 
30-34 4 2,248 9 9,905 8 9,627 3 9,821 
35-39 24 5,490 33 23,182 28 18,042 17 20,673 
40-44 52 12,008 113 48,123 64 30,309 30 34,347 
45-49 87 13,454 228 56,734 133 35,079 53 42,283 
50-54 107 10,520 295 45,849 185 36,036 163 45,440 
55-59 169 10,602 335 37,254 214 30,198 201 44,855 
60-64 230 11,658 430 31,980 242 19,975 221 30,334 
65-69 342 11,444 511 26,978 251 13,650 239 20,534 
70-74 521 11,905 680 21,756 311 10,300 319 16,610 
75-79 812 12,464 819 17,034 380 8,096 462 12,874 
80-84 907 9,323 1,036 12,335 483 5,913 482 8,367 
85+ 1,378 8,653 1,169 8,219 594 3,885 639 5,314 
Total 4,634 
120,38
5 5,660 
341,99
3 2,896 
223,78
0 2,829 
293,85
6 
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Table B6. Deaths and Person-Years of Exposure for Non-Hispanic White Females 
 1990-1992 
 Less than HS High School Some College College or More 
Age 
Group 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
25-29  4   2,683   3   11,084   1   6,524   3   6,375  
30-34 
 8   5,283   13   23,188   6   
13,211  
 4   
13,335  
35-39 
 7   4,427   20   21,664   13   
13,066  
 2   
14,218  
40-44 
 10   4,424   24   20,446   16   
11,723  
 13   
13,283  
45-49  21   5,197   44   18,136   16   8,479   15   8,872  
50-54  26   5,455   44   15,715   21   6,016   23   5,819  
55-59  58   6,112   75   14,708   17   4,846   16   4,186  
60-64  105   7,790   130   14,842   44   4,812   26   3,764  
65-69  199   9,150   219   15,069   57   4,607   38   3,065  
70-74  252   9,736   239   12,122   67   3,891   46   2,659  
75-79  346   9,397   265   8,006   88   2,778   45   1,947  
80-84  400   7,450   213   4,433   99   1,903   56   1,485  
85+  604   6,478   285   2,848   112   1,301   91   1,071  
Total 
 2,040   
83,580  
 1,574   
182,259  
 557   
83,154  
 378   
80,078  
 
Continued on next page 
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 1997-1999 
 Less than HS High School Some College College or More 
Age 
Group 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
25-29  -    1,185   3   4,567   2   4,252   2   4,462  
30-34  6   4,950   6   21,638   6   15,521   5   16,207  
35-39  17   9,907   51   44,228   25   28,152   12   27,802  
40-44  27   9,339   63   45,580   22   30,099   28   30,803  
45-49  31   7,944   92   40,924   57   26,871   45   29,858  
50-54  68   9,487   141   38,223   57   20,836   38   22,785  
55-59  103   10,351   195   32,652   66   14,544   49   14,147  
60-64  161   11,039   255   29,771   95   10,701   59   9,490  
65-69  277   13,519   362   29,026   114   9,911   86   7,839  
70-74  438   15,428   603   28,100   183   9,366   100   6,721  
75-79  660   15,944   760   22,928   252   8,031   140   5,240  
80-84  926   14,082   850   14,504   266   4,946   164   3,468  
85+  2,111   16,307   1,146   10,253   474   4,612   366   3,477  
Total 
 4,825   
139,482  
 4,527   
362,392  
 1,619   
187,840  
 1,094   
182,299  
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 2004-2006 
 Less than HS High School Some College College or More 
Age 
Group 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
Death
s PY 
25-29  2   559   -    2,192   2   2,973   -    2,912  
30-34  2   2,269   8   8,753   4   11,366   6   11,486  
35-39  12   4,846   37   22,617   14   21,442   9   22,703  
40-44  36   10,792   79   49,434   54   37,669   15   36,324  
45-49  47   12,037   163   59,924   77   43,368   41   42,151  
50-54  55   9,954   202   54,203   128   40,142   86   41,839  
55-59  132   10,684   262   50,768   148   33,605   110   35,937  
60-64  214   12,223   371   43,299   179   23,234   104   22,913  
65-69  261   12,350   430   37,471   169   16,316   110   14,192  
70-74  401   13,803   697   34,701   249   13,288   130   10,271  
75-79  711   15,636   1,013   31,492   382   11,998   200   8,670  
80-84  951   14,459   1,413   25,884   501   9,967   277   6,270  
85+  2,748   20,464   2,429   21,628   962   8,771   667   6,137  
Total 
 5,572   
140,075  
 7,104   
442,365  
 2,869   
274,136  
 1,755   
261,805  
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Comparison of NHIS-Based Mortality Estimates to NCHS Life Table Estimates 
The NHIS-based death rates that I compute for non-Hispanic whites in 2004-2006 
match fairly closely to 2005 U.S. life table death rates (Arias, Rostron, and Tejada-Vera 
2005) for (potentially Hispanic) white men and women (see Figure B2 and Table B7). 
Because life tables by ethnicity are not available prior to 2006, we cannot compare NHIS 
rates to national vital statistics for non-Hispanic whites. The NHIS-based death rates 
match more closely to the vital statistics estimates at the prime mortality ages (ages 50-
84). This is important since, among those who survive to age 25, roughly 5% and 3% of 
U.S. life table deaths occur below age 50 for white men and women, respectively. At the 
younger ages (25-45 years) accuracy is lower for men, potentially due to greater 
institutionalization at these ages. The greatest discrepancy for women occurs in the 85+ 
age group, potentially due to poor linkage quality or high rates of institutionalization at 
these ages (He and Muenchrath 2011).  
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Figure B2. Comparison of NHIS and U.S. Life Table Death Rates, non-Hispanic White Males and Females, 2004-2006 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on non-Hispanic whites in NHIS 1986-2004 and the 2005 U.S. life table for white males and 
females (Arias, Rostron, and Tejada-Vera 2005).  
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Table B7. Difference Between NHIS-Based Mortality Estimates for non-Hispanic Whites and NCHS Life Table Estimates for Whites 
 Non-Hispanic White Males  Non-Hispanic White Females 
 1990-1992 2004-2006  1990-1992 2004-2006 
Age 
Group nmxa 
Abs. 
Diff.b 
Rel. 
Diff.c nmx 
Abs. 
Diff. 
Rel. 
Diff.  nmx 
Abs. 
Diff. 
Rel. 
Diff. nmx 
Abs. 
Diff. 
Rel. 
Diff. 
25-29 0.002 0.000 15% 0.001 0.000 22%  0.001 0.000 6% 0.001 0.000 21% 
30-34 0.002 0.001 36% 0.001 0.001 42%  0.001 0.000 23% 0.001 0.000 20% 
35-39 0.002 0.001 33% 0.002 0.000 18%  0.001 0.000 15% 0.001 0.000 5% 
40-44 0.003 0.001 24% 0.003 0.001 27%  0.001 0.000 9% 0.002 0.000 19% 
45-49 0.004 0.001 29% 0.004 0.001 22%  0.002 0.000 -2% 0.002 0.000 15% 
50-54 0.007 0.001 13% 0.006 0.001 11%  0.004 0.000 11% 0.003 0.000 7% 
55-59 0.011 0.001 13% 0.009 0.001 12%  0.006 0.001 14% 0.005 0.000 5% 
60-64 0.018 -0.001 -7% 0.013 0.002 12%  0.010 0.000 1% 0.008 0.000 -1% 
65-69 0.027 0.001 5% 0.020 0.001 7%  0.015 -0.001 -4% 0.013 0.001 11% 
70-74 0.042 0.003 8% 0.032 0.002 5%  0.024 0.002 10% 0.021 0.001 5% 
75-79 0.063 0.003 5% 0.051 0.002 4%  0.037 0.004 10% 0.035 0.001 2% 
80-84 0.100 0.002 2% 0.084 0.003 3%  0.063 0.012 19% 0.060 0.005 8% 
85+ 0.190 0.039 21% 0.183 0.038 21%  0.153 0.059 38% 0.153 0.036 24% 
Source: nmx estimates are from the 1991 and 2005 NCHS Life Tables for white men and women. Absolute and relative differences 
based on author’s calculations using NHIS 1986-2004 with mortality follow-up through 2006. 
anmx is the age-specific death rate from the NCHS life tables for white men and women in 1991 and 2005 
bAbs. Diff. is the absolute amount by which the NHIS-based death rate is lower than the NCHS-based death rate 
cRel. Diff. is the percentage by which the NHIS-based death rate is lower than the NCHS-based death rate  
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Changing Patterns of Institutionalization Among non-Hispanic Whites  
Table B8 presents estimates of institutionalization among older non-Hispanic 
whites by education group for the years 1990 and 2006. The estimates are based on 
calculations using the public-use microdata samples from the 1990 U.S. Census and the 
2006 American Community Survey (data on institutionalization were not available for 
the years 1991 or 2005, the years which correspond to the life tables computed in the 
main text). There has been a decline in rates of institutionalization for this subpopulation. 
Proportion institutionalized has declined from 17% to 10% among non-Hispanic white 
men aged 85+, and from 28% to 19% among non-Hispanic white women aged 85+. It is 
unclear from the extant literature how much of this decline is due to changes in health 
and disability leading up to death and how much to changes in preferences about end-of-
life and long-term care, making it difficult to ascertain the degree to which mortality 
varies by changes in older-age institutionalization. Nevertheless, there exists the potential 
for institutionalization to bias estimates of health and mortality based on surveys of the 
non-institutionalized population. 
Two forms of bias can result from institutionalization when using surveys 
representative of the non-institutionalized population. The first is that comparisons of 
groups within a given period may not be representative if there are different rates of 
institutionalization across the groups being compared. For example, in 2006 24% of non-
Hispanic white women aged 85+ with less than high school were institutionalized, 
compared to only 16% among college-educated non-Hispanic white women aged 85+. 
This is problematic since institutionalization is likely selective on frailty. Still, if 
education-specific patterns of institutionalization do not change over time, then 
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comparisons of gradients over time may still be valid. The second bias is the corollary of 
this statement: comparisons of gradients over time may not be representative if the 
educational differential in institutionalization has changed over time. For example, there 
was no discernible educational differential in institutionalization in 1990 for non-
Hispanic white women aged 85+. By 2006, the odds of institutionalization were 60% 
higher for those with less than high school relative to the college-educated. 
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Table B8. Percent of Age 85+ Non-Hispanic White Population Institutionalized by 
Education, 1990 and 2006 
 Males  Females 
 1990 2006 
Chang
e 
 
1990 2006 
Chang
e 
Unknown 16% 10% -6%  26% 23% -3% 
Less than High 
School 17% 13% -4% 
 
28% 24% -5% 
High School 19% 10% -8%  28% 18% -10% 
Some College 16% 7% -9%  27% 14% -13% 
College or More 14% 7% -8%  29% 16% -12% 
Total 17% 10% -7%  28% 19% -9% 
 
Source: Author's calculations based on 1990 Census 5% Public Use Microdata Sample 
and 2006 American Community Survey 
Note: The four education categories were coded as: Less than High School for those with 
less than 12 years of school; High School for those with 12 years of school; Some 
College for those with 1 or 2 years of school; and College or More for those with 4 or 
more years of college. 
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Robustness Check for Mortality Estimates – Using Full Follow-Up Exposure versus 5-
Year Maximum Exposure 
When estimating period life tables using NHIS, one can either use the entire 
follow-up period (from date of interview through December 31, 2006) or a truncated 
period of exposure (e.g., up to 5 years after date of interview). The former mode of 
analysis allows for greater sample size and thus more stable estimates, but may be 
misleading if there are unobserved differences in mortality among people sampled at time 
 aged > versus people sampled at time  +  aged  + . For example, people in the aged 
75 and sampled in 1990 may represent 95% of all people aged 85 in 2000, whereas 
people aged 85 and sampled in 2000 may only represent 85% of all people aged 85 in 
2000 because 10% of 85-year-olds in 2000 became institutionalized between ages 75 and 
85. This 10% would be eligible for the 1990 sampling frame but ineligible for the 2000 
sampling frame because they became institutionalized. In other words, the longer follow-
up time allows more institutionalized people to be included in the sample for estimates 
for later time periods. This bias can be reduced (but not eliminated) by reducing the 
follow-up time. The tradeoff is that the shorter follow-up time leads to much more 
variable estimates. 
I have computed estimates using both modes of analysis (full exposure and 5-year 
maximum exposure). Figure B3 shows age decompositions of the difference in 567 
between the full exposure and 5-year max exposure estimates. Figures B4 and B5 show 
comparisons of estimates of age-specific mortality for females and males, respectively, 
using both types of estimates (full vs. 5-year max exposure). Overall, the two sets of 
estimates were quite similar, considering the greater sampling variation using the 5-year 
max exposure method. The one exception is for women in the higher education categories 
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(high school or more) aged 85+, for whom the 5-year max exposure mortality rates are 
lower. The full exposure method yields 5J7 = 9.2 versus 5J7 = 11.6 using the 5-year 
max exposure method. It is unclear whether this is due to a systematic bias of the type 
described above or to sampling variability (the confidence intervals for the nMx estimates 
overlap). 
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Figure B3. Age Decompositions of Difference in Education-Specific Life Expectancy at 
Age 25 for Estimates Using Full Exposure versus Estimates Using a 5-Year Maximum of 
Exposure by Sex, Non-Hispanic Whites, 1991-2005 
  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 with mortality follow-up 
through 2006. 
Note: Bars in each graph sum up to the total sex and education-specific difference in life 
expectancy at age 25 for estimates using full exposure and estimates using a maximum of 
5 person-years of exposure per respondent. 
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Figure B4. Age-Specific Mortality for Full Exposure Sample versus Estimates 5-Year 
Maximum Exposure Sample, Non-Hispanic White Females, 2004-2006 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 with mortality follow-up 
through 2006. 
Note: Solid black lines are the full exposure samples and dashed red lines are the 5-year 
max exposure samples. Y-axes are on a log scale. Graphs are for less than high school 
(top left), high school (top right), some college (bottom left), and college or more (bottom 
right). 
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Figure B5. Age-Specific Mortality for Full Exposure Sample versus Estimates 5-Year 
Maximum Exposure Sample, Non-Hispanic White Males, 2004-2006 
  
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 with mortality follow-up 
through 2006. 
Note: Solid black lines are the full exposure samples and dashed red lines are the 5-year 
max exposure samples. Y-axes are on a log scale. Graphs are for less than high school 
(top left), high school (top right), some college (bottom left), and college or more (bottom 
right). 
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Composition-Adjusted Life Expectancy at Age 25 
In the main text, it was judged that estimates for mortality above age 85 may not 
be reliable. Thus, the manuscript only presents composition-adjusted temporary life 
expectancy between 25 and 85 and not composition-adjusted 567. The latter is described 
below. 
Table B9 (below) presents the estimates of composition-adjusted life expectancy 
at age 25 (5̂67) for each of the three periods under analysis. It also presents estimates of 
changes in 5̂67 between the first and last period. Among white men, 5̂67 increased from 
46.9 to 48.9 years (2.0 year increase) for those with less than high school, from 50.8 to 
53.0 years (2.1 year increase) for high school graduates, from 52.1 to 54.4 years (2.3 year 
increase) for those with some college, and from 55.4 to 58.2 years (2.8 year increase) for 
college graduates. Among white women, 5̂67 decreased from 55.0 to 53.0 years (2.0 year 
decline) for those with less than high school, from 58.5 to 58.1 years (0.4 year decline) 
for high school graduates, and from 60.4 to 59.6 years (0.8 year decline) for those with 
some college. White female college graduates experienced an increase from 60.9 to 61.5 
years (0.6 year increase). 
Among men, 	RSTΔVW for 5̂67 was 8.5 years in 1991 and widened to 9.3 years by 
2005. For women, 	RSTΔVW for 5̂67 was 5.8 years in 1991 and widened to 8.5 years by 
2005. The gap thus widened by 0.8 years for men and 2.7 years for women between 1991 
and 2005. 
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Table B9. Composition-Adjusted Life Expectancy at Age 25 by Sex and Education for non-Hispanic Whites, 1990-2006 
 Males   Females  
 1990-1992 1997-1999 2004-2006 [’91-’05  1990-1992 1997-1999 2004-2006 [’91-’05 
Less than High School 46.9 [45.9, 47.9] 
48.3 
[47.7, 48.9] 
48.9 
[48.1, 49.7] 
2.0 
[0.7, 3.2]  
55.0 
[54.1, 55.9] 
53.7 
[53.1, 54.3] 
53.0 
[51.9, 54.1] 
-2.0 
[-3.4, -0.6] 
High School or GED 50.8 [50.2, 51.4] 
52.0 
[51.6, 52.4] 
53.0 
[52.6, 53.4] 
2.1 
[1.4, 2.8]  
58.5 
[57.9, 59.0] 
57.7 
[57.3, 58.1] 
58.1 
[57.8, 58.4] 
-0.4 
[-1.0, 0.2] 
Some College 52.1 [51.2, 53.1] 
52.4 
[51.5, 53.2] 
54.4 
[53.8, 55.0] 
2.3 
[1.2, 3.4]  
60.4 
[59.5, 61.3] 
59.1 
[58.5, 59.7] 
59.6 
[59.0, 60.2] 
-0.8 
[-1.9, 0.3] 
College or More 55.4 [54.6, 56.2] 
56.1 
[55.6, 56.6] 
58.2 
[57.8, 58.6] 
2.8 
[1.9, 3.7]  
60.9 
[59.8, 61.9] 
60.4 
[59.7, 60.9] 
61.5 
[61.0, 62.0] 
0.6 
[-0.5, 1.8] 	RSTΔVW 8.5 [7.2, 9.8] 7.8 [7.0, 8.7] 9.3 [8.4, 10.2] 0.8 [-0.7, 2.4]  5.8 [4.4, 7.2] 6.6 [5.7, 7.4] 8.5 [7.3, 9.7] 2.7 [0.9, 4.5] 
Slope Index of Inequality 9.8 [8.4, 11.3] 
8.7 
[7.7, 9.7] 
10.9 
[9.9, 11.9] 
1.0 
[-0.7, 2.8]  
7.0 
[5.5, 8.5] 
7.4 
[6.5, 8.4] 
9.4 
[8.2, 10.6] 
2.4 
[0.5, 4.4] 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHIS 1986-2004 
Note: Δ’91-’05 indicates change between the 1990-1992 period and the 2004-2006 period. 	RSTΔVW refers to the life expectancy of the 
“College or More” group less the life expectancy of the “Less than High School” group. Approximate 95% confidence intervals are 
given in brackets. 
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Chapter III 
Appendix A   
Figure A1. Life Expectancy at Birth With and Without Smoking by Sex, 1933-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Human Mortality Database and WHO Mortality Database 
Note: Life expectancy without smoking is computed for 1950-2010 using the method outlined in Preston, Glei, and Wilmoth (2010) 
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Figure A2. Years of Life Lost Due to Smoking by Sex, 1950-2010 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Human Mortality Database and WHO Mortality Database 
Note: Life expectancy without smoking is computed for 1950-2010 using the method outlined in Preston, Glei, and Wilmoth (2010).
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Appendix B. Proof that More Intense Educational Assortative Mating Leads to Longer 
Average Marital Durations 
We would like to show that more intense educational assortative mating leads to 
longer marital durations. First, let’s lay out some of the primitives to discuss this claim. 
Let  and 
 be continuous latent variables. These latent variables determine the wife’s 
and husband’s educational attainment, respectively. The joint density function of the 
latent education variables is ℎ, 
. Without loss of generality, assume that both 
husband and wife get married at some fixed ages and that  and 
 lie on the unit segment 
[0,1]. 
Educational assortative mating is the tendency for individuals to marry others 
with education similar to their own. In this application, we will measure the intensity of 
educational assortative mating in terms of covariance. For the joint density given above, 
the intensity of assortative mating is thus the covariance of this density: cymÆ, 
. The 
expected duration of the marriage and covariance of the mating function are defined as 
follows: 
Ç!j>y = fff Hd, H%
, 	ℎ, 
	h	h	h
g
Q
-
Q
-
Q
 
Èym = 	ff
	ℎ, 
h	h
 −	f 	ℎf
	ℎ
-
Q
-
Q
-
Q
-
Q
 
where ℎ and ℎ
 are the marginal densities for  and 
, respectively, corresponding 
to the joint density ℎ, 
; and Hd,  and H%
,  are the survivorship functions to 
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marital duration  for a couple where the husband has education 
 and the wife has 
education . For parsimony, we will omit the integration limits and h, h
, and h from 
now onwards. 
We are interested in the effect of more intense assortative mating. Consider 
another joint density function, z, 
, which maintains the same marginals as ℎ but has 
higher covariance (we can prove such a function exists by way of Sklar’s theorem). If we 
apply z to our population, it would be equivalent to keeping the same people in society 
(same marginals) but changing the rules about who marries whom (higher covariance). 
Our claim would then be as follows: 
Claim: Ç!j>y − Ç!j>yÆ > 0. 
 
Proof : Suppose H% and Hd are affine in 
, : 
H%, 
 = 1 + *
H% 
Hd,  = 1 + Hd 
and that * and  have the same sign (either both men’s and women’s survival is 
increasing in latent education, or both are decrease in latent education). Then  
ÉH%
, 	Hd, z − ℎ	h
	h 
 
=	É1 + *
 + 	 + *
H%Hdz − ℎ	h
	h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= H%Hd ÊÉz − ℎ + *É
z − ℎ + Éz − ℎ + *É
z − ℎË 
= H%Hd	*É
z − ℎ > 0 
where the latter inequality holds because ∬
z − ℎ > 0 when the covariance of z 
is greater than the covariance of ℎ. ∎ 
 
We have thus shown that, when survivorship (for a given age) is affine in some 
latent education variable, marital duration is greater under the higher-covariance mating 
function. This proof dispels the following counterexample made against the claim: if 
college-educated men have mortality that is closer to that of less-than-high-school-
educated women than to college-educated women, then marital durations would be longer 
if we paired up college+ men with less than high school women. Let’s construct an 
example to show that this claim is incorrect. Suppose, as in the proof, that survivorship is 
affine in the latent education variable. We will specify a case where the least-educated 
women have the same mortality as the most-educated men. The relationship between H% 
and Hd and the latent education variable is shown in Figure B1 below. In this example, 
the most-educated men’s mortality is equal to the least-educated women’s mortality. 
Mortality is decreasing in education for both men and women. Following the proof given 
above, even in this case marital durations will be longer if assortative mating is stronger 
(that is, if the most educated men marry the most educated women and so forth). Of 
course, this is an average, and thus need not hold for every individual in the population 
235 
 
(in general, some couples will have shorter marital durations, but on average, couples will 
have longer marital durations). 
 One concern is that the assumption that survivorship is affine in latent education 
seems too strong. However, note that this relationship is imposed only on the latent 
education index, and not on education itself. If there exists an increasing function 
between the latent education variable and actual education, then our claim is proven in 
full generality—any increase in the covariance between husband’s and wife’s education 
will lead to a longer average marital duration. 
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Female Survivorship 
Figure B1. Relationship between Survivorship and Latent Education 
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Appendix C. 
Appendix Table C1. Decomposition of Change in Duration of First Marriage (Years) 
Between 1960 and Year  
Year SDM Mortality Marriage AMA Divorce AME Education 
1960 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1961 - - - - - - - 
1962 -0.02 0.03 -0.09 0.08 -0.46 0.10 0.14 
1963 - - - - - - - 
1964 -0.13 0.01 0.11 0.15 -1.14 0.14 0.23 
1965 -0.21 0.01 0.01 0.14 -1.23 0.14 0.25 
1966 -0.30 -0.01 -0.09 0.08 -1.75 0.15 0.30 
1967 -0.29 0.07 -0.19 0.16 -2.49 0.15 0.33 
1968 -0.43 -0.07 -0.28 0.14 -3.39 0.20 0.44 
1969 -0.41 0.01 -0.66 0.20 -4.11 0.24 0.51 
1970 -0.37 0.04 0.10 0.17 -4.84 0.18 0.45 
1971 -0.31 0.12 0.05 0.21 -5.63 0.19 0.47 
1972 -0.36 0.15 -0.15 0.21 -5.71 0.21 0.50 
1973 -0.32 0.22 -0.84 0.22 -6.09 0.19 0.49 
1974 -0.19 0.42 -0.96 0.22 -6.93 0.22 0.54 
1975 -0.10 0.61 -1.09 0.22 -7.17 0.24 0.65 
1976 -0.01 0.70 -1.34 0.12 -7.83 0.26 0.70 
1977 0.06 0.79 -0.87 0.19 -8.19 0.20 0.63 
1978 0.10 0.83 -1.00 0.16 -8.91 0.22 0.73 
1979 0.18 0.98 -1.03 0.00 -9.03 0.25 0.77 
1980 0.18 0.93 -1.13 0.13 -9.35 0.23 0.77 
1981 0.27 1.01 -1.21 0.05 -9.14 0.25 0.84 
1982 0.38 1.13 -1.28 0.05 -9.36 0.29 0.91 
1983 0.44 1.15 -1.28 0.05 -8.73 0.23 0.87 
1984 0.45 1.16 -1.39 0.03 -8.55 0.20 0.86 
1985 0.41 1.17 -1.44 0.05 -8.19 0.22 0.88 
1986 0.40 1.17 -1.60 -0.02 -8.31 0.24 0.97 
1987 0.43 1.18 -1.85 -0.05 -8.24 0.30 1.05 
1988 0.41 1.17 -1.96 0.04 -8.30 0.29 1.07 
1989 0.44 1.25 -2.06 0.00 -8.35 0.32 1.10 
1990 0.49 1.31 -2.18 -0.02 -8.42 0.31 1.16 
1991 0.60 1.30 -2.29 -0.03 -8.50 0.33 1.17 
1992 0.66 1.34 -2.45 0.00 -8.53 0.26 1.15 
1993 0.67 1.20 -2.59 0.11 -8.56 0.28 1.16 
1994 0.73 1.20 -2.68 -0.03 -8.58 0.27 1.17 
1995 0.79 1.17 -2.81 0.01 -8.65 0.33 1.26 
1996 0.96 1.30 -2.94 -0.02 -8.72 0.31 1.24 
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1997 1.14 1.38 -3.09 -0.18 -8.76 0.34 1.14 
1998 1.24 1.38 -3.19 -0.08 -8.84 0.41 1.23 
1999 1.27 1.34 -3.33 -0.04 -8.88 0.41 1.31 
2000 1.27 1.35 -3.43 -0.17 -8.91 0.45 1.40 
2001 1.27 1.32 -3.60 -0.13 -8.91 0.41 1.44 
2002 1.31 1.34 -3.71 -0.13 -9.06 0.55 1.40 
2003 1.40 1.29 -3.84 -0.12 -9.10 0.59 1.46 
2004 1.52 1.48 -4.01 -0.11 -9.18 0.64 1.43 
2005 1.45 1.41 -4.13 -0.17 -9.18 0.67 1.57 
2006 1.44 1.58 -4.24 -0.25 -9.20 0.68 1.61 
2007 1.49 1.58 -4.41 -0.20 -9.25 0.73 1.71 
2008 1.57 1.61 -4.61 -0.19 -9.26 0.73 1.67 
2009 1.74 1.56 -4.97 -0.14 -8.95 0.72 1.62 
2010 1.77 1.72 -5.37 -0.10 -9.13 0.69 1.60 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (see Source for Figure 30) 
Note: SDM stands for sex difference in mortality, Mortality for overall mortality, 
Marriage for the age pattern of marriage, AMA for assortative mating on age, Divorce for 
rates of divorce, AME for assortative mating on education, and Education for the 
education distribution. Each row sums to the difference in the outcome between year  
and 1960.
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Appendix Table C2. Decomposition of Change in Probability that a First Marriage Ends 
in Widowerhood Between 1960 and Year  
Year SDM Mortality Marriage AMA Divorce AME Education 
1960 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1961 - - - - - - - 
1962 - -0.0014 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0050 0.0002 0.0010 
1963 - - - - - - - 
1964 - -0.0037 -0.0003 0.0026 -0.0170 0.0006 0.0019 
1965 - -0.0057 0.0002 0.0028 -0.0188 0.0004 0.0020 
1966 - -0.0069 0.0003 0.0020 -0.0232 0.0002 0.0023 
1967 - -0.0077 0.0005 0.0036 -0.0284 -0.0001 0.0022 
1968 - -0.0083 0.0005 0.0035 -0.0372 0.0000 0.0028 
1969 - -0.0088 0.0016 0.0048 -0.0422 -0.0002 0.0030 
1970 - -0.0080 -0.0008 0.0044 -0.0451 0.0000 0.0035 
1971 - -0.0083 -0.0008 0.0051 -0.0525 -0.0002 0.0036 
1972 - -0.0096 -0.0004 0.0054 -0.0529 -0.0004 0.0038 
1973 - -0.0098 0.0023 0.0054 -0.0577 -0.0006 0.0038 
1974 - -0.0096 0.0030 0.0052 -0.0676 -0.0005 0.0043 
1975 - -0.0105 0.0028 0.0056 -0.0709 -0.0006 0.0047 
1976 - -0.0103 0.0036 0.0039 -0.0754 -0.0009 0.0045 
1977 - -0.0099 0.0009 0.0046 -0.0769 -0.0011 0.0047 
1978 - -0.0093 0.0012 0.0038 -0.0833 -0.0009 0.0054 
1979 - -0.0090 0.0015 0.0018 -0.0829 -0.0010 0.0056 
1980 - -0.0074 0.0013 0.0032 -0.0828 -0.0016 0.0056 
1981 - -0.0065 0.0018 0.0022 -0.0809 -0.0019 0.0062 
1982 - -0.0056 0.0017 0.0020 -0.0823 -0.0015 0.0067 
1983 - -0.0049 0.0018 0.0025 -0.0777 -0.0024 0.0067 
1984 - -0.0043 0.0026 0.0017 -0.0792 -0.0030 0.0067 
1985 - -0.0049 0.0029 0.0017 -0.0778 -0.0028 0.0064 
1986 - -0.0040 0.0037 0.0007 -0.0800 -0.0032 0.0068 
1987 - -0.0032 0.0048 0.0001 -0.0788 -0.0034 0.0074 
1988 - -0.0027 0.0052 0.0015 -0.0800 -0.0036 0.0073 
1989 - -0.0018 0.0056 0.0012 -0.0811 -0.0034 0.0076 
1990 - -0.0013 0.0061 0.0003 -0.0820 -0.0037 0.0081 
1991 - 0.0005 0.0066 0.0004 -0.0831 -0.0042 0.0079 
1992 - 0.0010 0.0068 0.0001 -0.0837 -0.0044 0.0069 
1993 - 0.0025 0.0070 0.0022 -0.0847 -0.0055 0.0054 
1994 - 0.0049 0.0079 0.0006 -0.0858 -0.0057 0.0061 
1995 - 0.0069 0.0082 0.0013 -0.0870 -0.0062 0.0060 
1996 - 0.0085 0.0088 0.0003 -0.0880 -0.0060 0.0067 
1997 - 0.0089 0.0093 -0.0024 -0.0880 -0.0072 0.0038 
1998 - 0.0114 0.0100 -0.0006 -0.0900 -0.0066 0.0051 
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1999 - 0.0133 0.0105 -0.0005 -0.0915 -0.0068 0.0069 
2000 - 0.0150 0.0114 -0.0024 -0.0926 -0.0067 0.0080 
2001 - 0.0165 0.0115 -0.0024 -0.0929 -0.0073 0.0077 
2002 - 0.0160 0.0122 -0.0017 -0.0947 -0.0073 0.0070 
2003 - 0.0183 0.0131 -0.0021 -0.0956 -0.0078 0.0072 
2004 - 0.0178 0.0132 -0.0010 -0.0966 -0.0090 0.0056 
2005 - 0.0178 0.0143 -0.0022 -0.0970 -0.0087 0.0075 
2006 - 0.0149 0.0153 -0.0038 -0.0970 -0.0086 0.0077 
2007 - 0.0166 0.0155 -0.0037 -0.0982 -0.0083 0.0087 
2008 - 0.0172 0.0157 -0.0031 -0.0989 -0.0094 0.0068 
2009 - 0.0211 0.0167 -0.0026 -0.0965 -0.0100 0.0055 
2010 - 0.0201 0.0183 -0.0023 -0.0995 -0.0090 0.0077 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (see Source for Figure 30) 
Note: SDM stands for sex difference in mortality, Mortality for overall mortality, 
Marriage for the age pattern of marriage, AMA for assortative mating on age, Divorce for 
rates of divorce, AME for assortative mating on education, and Education for the 
education distribution. Mortality and sex difference in mortality are combined for this 
outcome. Each row sums to the difference in the outcome between year  and 1960.
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Appendix Table C3. Decomposition of Change in Probability that a First Marriage Ends 
in Widowhood Between 1960 and Year  
Year SDM Mortality Marriage AMA Divorce AME Education 
1960 - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1961 - - - - - - - 
1962 - 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0116 0.0026 0.0007 
1963 - - - - - - - 
1964 - 0.0042 0.0000 -0.0030 -0.0386 0.0032 0.0008 
1965 - 0.0064 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0429 0.0028 0.0001 
1966 - 0.0079 0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0542 0.0030 -0.0001 
1967 - 0.0085 0.0003 -0.0039 -0.0677 0.0029 -0.0005 
1968 - 0.0100 0.0006 -0.0038 -0.0888 0.0036 -0.0004 
1969 - 0.0104 0.0010 -0.0052 -0.1012 0.0039 -0.0010 
1970 - 0.0094 -0.0001 -0.0046 -0.1095 0.0039 -0.0011 
1971 - 0.0096 -0.0001 -0.0054 -0.1271 0.0042 -0.0013 
1972 - 0.0109 0.0000 -0.0057 -0.1285 0.0047 -0.0018 
1973 - 0.0110 0.0014 -0.0058 -0.1392 0.0045 -0.0023 
1974 - 0.0100 0.0019 -0.0058 -0.1618 0.0052 -0.0019 
1975 - 0.0098 0.0020 -0.0061 -0.1692 0.0057 -0.0023 
1976 - 0.0089 0.0025 -0.0041 -0.1809 0.0055 -0.0023 
1977 - 0.0084 0.0006 -0.0050 -0.1851 0.0057 -0.0028 
1978 - 0.0075 0.0011 -0.0042 -0.2001 0.0061 -0.0020 
1979 - 0.0071 0.0007 -0.0016 -0.2005 0.0063 -0.0019 
1980 - 0.0065 0.0004 -0.0034 -0.1997 0.0059 -0.0028 
1981 - 0.0052 0.0002 -0.0022 -0.1949 0.0066 -0.0028 
1982 - 0.0037 0.0003 -0.0020 -0.1975 0.0069 -0.0023 
1983 - 0.0026 0.0001 -0.0025 -0.1858 0.0067 -0.0037 
1984 - 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0018 -0.1886 0.0068 -0.0052 
1985 - 0.0013 0.0006 -0.0018 -0.1850 0.0066 -0.0053 
1986 - 0.0005 0.0010 -0.0005 -0.1893 0.0062 -0.0069 
1987 - -0.0001 0.0016 0.0001 -0.1865 0.0068 -0.0067 
1988 - -0.0004 0.0018 -0.0017 -0.1881 0.0072 -0.0067 
1989 - -0.0015 0.0019 -0.0012 -0.1896 0.0075 -0.0070 
1990 - -0.0023 0.0021 -0.0002 -0.1914 0.0076 -0.0079 
1991 - -0.0045 0.0023 -0.0004 -0.1936 0.0080 -0.0075 
1992 - -0.0055 0.0032 -0.0001 -0.1950 0.0066 -0.0071 
1993 - -0.0067 0.0039 -0.0026 -0.1964 0.0077 -0.0056 
1994 - -0.0093 0.0036 -0.0004 -0.1971 0.0075 -0.0063 
1995 - -0.0114 0.0041 -0.0013 -0.1986 0.0078 -0.0068 
1996 - -0.0145 0.0043 -0.0003 -0.2004 0.0090 -0.0070 
1997 - -0.0164 0.0046 0.0029 -0.2033 0.0102 -0.0035 
1998 - -0.0195 0.0047 0.0009 -0.2041 0.0096 -0.0048 
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1999 - -0.0216 0.0052 0.0005 -0.2049 0.0100 -0.0069 
2000 - -0.0233 0.0049 0.0031 -0.2056 0.0098 -0.0087 
2001 - -0.0246 0.0060 0.0027 -0.2068 0.0104 -0.0083 
2002 - -0.0243 0.0058 0.0021 -0.2104 0.0122 -0.0075 
2003 - -0.0267 0.0059 0.0023 -0.2114 0.0127 -0.0079 
2004 - -0.0275 0.0067 0.0015 -0.2129 0.0141 -0.0057 
2005 - -0.0270 0.0066 0.0027 -0.2141 0.0139 -0.0084 
2006 - -0.0248 0.0063 0.0046 -0.2158 0.0139 -0.0088 
2007 - -0.0267 0.0073 0.0042 -0.2166 0.0137 -0.0103 
2008 - -0.0279 0.0083 0.0038 -0.2174 0.0144 -0.0082 
2009 - -0.0323 0.0092 0.0031 -0.2103 0.0133 -0.0084 
2010 - -0.0325 0.0096 0.0026 -0.2155 0.0144 -0.0088 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (see Source for Figure 30) 
Note: SDM stands for sex difference in mortality, Mortality for overall mortality, 
Marriage for the age pattern of marriage, AMA for assortative mating on age, Divorce for 
rates of divorce, AME for assortative mating on education, and Education for the 
education distribution. Mortality and sex difference in mortality are combined for this 
outcome. Each row sums to the difference in the outcome between year  and 1960.
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Appendix Table C4. Decomposition of Change in Probability that a First Marriage Ends 
in Divorce Between 1960 and Year  
Year SDM Mortality Marriage AMA Divorce AME Education 
1960 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
1961 - - - - - - - 
1962 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0163 -0.0028 -0.0017 
1963 - - - - - - - 
1964 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0542 -0.0037 -0.0027 
1965 -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0602 -0.0032 -0.0021 
1966 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0758 -0.0031 -0.0021 
1967 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0004 0.0943 -0.0028 -0.0016 
1968 -0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0012 0.0003 0.1235 -0.0035 -0.0023 
1969 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0026 0.0003 0.1408 -0.0037 -0.0019 
1970 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 0.1520 -0.0039 -0.0024 
1971 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0009 0.0003 0.1764 -0.0040 -0.0023 
1972 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.1783 -0.0042 -0.0019 
1973 -0.0016 0.0003 -0.0039 0.0003 0.1932 -0.0038 -0.0014 
1974 -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0051 0.0006 0.2248 -0.0046 -0.0022 
1975 -0.0012 0.0019 -0.0050 0.0005 0.2351 -0.0050 -0.0023 
1976 -0.0008 0.0022 -0.0062 0.0002 0.2506 -0.0045 -0.0021 
1977 -0.0007 0.0023 -0.0016 0.0005 0.2563 -0.0045 -0.0019 
1978 -0.0006 0.0025 -0.0024 0.0004 0.2770 -0.0051 -0.0033 
1979 -0.0007 0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0002 0.2771 -0.0052 -0.0035 
1980 -0.0010 0.0021 -0.0019 0.0002 0.2762 -0.0042 -0.0026 
1981 -0.0009 0.0022 -0.0021 0.0000 0.2698 -0.0046 -0.0032 
1982 -0.0006 0.0025 -0.0021 0.0000 0.2736 -0.0053 -0.0042 
1983 -0.0003 0.0027 -0.0021 0.0000 0.2578 -0.0042 -0.0028 
1984 0.0000 0.0033 -0.0031 0.0001 0.2620 -0.0038 -0.0014 
1985 0.0000 0.0037 -0.0037 0.0002 0.2571 -0.0037 -0.0010 
1986 -0.0001 0.0038 -0.0048 -0.0001 0.2635 -0.0030 0.0002 
1987 -0.0001 0.0036 -0.0065 -0.0002 0.2597 -0.0034 -0.0006 
1988 -0.0003 0.0036 -0.0072 0.0002 0.2625 -0.0036 -0.0005 
1989 -0.0003 0.0038 -0.0077 0.0000 0.2649 -0.0041 -0.0005 
1990 -0.0003 0.0040 -0.0084 -0.0001 0.2675 -0.0039 -0.0001 
1991 0.0002 0.0040 -0.0092 -0.0001 0.2708 -0.0037 -0.0003 
1992 0.0004 0.0043 -0.0103 0.0001 0.2727 -0.0022 0.0003 
1993 0.0005 0.0039 -0.0112 0.0004 0.2750 -0.0022 0.0002 
1994 0.0007 0.0039 -0.0118 -0.0003 0.2767 -0.0018 0.0002 
1995 0.0009 0.0038 -0.0127 0.0000 0.2794 -0.0017 0.0009 
1996 0.0017 0.0045 -0.0134 0.0000 0.2821 -0.0030 0.0004 
1997 0.0027 0.0051 -0.0143 -0.0005 0.2849 -0.0031 -0.0003 
1998 0.0033 0.0052 -0.0151 -0.0002 0.2877 -0.0030 -0.0002 
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1999 0.0036 0.0051 -0.0161 0.0000 0.2898 -0.0031 0.0000 
2000 0.0035 0.0052 -0.0168 -0.0007 0.2916 -0.0031 0.0008 
2001 0.0033 0.0052 -0.0180 -0.0004 0.2931 -0.0031 0.0007 
2002 0.0035 0.0051 -0.0185 -0.0004 0.2983 -0.0048 0.0006 
2003 0.0039 0.0049 -0.0195 -0.0003 0.3001 -0.0049 0.0008 
2004 0.0045 0.0057 -0.0204 -0.0005 0.3026 -0.0050 0.0002 
2005 0.0043 0.0054 -0.0215 -0.0005 0.3040 -0.0051 0.0011 
2006 0.0043 0.0061 -0.0222 -0.0009 0.3056 -0.0052 0.0013 
2007 0.0046 0.0060 -0.0234 -0.0005 0.3076 -0.0054 0.0017 
2008 0.0050 0.0063 -0.0248 -0.0007 0.3090 -0.0049 0.0015 
2009 0.0057 0.0060 -0.0266 -0.0005 0.2998 -0.0032 0.0030 
2010 0.0060 0.0071 -0.0287 -0.0003 0.3077 -0.0053 0.0012 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (see Source for Figure 30) 
Note: SDM stands for sex difference in mortality, Mortality for overall mortality, 
Marriage for the age pattern of marriage, AMA for assortative mating on age, Divorce for 
rates of divorce, AME for assortative mating on education, and Education for the 
education distribution. Each row sums to the difference in the outcome between year  
and 1960.
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Appendix Table C5. Decomposition of Change in the Duration of Widowhood (Years) 
Following First Marriage Between 1960 and Year  
Year SDM Mortality Marriage AMA Divorce AME Education 
1960 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1961 - - - - - - - 
1962 - 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.25 0.05 -0.03 
1963 - - - - - - - 
1964 - 0.27 0.01 -0.12 -1.01 0.06 -0.06 
1965 - 0.35 -0.01 -0.12 -1.14 0.05 -0.09 
1966 - 0.43 -0.02 -0.07 -1.36 0.06 -0.11 
1967 - 0.52 -0.03 -0.14 -1.58 0.06 -0.13 
1968 - 0.57 -0.02 -0.13 -2.05 0.08 -0.14 
1969 - 0.64 -0.07 -0.19 -2.26 0.09 -0.16 
1970 - 0.69 0.03 -0.16 -2.32 0.08 -0.20 
1971 - 0.65 0.03 -0.19 -2.69 0.08 -0.21 
1972 - 0.69 0.00 -0.20 -2.71 0.09 -0.24 
1973 - 0.67 -0.12 -0.21 -2.98 0.10 -0.25 
1974 - 0.62 -0.13 -0.20 -3.53 0.12 -0.25 
1975 - 0.67 -0.12 -0.22 -3.72 0.12 -0.28 
1976 - 0.57 -0.16 -0.13 -3.93 0.12 -0.28 
1977 - 0.61 -0.06 -0.17 -3.98 0.11 -0.33 
1978 - 0.55 -0.07 -0.15 -4.30 0.13 -0.32 
1979 - 0.56 -0.09 -0.03 -4.28 0.13 -0.33 
1980 - 0.47 -0.10 -0.11 -4.13 0.12 -0.37 
1981 - 0.45 -0.13 -0.05 -4.04 0.14 -0.39 
1982 - 0.37 -0.12 -0.05 -4.07 0.14 -0.38 
1983 - 0.26 -0.12 -0.05 -3.85 0.15 -0.43 
1984 - 0.24 -0.13 -0.03 -3.99 0.16 -0.47 
1985 - 0.25 -0.13 -0.05 -3.95 0.14 -0.48 
1986 - 0.30 -0.16 0.01 -4.05 0.13 -0.54 
1987 - 0.30 -0.21 0.04 -3.96 0.15 -0.56 
1988 - 0.30 -0.23 -0.04 -3.99 0.16 -0.57 
1989 - 0.34 -0.24 -0.01 -4.04 0.17 -0.59 
1990 - 0.36 -0.26 0.01 -4.08 0.17 -0.63 
1991 - 0.26 -0.27 0.02 -4.12 0.18 -0.60 
1992 - 0.22 -0.27 0.01 -4.14 0.14 -0.60 
1993 - 0.12 -0.27 -0.09 -4.14 0.17 -0.54 
1994 - 0.07 -0.31 0.00 -4.17 0.17 -0.57 
1995 - -0.01 -0.32 -0.02 -4.18 0.17 -0.59 
1996 - -0.21 -0.33 0.02 -4.19 0.21 -0.57 
1997 - -0.39 -0.33 0.16 -4.24 0.25 -0.44 
1998 - -0.52 -0.35 0.06 -4.22 0.22 -0.48 
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1999 - -0.62 -0.36 0.04 -4.21 0.23 -0.54 
2000 - -0.64 -0.40 0.14 -4.22 0.22 -0.61 
2001 - -0.63 -0.40 0.13 -4.26 0.25 -0.62 
2002 - -0.64 -0.42 0.11 -4.33 0.28 -0.57 
2003 - -0.68 -0.45 0.11 -4.34 0.29 -0.58 
2004 - -0.72 -0.43 0.07 -4.37 0.34 -0.49 
2005 - -0.67 -0.48 0.13 -4.41 0.33 -0.60 
2006 - -0.58 -0.52 0.20 -4.46 0.33 -0.63 
2007 - -0.58 -0.53 0.18 -4.47 0.32 -0.69 
2008 - -0.67 -0.52 0.15 -4.47 0.35 -0.61 
2009 - -0.71 -0.56 0.12 -4.33 0.33 -0.60 
2010 - -0.76 -0.60 0.10 -4.41 0.35 -0.60 
 
Source: Author’s calculations (see Source for Figure 30) 
Note: SDM stands for sex difference in mortality, Mortality for overall mortality, 
Marriage for the age pattern of marriage, AMA for assortative mating on age, Divorce for 
rates of divorce, AME for assortative mating on education, and Education for the 
education distribution. Mortality and sex difference in mortality are combined for this 
outcome. Each row sums to the difference in the outcome between year  and 1960. 
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